Expert Explains | Changing pattern of Chinese mobilisation: National Defence Mobilisation Offices and Reserve Personnel Law

What are China’s NDMOs, and why were they formed?

From December 2022 onward, China started establishing NDMOs in Beijing, Shanghai, Shandong, Fujian, Wuhan, Hunan, Sichuan, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Hubei, Xinjiang, and some other cities and smaller villages. Local press releases and reports have highlighted that China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) manages these offices.

The stated functions of these offices are economic mobilisation, civil air defence mobilisation, traffic readiness during mobilisation, equipment mobilisation, technology mobilisation and planning, and organising and implementation of mobilisation processes at the local level.

However, an additional function, besides mobilisation, appears to be the recruitment of militia and reserve force personnel at the local level.

Over the past year, multiple reports in the Chinese press have indicated that the Communist Party is alarmed by the success of the Ukrainian mobilisation of its troops, and the Russian failures. The formation of these offices is a direct result of the lessons learnt from the ongoing war in Ukraine, as the Chinese Communist Party worries about its mobilisation capabilities in the event of a contingency on its borders.

How are these offices structured, and what is their mandate?

An article in the PLA Daily, the mouthpiece of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC), published on January 31 this year, demanded a new pattern of national defence mobilisation, which should include a joint effort between military and civilian agencies. Previously, the 1982 PRC constitution and the 1997 National Defence Law stated that the Chinese State Council and the CMC are charged with undertaking mobilisation preparations and implementation.

China’s National Defence Mobilisation Commission (NDMC), under the Chinese State Council and CMC, is the unified structure responsible for coordinating decisions concerning military affairs, strategic plans, and defence mobilisation among relevant state and military agencies, departments, and structures. Earlier, under the supervision of NDMC, military region-level defence mobilisation committees (MRDMCs) (now theatre command level) were responsible for organising and coordinating national defence mobilisation work within their respective military regions (now theatre commands).

However, with the recent changes, it looks like the MRDMCs’ role has been curtailed, and the NDMOs have been empowered with local-level mobilisation and mobilisation-related recruitment. This would mean that China is attempting in part to decentralise its mobilisation power to the local level. The centre will still have complete command over the mobilisation decision, but local governments would be responsible for mobilising militias and reserve forces.

Along with the mobilisation, these offices will also recruit and manage the militia and reserve forces at the local level. Simply put, the theatre commands (earlier military regions) had mobilisation responsibilities; now, some part of it is with the local governments. The theatre commands, however, will still have a major say during wartime.

What is the new Reserve Personnel Law?

From March 1, 2023, China began implementing the new Reserve Personnel Law. This law was passed at the National People’s Congress (NPC) on December 30 last year. This reform had been under consideration since 2019; like the NDMCs, it too was fast-tracked based on the learnings on mobilisation from the Russia-Ukraine War.

China’s reserve service personnel include reserve units affiliated with the PLA, personnel registered for reserve services, technical personnel, qualified veterans, local cadres, and people’s armed police and militia cadres. They are responsible for combat-readiness and non-combat military operations during an escalation. Also, during an escalation, the reserve personnel can be directly transferred to active duty troops, and play a pivotal role in maintaining logistics and supply lines.

In the past, the reserve forces were under the dual leadership of military organs and local Party committees. Since July 2020, they have been put under the PLA. The latest reform establishes a legal and regulatory system for reserve personnel, and seeks to improve the attractiveness of reserve duty by guaranteeing more benefits for the reservists. This law addresses reservists’ military ranks, training, promotion, management, mobilisation, personnel benefits, and retirement.

Put simply, China is attempting to expand the reservist force by recruiting more personnel. Taiwanese security scholars researching the Chinese armed forces estimate that the size of the reserve personnel will be around 7.3 million by 2027.

How are NDMO and Reserve Personnel Law connected? What do these two changes suggest?

These appear to be separate reforms, but both are related to Chinese military and civilian mobilisation during a possible escalation on its borders. The PRC views mobilisation as an essential means of allowing maximum peacetime development of locally available resources, which can be exploited during a conflict or escalation.

Since NDMCs would be recruiting militia and reserve personnel at the local level, and the related theatre command would be training them, this would result in more region-specific and contingency-specific Chinese militia and reserve personnel.

Since they are trained under the theatre commands, the recruits will also compensate for the shortage of military personnel in their respective regional contingencies.

Furthermore, local recruitment reduces regional and centralised hurdles like familiarisation with the region — especially in high-altitude areas like Tibet — and lack of acquaintance with local authorities, which slows down the process. Thus, these changes enable civilian enterprises and assets to transform into military capabilities faster at the local level during an escalation.

Finally, during the initial stages of a conflict or an escalation, camouflaging mobilisation is relatively more simple at the local level than mobilising personnel from different parts of China.

Expanding the reservist force, making them a more attractive force, and training them with the PLA to keep them combat-ready increases the strength of active duty personnel available to the armed forces during a contingency. This is not only important for the mobilisation of forces, but is crucial for managing supply lines during an escalation or a conflict.

Also, as reservists are training with the PLA, they would be possibly and gradually adjusted from the current reserve divisions, brigades, and regiments to the PLA’s combined armed brigades and divisions. (Xinjiang military district still retains combined armed divisions.) Their training with the PLA would also make them capable of using equipment and developing skills, which would help integration within the services a relatively smoother process.

Thus, through NDMO and the Reserve Personnel Law, China is increasing the size of reservists, militia, and personnel at the local level for mobilisation of forces, maintaining supply lines, and performing supporting roles to the PLA during a possible escalation on its borders.

What questions does it raise about the Chinese armed forces and reforms?

Certain questions remain unanswered. First, the NDMOs under NDRC neither have the experience nor enough resources to recruit cadres for mobilisation. Also, would it mean that the CMC has relatively less faith in theatre commands and military districts to perform such duties?

Second, the expansion of the reserve personnel cadre and the adjustment of certain sections within the armed forces appears to run contrary to China’s ongoing military reforms, which aim to convert the PLA into a lean and technologically advanced force.

Third, it raises questions over the credibility of the recently formed PLA Joint Logistics Support Force, as one of the reservist force’s major mandates is helping with logistics and maintaining supply lines.

Finally, it remains to be seen how the patterns of distribution of spending on the Chinese armed forces change. Like most aspects of PLA spending, there is an ambiguity over how China funds its reserve personnel forces — from its defence budget or elsewhere.

(Suyash Desai is a research scholar based in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, researching on China’s defence and foreign policies and the PLA.)