Prime Minister Narendra Modi is hosting the virtual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) today, which is likely to see the participation of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. The meeting comes at a crucial time, with India’s ties with neighbours Pakistan and China tense and war raging in Europe.
Ashok Sajjanhar, a former IFS officer who has served as the ambassador of India to Kazakhstan, Sweden and Latvia, spoke to The Indian Express about the event and what can be expected from it.
India is hosting the SCO meeting, which Putin is expected to attend, as the Russia-Ukraine war drags on. What is the significance of the meeting at such a time?
We can look at the significance of the meeting from the point of view of India as well as Russia.
As far as Russia is concerned, I think President Putin will be able to see that the influence and the relevance of Russia has declined because of the war. This was apparent at the last SCO meeting in Samarkand in September 2022 too, and I think 10 months down the line, Putin will be able to see that for the Central Asian countries, Russia’s importance has come down further. This will send the message to him that possibly the war needs to be brought to a close as quickly as possible.
From the point of view of India, we’ve just had a very successful visit by the Prime Minister to the United States. The India-US relationship has been growing for the last 20 plus years, but this was sort of a watershed moment in taking the relationship forward. And the fact that India can have such strong positive relations with the United States, and also be part of the SCO, really speaks about India’s strategic autonomy, and self-assuredness.
At the last SCO meeting in Samarkand, PM Modi had told Putin “this is not the era of war”. What impact would you say the statement has had? What is the way ahead?
That statement sent out a very strong message that although India might not have directly condemned or criticised Russia, it has the capacity to speak its mind to President Putin.
The statement was able to get us over the hump as far as the Bali G20 summit was concerned, because we were able to use this formulation to get the Bali final declaration. Of course, subsequently, China and Russia went back on this, but we were at least able to get all the countries to agree to a final declaration.
It also sent out a very strong message that India is a voice that is listened to not only in the West, but also by Putin. As far as voices from the West are concerned, they were not in a position to reach out to Putin, because there is so much polarisation between Russia and the West. So here, PM Modi’s voice came as a voice of reason which could articulate the sentiments of the rest of the world to Putin.
This time, since this is a virtual meet, there is no scope of a bilateral meeting on the sidelines and so there is very little possibility of the PM making a comment of this nature to Putin.
In terms of the war, Ukraine has just started its counter-offensive, and any forward movement towards negotiations for peace or ceasefire is unlikely before the counter offensive has had its run.
Xi is likely to participate in this meeting, three years after the Galwan clash and months ahead of his visit to India for the G20 summit. Could this meeting have any bearing on either of these two things?
I don’t think there would be any correlation between this meeting and the G20 summit, as the latter is a separate platform that stands on its own merits.
As far as the border standoff is concerned, I feel this meeting is unlikely to have any impact whatsoever, because it’s not as if the two sides have not been in contact with each other. India and China have held regular and multiple rounds of talks, and China has been unwilling to relent as far as de-escalation and disengagement in some key areas is concerned. India’s External Affairs Minister has met his counterpart several times. India’s Raksha Mantri has also met the Chinese Defence Minister many times. Some progress has been made on some issues but the issue of standoff at Depsang and Demchok remain unresolved. I don’t think there is any possibility of this virtual meeting making a breakthrough in that direction.
Pak PM Sharif is likely to participate in the meeting. At the SCO foreign ministers’ meet in Goa, India had taken a hard line on cross-border terrorism. Is the issue likely to feature in a big way again?
Again, there is going to be no bilateral here, since this is not an in-person meeting.
However, fighting terrorism is one of the original mandates of the SCO. The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) is a permanent organ of the SCO. Also, at the foreign ministers’ meeting in May, EAM Jaishankar had said that in addition to the New Delhi declaration, we will have another document on de-radicalisation. So I would imagine that terrorism and cross-border terrorism are going to be a very important part of the declaration.
The Central Asian countries have traditionally been considered Russia’s backyard. But now, China is trying to expand its footprint in the region. How do you see them responding to this battle of influence between Moscow and Beijing?
When Russia said last September that it was going to annex Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine, Kazakhstan had said that it would not support that decision. This is the position of the other Central Asian countries. So I think it is quite clear that Russia’s influence has been declining in this region.
China has tried to take advantage of that, it organized on May 18 and 19 the China plus Central Asia Summit. China is trying to enhance its presence in the region and fill the vacuum created by the reduced sway of Russia. However, while the elites in these countries might not have much of a problem with the growing presence of Beijing, the expanding footprint of China is viewed with great concern and suspicion by the common people in these countries. And, of course, a cognizance of this has to be taken by the respective governments.
What is important to note is that these countries have started looking at options beyond Russia and China. Earlier, Russia was seen as the security provider and China as providing the economic traction and ballast. But now these countries don’t want to have total dependence on one or the other.
In that context, India has great possibilities and opportunities to strengthen its own relations with these five countries of Central Asia. India has taken a number of steps in recent months to further strengthen and expand its partnership with the region.
Other countries too are looking at this opportunity, such as Turkey, Iran which is going to become a member of SCO this year, and the United States and Europe.
Could you elaborate on how the elites may not have a problem with China, but the common man in these countries does?
The elite, the ruling classes, are looking for investments. They are seeing that China will provide infrastructure, pipelines, buildings, transmission lines, etc. But many of China’s projects are not beneficial for host countries, in terms of bringing in jobs or new technology or helping the economy. The common people see that their national assets, their riches, are being taken away by China and they are not getting any tangible, economic benefit. Which is why there have been demonstrations against China in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, etc.
In the SCO meets over the years, what distance has India come in achieving its key goals, and what do you think can be the reasonable expectations from today’s summit?
One of the major reasons SCO is important for us is the outreach it provides us to the Central Asian countries. We have ancient historical, cultural and civilisational links with these countries. They are a part of our extended neighbourhood. Until 1991, when they were a part of the Soviet Union, we had very extensive and intensive engagement and partnership with these Soviet republics. But after 1991, because Pakistan does not permit us to have access to these countries through its territory, our engagement came down significantly.
Our relations with these countries were neglected a few years after their independence in 1991. For instance between 1995 and 2015 there were only four Prime Ministerial visits from India to the region. All this changed after the visit of PM Modi to all the five countries in 2015. He is the only Indian PM to do so. The SCO has given us a platform to engage with these Central Asian Republics. Being a member of the SCO gives us possibilities of interacting with the leadership at different levels in these countries. And that helps to take our relationship forward.
Next is the issue of Afghanistan. Particularly after the US withdrawal in 2021, there are so many terrorist groups operating there. To deal with the whole issue of terrorism and radicalisation, it is necessary for us to stay engaged there, and the SCO allows that.
This time, in addition to the New Delhi Declaration, four separate documents will also be adopted, one on deradicalisation, one on millets, the third is on Mission LiFE (Lifestyle for Environment), and the fourth on digitisation. We have also been able to establish two independent working groups, one on traditional medicine and the other on startups and innovation. So, I think these are all areas where India has strengths, and India can contribute. And this will go to strengthen relations between India and particularly members of the Central Asian countries. And, of course, discussions will take place on improving trade and improving investments in these countries.
Therefore, this summit will definitely go a long way in advancing both India’s interest, and India’s profile and stature in the Region.
Ashok Sajjanhar, a former IFS officer, was the ambassador of India to Kazakhstan, Sweden and Latvia. He is currently the president of Institute of Global Studies in New Delhi. He spoke to Yashee