Journalism of Courage
Hours after Defence Minister Rajnath Singh told Parliament that “PLA troops tried to transgress the LAC in Yangtse area of Tawang Sector and unilaterally change the status quo”, the PLA claimed that the clash in the early hours of December 9 took place after Chinese troops on regular patrol on their side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the “Dongzhang” area were blocked by Indian soldiers who had “illegally crossed the line”.
A PTI report from Beijing quoted Senior Colonel Long Shaohua, spokesman of the PLA’s Western Theatre Command, as saying, “Our troops’ response is professional, firm and standard, which has helped to stabilise the situation… We ask the Indian side to strictly control and restrain the frontline forces and work with the Chinese side to maintain peace and tranquility.”
The PTI report also quoted Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin as saying that “the current border situation between China and India is generally stable”.
The clash in Tawang took place two and a half years after the deadly encounter between the two sides in the Galwan Valley in Ladakh in June 2020.
Soldiers of the two sides clashed in an area called Yangtse, in the upper reaches of Tawang sector in Arunachal Pradesh. Tawang, indeed nearly all of Arunachal, is claimed by China. It is one of the more serious dispute points between India and China in the overall border question.
Tawang is the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama and an important pilgrimage centre for Tibetan Buddhists. The 14th Dalai Lama took refuge in Tawang after he crossed over from Tibet to India in 1959, spending some days in the monastery there before proceeding further.
Within Tawang, there are three “agreed areas” of differing Indian and Chinese perceptions of the LAC. Yangtse, which is about 25 km from Tawang town, north of the Lungroo grazing ground, is one of these areas. As a result, it has been the site of regular “physical contact” between the Indian Army and the PLA, especially as the high ground is on the Indian side, giving it a commanding view of the Chinese side.
Last October, patrol parties of the PLA and the Indian Army in the area came face to face in Yangtse, leading to a scuffle. No one was hurt. A similar incident was reported in 2016.
The December 9 incident is the most serious encounter between the two sides in recent years in this sector, and the first one resulting in injuries since the Galwan clash, in which 20 soldiers on the Indian side and an unspecified number of Chinese troops lost their lives.
In identical statements to Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha on the incident at Yangtse, Defence Minister Singh said the Indian troops had confronted the PLA, and a “physical scuffle” ensued, which had prevented the Chinese from transgressing into Indian territory and compelled them to return to their posts. It caused injuries on both sides, but no fatalities, he said.
According to Brigadier Rahul Bhonsle (retd), who runs the online security anlayses site Security Risks Asia, the PLA’s motivation for creating a new crisis along the disputed border, this time in the east, “appears to be to extend the points of confrontation and keep the issue of India China border alive at a time when the world is engaged in overcoming multiple crisis emanating from the War in Ukraine”.
After the PLA incursions into eastern Ladakh in April-May 2020, the two sides held 16 rounds of talks for disengagement at the so-called “friction points” — in other words, the areas where the incursions had taken place, and Indian patrolling parties were being prevented from accessing places that they had patrolled earlier.
The disengagement has led to the withdrawal of both sides from eyeballing each other at such places, including Galwan, Pangong Lake, Gogra and Hot Springs, and the creation of “buffer areas” at these places. While this has reduced the chances of hair-trigger situations, the status quo that existed before the incursions has not been restored.
The de-escalation of tensions envisaged under this plan has proved elusive, infrastructure development on the Chinese side has continued apace, including the building of roads and even two bridges over Pangong Tso, giving the PLA easier access to the souther bank of the lake.
The Indian side has tried to keep pace with frenetic roadworks and other construction on its side. As yet, there is no indication that the Chinese want to talk about resolving the Depsang and Demchok “friction points”.
Over the last two years, the deployment of troops in the forward areas of the LAC at Ladakh has become a permanent feature. The Chinese activation in the eastern sector is to be viewed against this backdrop of military tensions, and serves to divide the attention of India’s security planners as it deals with new situations.
More reason for mistrust
Singh told Parliament that the Yangtse situation had been defused — the two sides had disengaged, and the local commanders had held a flag meeting. “The Chinese side was asked to refrain from such actions and maintain peace and tranquility along the border. The issue has also been taken up with the Chinese side through diplomatic channels,” he said.
In Beijing, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang said both sides were maintaining open communication on border-related issues through diplomatic and military channels.
However, the incident is certain to add a fresh layer of mistrust in India’s perception of China’s intentions. The Yangtse incident came days after China said that the joint India-US military exercise Operation Yudhabhyas had violated the terms of the 1993 and 1996 border agreements.
New Delhi believes that the Chinese actions in Ladakh were tantamount to the tearing of painstakingly negotiated border agreements. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar has said that India-China relations cannot be normalised without peace and tranquility on the border.
