Blinkit, Zepto, Swiggy: A brief history of quick commerce, its rise, impact, and possible future in India

How do q-commerce platforms such as Blinkit, Zepto, Swiggy Instamart, and the recently-launched Amazon Now work, and what is their business model?

What is q-commerce, and how does the company ensure that goods ordered on its platform reach customers quickly?

Quick commerce (q-commerce) refers to the rapid delivery of goods ordered online, usually between 10 minutes and 30 minutes.

For q-commerce to work effectively, firms must invest in opening and efficiently stocking so-called “dark stores”, which are stocked like standard retail stores but are used only as storage and are not open to the public. Dark stores are critical working infrastructure that make expedited fulfillment feasible in the area of operation of the q-commerce firm.

Next, the firms must implement effective order management systems, and for the relevant information to be processed properly and directed to the closest dark store.

At the store, the order details are automated using a dispatch software that swiftly redirects them to the warehouse staff and delivery personnel. Then, orders are delivered using transport vehicles (primarily two-wheelers such as motorcycles or electric e-scooters) to the customer’s address using the most time-efficient routes.

When and how did q-commerce start in India and grow to its current stage?

In 2013, grocery-delivery app Grofers was founded in Gurgaon by entrepreneurs Albinder Dhindsa and Saurabh Kumar. Soon afterward, Grofers announced 90-minute deliveries, rapidly connecting kirana stores to consumers. Towards the end of 2015, Grofers was getting almost 30,000 orders per day, and the company had received $120 million in funding from investors such as Softbank and Yuri Milner.

In 2016, as competition emerged from other online grocers such as Dunzo, and having experienced a period of relative drought in sales, Grofers decided to adopt an inventory-led model. The company ended 2017 with an annual revenue run-rate of approximately Rs 1,000 crore, with sales having tripled from February to November of that year.

In FY 2019, Grofers’ revenue had skyrocketed to Rs 2,500 crore. Then, during the COVID-19 pandemic, an even quicker model for q-commerce emerged: under-30-minute deliveries. By the end of 2021, Grofers had changed its name to Blinkit and was fulfilling over 125,000 orders daily.

Over the next couple of years, the Indian q-commerce business grew rapidly. In 2024, the q-commerce industry boasted a market size of approximately $6.1 billion, thanks in part to changes in consumer preferences and behaviour brought about by the pandemic, and the entry of other players such as Zepto, Swiggy Instamart, and Flipkart Minutes.

How has q-commerce changed the grocery-shopping space in India?

More than 20 million people are currently estimated to be placing orders on q-commerce portals annually in India. Blinkit is the largest player, accounting for more than 40% of the q-commerce market share.

On its website, Eternal says Blinkit is present in 100+ cities, and more than 16 million customers use the app every month. The three largest q-commerce companies in India — Blinkit, Zepto, and Swiggy Instamart — together receive approximately 4.3 million orders every day.

The industry has been disruptive, most notably in decreasing the dependence of customers on the estimated 13 million kirana stores across the country.

According to a survey by Datum Intelligence, q-commerce has reduced consumers’ spending on kirana stores by around $1.28 billion, with 46% of respondents expressing a partial or major shift in expenditure.

Approximately 200,000 kirana stores have been forced to shut down due to pressure on their businesses from q-commerce, according to the trade body All India Consumer Products Distributors Federation (AICPDF).

In towns and cities across India, these local stores with their smaller budgets and tight margins find it difficult to compete with well-funded q-commerce companies that offer rapid home deliveries at competitive prices and over long hours of the day. The shrinking of traditional kirana stores and the disappearance of jobs in that sector present a difficult policy challenge.

And are the quick commerce companies themselves doing well?

Despite the boom, no major q-commerce player has truly reached profitability – even though most remain optimistic of being able to do so in the near future.

The challenges to the model arise due to a few reasons: q-commerce companies have high operational costs that consist of maintaining and managing a large number of dark stores, thousands of delivery personnel and staff, and large-scale, functional software. These costs have continued to increase as q-commerce companies have rapidly expanded their footprint.

A large number of customers buy only a few items at a time – usually essentials such as milk and bread, chips, cold drinks, instant noodles, party supplies, etc. – and low average order values (AOVs), ranging from Rs 500-600, make profiting from most deliveries a challenge.

There is also fierce competition in the market among a handful of q-commerce companies that are constantly trying to one-up one another, which makes it difficult for them to make decisions based solely on profits.

Concerns have been raised over the safety and security of the gig workers who often work without adequate legal protection and social security, and face risks of accidents and injury trying to deliver orders within short times.

In the end, despite the popularity of q-commerce and the great convenience that it offers to customers, it faces a range of stresses and challenges, and the profitability and sustainability of this model over the longer term remains an open question.

The writer is a student and a summer intern at The Indian Express