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Journalism of Courage
The reprieve to Imran Khan from the Supreme Court — which on Thursday called his arrest “illegal” — and from the Islamabad High Court, which on Friday gave him blanket bail in all cases for two weeks, is not the end of Pakistan’s internal chaos. If anything, it sets the stage for a new round in this 20-month conflict that began with the former Prime Minister eyeballing the Army over the appointment of a new ISI chief — Imran wanted to retain the old one, but he blinked first.
All this time, Pakistan’s legendary cricket captain has been careful not to frame his battle as being against the Army, but as one against individual officers he holds responsible for his ouster from office last year. He has blamed the former Army chief Qamar Javed Bajwa (along with the Biden Administration and opposition parties); he alleges that an ISI officer was the mastermind behind the assassination attempt on him last year; and he views the current chief, General Asim Munir, as a continuation of the Bajwa conspiracy to prevent him from returning as Prime Minister.
As Prime Minister, Imran persuaded Bajwa, who was on his side then, to remove Munir as ISI chief — and he tried to prevent Munir’s appointment as chief, even offering an extension to Bajwa at the time.
The circumstances under which Munir was made chief did not dispel the impression that he was chosen because he was anti-Imran. Munir’s tenure as Lieutenant General was to end on November 25, 2022, two days before Bajwa’s retirement. The government amended the rules to retain him in service.
This aspect of his appointment may gain importance in the coming days as Imran and Munir get ready to face off again, this time with the Army chief evidently on the defensive.
With the Pakistan Army now visibly divided even at the level of corps commanders, what steps Munir takes in the two weeks before Imran’s next court appearance may be crucial to his continuance in office.
There is speculation of a purge against all pro-Imran elements in the Army. The Lahore corps commander who stood by as his official residence was vandalised is reported to have been shunted out. There is also talk of a coup against Munir, with one corps commander waiting in the wings to take over. Some in Pakistan view Munir’s extended tour to Oman and Qatar — he is still abroad — as a sign of his confidence that he will wing it; others see it as a time-buying tactic as he weakens.
Among the anti-Imran sections of the establishment, there is concern that any acknowledgment of weakness by the Army chief at this moment will weaken the institutional power and interests of the Army forever, setting a precedent for street power to dictate terms to it.
The first sign of a shadow war came from an Islamabad-based Twitter handle called The Khorasan Diary that tracks the activities of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. It flagged a purported statement of support to Imran from the Jamaat-ul Ahrar, a breakaway faction of the TTP. Both the TTP and JuA are designated global terrorist groups; the JuA is also said to be linked to the Islamic State-Khorasan.
How Imran responds to this purported statement of solidarity from a terrorist group remains to be seen. While in office, he was unpopular for doing deals with the TTP. Having won Friday’s round in court, he would be careful to ensure that the streets remain calm.
Imran is also certain to call for immediate elections once more. The Supreme Court had ordered the government to hold elections to the provincial assemblies of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on May 14, but there is no sign that they will take place on Sunday. If the court pulls up the Election Commission or the government for contempt, Imran will get another political opening.
Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s gamble of putting off all elections until such time as Imran is disqualified from holding office, and his dependence on the Army to ensure this, may have run its course.
The civilians, led by Imran, seem to have triumphed in this round, and the Army appears weak. But this hardly heralds a moment that will deliver Pakistan from the domination of the military.
For one, Imran is hardly a champion of democracy. A creation of the establishment, he took office in 2018 with the help of the military. He was openly contemptuous of Parliament, and rarely attended it. What Imran wants is a return to the hybrid arrangement with a new Army chief, in which the PTI and the establishment are once again on the same page, so that he can continue in office assured that the opposition will not be able to oust him again.
A true rebalancing of the civilian-military relationship in Pakistan will require more fundamental changes — for instance, in how the political class views ties with India. The eruption of anger against the Army and its symbols following Imran’s arrest is not a fundamental breakdown in the relationship between the people and the Army — only the people’s anger against an Army chief.
Pakistan has been here earlier — when Pervez Musharraf sacked the Chief Justice, judges and lawyers revolted — but as soon as a new chief took over, the relationship was more than restored. The 2008 Mumbai attacks, in which the Pakistani political class and the military joined hands to project their country as the victim and India as the aggressor, healed the fracture completely.
So long as India remains the “humsaya dushman mulk”, and Kashmir remains the “jugular vein” of Pakistan, the Army will remain dominant.
