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Journalism of Courage
Taiwan, an independent nation since 1949, is an island separated from China by the Taiwan Strait. China views it as a renegade province and vows to eventually unify the island with the mainland. Cross-strait tensions have escalated since the election of Taiwan’s current President in 2016 with Beijing taking an increasingly hostile stance towards reunification
China’s actions in Hong Kong, its provoking foreign policy and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have all stoked fears that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is imminent. The possibility of such an action is widely debated, as is its outcome, but the ramifications of the same are well established. An invasion of Taiwan would have regional implications for most of Asia and would fundamentally reshape the global order, both politically and economically.
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Between the 17th century and the end of the Second World War, Taiwan was governed by a rotating cast of actors ranging from the Netherlands, China, and Japan. After the war ended, Taiwan was ruled by China with the consent of its allies, the UK, and the US. However, in its aftermath, a civil war broke out in China, and the then Chinese leader, Chiang Kai-Shek, was exiled from the mainland by Mao Zedong’s Communist army. Chiang and his government subsequently fled to Taiwan in 1949, and dominated the island’s politics for several years, despite accounting for under 20 per cent of its population.
For decades, Chiang and his successors established what was essentially a dictatorship in Taiwan until democracy finally prevailed in 2000, when Taiwan elected Chen Shui-bian as president. Beijing was alarmed by this move as it disrupted years of peaceful relations between the two territories. As early as the 1980s, China put forward a formula for governance known as “one country, two systems” under which Taiwan would be given autonomy if it accepted Chinese reunification. Taiwan rejected that offer but did relax rules on visits and investments from China which ushered in a brief era of peace from 1991 onwards.
However, Chen marked a vast divergence from the status quo. He had openly backed independence, and his election sparked so much fear that in 2004 China passed an anti-secession law, stating that it reserved the right to use non-peaceful means against Taiwan if it attempted to secede from the mainland. In 2016, Taiwan elected Tsai Ing-wen as president, who officially declared her plans to eventually establish independence from China. Despite Chinese President Xi Jinping’s assertion that Taiwan would be reunited with China, Tsai pointed to Beijing’s recent crackdown on Hong Kong as evidence that a “one country, two systems” framework would not work.
This attitude is widely backed by Taiwanese popular sentiment. A generation ago, it could matter greatly whether someone’s grandparents had arrived from the mainland in 1949, but today, an increasing number of people feel more closely tied to Taiwan than to China. A survey from the National Chengchi University found that over 64 per cent of the island’s residents identified as Taiwanese, while only 3 per cent identified as Chinese. Similarly, polling from the Taiwan Center for International Strategic Studies found that more than 77 per cent of Taiwanese say that they are willing to fight for the nation in the event of an invasion from China.
However, this sentiment isn’t shared by the international community. Only 15 states maintain official diplomatic ties with Taiwan and no government maintains formal ties with both Taiwan and China. Taiwan also lacks a seat at the United Nations and has been excluded from a number of international institutions and partnerships at the behest of Beijing. Despite a lack of formal ties, the US has long maintained good relations with Taiwan and has pledged to supply the island with defensive weapons, stressing that any attack by China would provoke “grave concerns” in Washington.
Experts largely disagree about the likelihood and timing of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The top US military commander in the Indo-Pacific warned that an invasion is imminent while others interpret President Xi’s 2017 Party Congress Report as setting a deadline for reunification by 2049. In a report for the Brookings Institute, Senior Fellow Ryan Hass asserts that any talk of a reunification deadline should be interpreted with caution. Ryan argues that there has never been a major protest in China over Taiwan policy which indicates that Xi is not facing any domestic pressure to make any significant advances. He writes that China’s ultimate objective is “not invasion but instead a process between China and Taiwan authorities to negotiate the formal long-term political relationship across the strait.”
However, some argue that the calculus may have changed following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Michael Shuman, a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council, warns that Vladimir Putin’s actions have just made Beijing’s attempts to claim Taiwan by force “more likely.” Stating that America is perceived as a declining power, Shuman argues that autocrats around the world are growing more and more confident in their own ability to usurp the global order without facing consequences from the US and its allies.
Others disagree with that assessment though. A recent United States Institute of Peace (USIP) publication states that Russia and China are two contrasting military powers, noting that while Russia has repeatedly dispatched its armed forces for combat missions overseas, Beijing has largely “refrained from massive interventions, invasions or occupations of other countries since it invaded Vietnam in 1979.” Additionally, it states that Chinese leaders are convinced that Washington has an “ironclad” relationship with Taiwan based on statements made by successive US presidents and the assumption that American policy makers believe they have a commitment to defend the island from a Chinese attack. Alluding to sanctions placed against Russia, it also asserts that Beijing would be wary of facing an economic backlash from the international community at a time when the Chinese economy is experiencing stagnant growth.
Oriana Mastro, a fellow at Stanford University, considers both sides of the argument, but refuses to declare an invasion imminent or otherwise. Mastro states that while China has continued to pay lip service to the prospect of peaceful reunification, its actions may suggest otherwise. She writes that the possibility of war is now conceivable because “Xi is no longer trying to avoid escalation at all costs now that his military is capable of contesting the US military presence in the region.” Essentially, the argument goes that America is no longer the superpower it once was, and despite its potential support, Taiwan would not be able to defend itself against a Chinese military invasion.
So, all of that begs the question—could China realistically invade Taiwan?
According to Mastro, Beijing is preparing for four main campaigns that would be necessary to take control of the island. The first consists of missile and airstrikes to disarm Taiwanese targets, military, government and civilian, thereby forcing Taiwan’s submission. The second involves a blockage operation in which China would attempt to cut off Taiwan from the outside world using naval raids and cyber-attacks. The third is contingent on China attacking US forces and bases stationed in the Pacific, which would make it difficult for Washington to come to Taiwan’s aid. Fourth and lastly, Mastro states that China could launch an amphibious stack against Taiwan, conducting a joint assault on the island directly.
Mastro asserts that the first three campaigns are all within China’s ability given its own sophisticated military infrastructure and America’s failure to maintain its dominance over Asia. However, an all-out assault of Taiwan remains out of reach. Towards this end, she refers to a 2020 US Department of Defense report which states that, “China continues to build capabilities that would contribute to a full-scale invasion,” but “an attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain China’s armed forces and invite international condemnation.”
Summarising the situation, Atlantic Council fellow Harlan Ullman writes, “China could infiltrate the political parties and Taiwanese government and use influence operations to change public support. It could contrive or provoke a crisis to force Taiwan to accept a settlement that could lead to annexation. It could obliterate Taiwan under a rain of missiles. However, unless Taiwan were to declare independence, it is very unlikely that—barring a crisis—China would attempt any direct annexation.”
That’s not to say that China could not control Taiwan in the near future, but that doing so may require unconventional means.
Before getting to Taiwan’s own defences, first, we need to understand how the US could respond to an invasion. America still boasts a stronger military and better-established alliances than China, but Beijing has proximity on its side. Taiwan is only 100 miles off the Chinese coast and with China’s missile capabilities, any naval force attempting to defend the island would come under two or more days of attack before it reaches the combat zone. Additionally, US General John Hyten declared that during a series of war games designed to replicate a potential Chinese invasion, the US military “failed miserably” to prevent the same.
Nevertheless, the possibility of US involvement is still enough to give the powers in Beijing pause for thought. However, there is still the question of whether America would intervene. The US government currently believes that Taiwan’s best chance is contingent on a “porcupine strategy” of asymmetric defence. But Taiwan’s military strength pales in comparison to China’s and therefore asymmetric defence is predicated on the US military showing up. As a result, Michael Hunzeker, a professor at George Mason University, argues that Taiwan has eschewed asymmetrical defence in favour of pursuing high-tech capabilities that prevent Chinese non-conventional warfare. This strategy might deter Chinese cyber-attacks and economic manoeuvrings but would fail to contend with a direct attack.
In an article for Foreign Affairs, Richard Haas and David Sacks argue that in order to incentivise a build-up of Taiwanese military capacities, the US must make a direct commitment to Taiwan’s defence which would subsequently “lower the risk of Chinese miscalculation and war.” This is because, as Hunzeker notes “asking the Taiwanese people to prepare for a long and bloody war of attrition — one that might become a fool’s errand if the United States ultimately decides to stay on the sidelines — is a tall order.”
Ramifications of a Chinese invasion
Firstly, it is important to note that even if China successfully invades Taiwan, it might struggle to occupy it. Keeping that aside, the ramifications of a Chinese invasion would be profound, with its impact being felt on the global economy, regional stability and the shape of the world order.
Starting with the economy, Taiwan is the world’s leading producer of semiconductor chips. These chips are found in most electronics ranging from smartphones, vehicles and weapon systems. Companies in Taiwan were responsible for more than 60 per cent of the revenue generated from semiconductor manufacturers in 2020, and account for nearly 90 per cent of production of small, advanced microchips. According to an analysis for the US Air Force Office of Commercial and Economic Analysis, if China conquered Taiwan, it would control nearly 80 per cent of global semiconductor production (keeping its own domestic capabilities in mind.)
This in turn would place leading companies like Microsoft and Apple, along with military defence contractors, at the mercy of Beijing. President Joe Biden has urged Congress to pass legislation that would increase US semiconductor production but even if his lofty targets are met, according to a study by the Center for New American Security, matching Taiwanese expertise is still years away. Highlighting the problem, the report notes that the United States is already more dependent on Chinese microchips than it was on Middle Eastern oil in the past decades.
China’s dominance would also have massive implications for regional powers like India, Japan and Australia. Asian powers have largely integrated with China economically under the premise of “internal balancing.” The theory states that regional nations can facilitate the rise of China, and benefit from the same, only if that rise is limited by competing nations. If China were to assert its influence across Asia unchecked, its upwards trajectory may skyrocket. This would pose massive security concerns for the likes of Japan, from whom China is attempting to amass territory, and for India, which is threatened by Chinese incursions across its northern border. Other nations that do not face a direct security threat from China would also suffer both from the instability caused by an invasion, and from the loss of economic ties with Taiwan.
Lastly, a Chinese invasion would potentially end the era of US military dominance. For years, Asian nations have depended on a US military presence in the region to deter potential aggression. In addition to potentially losing its own military bases in the Pacific, the US risks losing its place as the global superpower. US Representative Mike Gallagher writes that “if the United States fails to stand with its democratic allies when they are threatened by an authoritarian adversary, then it will seriously undermine its own credibility and influence,” leading to “the end of the United States’ superpower status and the corresponding guarantees of prosperity, freedom, and human rights that have come with it.”
To put it simply, following Russia’s attack on Ukraine, and in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the democratic world order that we know would be at risk of falling into the clutches of authoritarianism.
