The state of Europe’s air defences has emerged as a key issue in the informal European Union (EU) leaders’ summit taking place in Copenhagen on Wednesday (October 1).
On September 10, hours after Russian drones breached Polish airspace, Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, had articulated the idea of a “drone wall” along the EU’s eastern flank. More airspace violations since then have now imbued the idea with unprecedented urgency.
But details of what a drone wall would comprise remain scant, and there is much skepticism, including from within the EU, about the feasibility of the ambitious idea. Here’s why.
Von der Leyen’s plan for a drone wall currently lacks details, particularly regarding its scope and cost, issues that are likely to be major sticking points in any discussions about it. But the need for improved air defences along Europe’s eastern border with Russia is widely appreciated.
In the last two years, Russian aircraft have violated Polish airspace on at least six occasions, including three times since August 20 alone. Russian aircraft have violated Estonian airspace four times this year, most recently on September 19, which The Economist reported as “the most serious” against NATO over the past two decades. Multiple other violations have been reported by Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, Moldova, and Germany.
In September, Denmark and Norway experienced a spate of drone incursions that heightened security concerns ahead of the EU leaders’ summit in Copenhagen. These incidents led to temporary closures of several airports, including a nearly four-hour shutdown of Copenhagen Airport on September 22.
Russia is waging a “hybrid war” against Europe, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said Wednesday. “The war in Ukraine is a Russian attempt to threaten all of us,” he added, urging European leaders to “look at Ukraine from a European perspective instead of your own national perspective.”
A drone would not be a literal wall; instead it would comprise better data sharing practices and the creation of a unified network of anti-drone infrastructure on frontline countries which may include better radar, acoustic sensors, jammers, and even kinetic anti-drone capabilities.
The goal, as per The New York Times, is to “be a joint shield to better detect, track and intercept drones when they enter airspace over the European Union or one of its close allies.”
Efficiency, particularly in cost, will have to be a central feature of a drone wall. The miniaturisation and improved cost-efficiency of drones, and their deployment in massive swarms comprising multiple decoys, has made expensive missile-based air defence systems increasingly inefficient.
As NATO secretary general Mark Rutte said earlier this week, “…we cannot spend millions of euros or dollars on missiles to take out the drones, which are only costing a couple of thousand of dollars.”
A drone wall may thus rely more on electronic warfare: defending against drones by jamming their navigation satellites or communication systems. Kinetic systems that will be in place are likely to be in the form of automated anti-aircraft guns or nets, among other things. There is likely to be a high amount of artificial intelligence-integration, which could help better distinguish real threats from decoys, and improve coordinated deployment of counter-drone measures.
“Militaries must enable drones to coordinate with each other, exchange high-volume data among themselves and with ground control stations, and execute missions in a networked fashion,” international security analyst Dominika Kunertova wrote in her paper ‘The war in Ukraine shows the game-changing effect of drones depends on the game’ (2023).
Russia shares a 2,250 km land border with EU countries, including Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. It shares another 200 km border with Norway, which is not a part of the EU but a member of the European Economic Area. In addition, Belarus, a firm ally of Moscow, shares another 1,200 km long border with EU states.
Creating a comprehensive drone defence system across such a vast border is replete with challenges. Most importantly, it will be expensive, perhaps prohibitively so, politically.
Speaking at the Warsaw Security Forum on Monday, Germany Defence Minister Boris Pistorius argued that the plans to build a drone wall are a misguided use of finite resources. “I very much appreciate the idea…but we should pay attention to manage expectations… We are not talking about a concept that will be realised in the next three or four years,” he said, emphasising on the need to focus on “priorities.” “We need more capabilities and more capacities,” he added.
On Wednesday, France President Emmanuel Macaron too voiced similar concerns. “I’m wary of [those kinds of] terms. Things are a little more sophisticated,” he told reporters.
This has long been the story when it comes to defence cooperation within the EU.
“National budgets are the pillars of EU defence. But ageing populations and low economic growth mean that it will be challenging for many governments to increase or even maintain funding for defence in coming years,” a policy brief by the Centre for European Reform published in January stated.
This has made countries like Germany and France, both under significant economic strain, wary of committing to grand European defence projects. Both have preferred to instead commit resources toward boosting domestic capabilities first.
As things stand, a drone wall is an ambitious, some might say necessary, project. But making it a reality will require creating consensus among European nations on how it will be funded and operationalised. Despite von der Leyen’s tall proclamations, pronounced reluctance from France and Germany are likely to be significant obstacles.