Military Digest | 60 years of Operation Kabaddi and the India-Pak clash in Kutch

Pakistani build-up in Kanjarkot

It appears that the Pakistan Army had started building up forces in the Kanjarkot area from about the third week of January 1965.

On February 10, this build-up was reported by routine Indian police patrols in the area. The commanders of the border police of India and Pakistan met on February 15 to resolve the issue of Kanjarkot. In fact, the Pakistanis had established a vehicle track running from Surai to Ding (32 km) that ran through the Indian area, south of Kanjarkot. Thereafter, the Indian police increased night patrols, and in reply, the Pakistanis put up a standing patrol there.

Pakistan had stationed one company of Rangers at Kanjarkot, 400 Indus Rangers at Rahim-Ki-Bazar, and one wing of Indus Rangers along the border. Two battalions of the Indus Rangers were kept in reserve at Hyderabad (Sind and Chhor).

As of February 18, the Indus Rangers were deployed in the Kanjarkot area as follows:

a) Kanjarkot: One platoon during the day and a listening post at night.

b) Area Sand Dune Hill, north of Kanjarkot: Three platoons supported by 3-inch mortars and MMGs.

Against this, the Indian side had five companies of state reserve police—two at Vigokot, one at Karim Shahi and two at Chhad Beg.

Operation Kabaddi

On February 21, Maj Gen PC Gupta, general officer commanding, Maharashtra and Gujarat Area, issued his operational instruction to the commander of the 31 Infantry Brigade Group, Brig M M S Pahalajani, to capture Kanjarkot. The brigade headquarters was in Ahmedabad.

He was authorised to cross the international border for the completion of the task. The support elements of the brigade, including artillery, engineers, signals and medical troops, reached Bhuj on February 27. The three battalions of the brigade—1 Mahar, 2 Sikh LI and 17 Raj Rif—were located in Ahmedabad, Bhuj and Jamnagar, respectively. Its affiliated artillery regiment was the 11 Field Regiment, located at Dhrangadhra.

A parachute battalion was also placed on 24 hours’ notice for movement to the area.

Pakistan retaliated by ordering its 8 Infantry Division under Maj Gen Tikka Khan to assume operational command of the Indus Rangers and to take measures for effective retaliation.

The general officer commanding of 8 Division, in turn, alerted the 51 Brigade Group to move forward if necessary. The latter moved 8 Frontier Force to Khadan on March 6, reinforced the posts at Rahim-Ki-Bazar and Kanjarkot to company strength, and deployed mortars and machine guns around Kanjarkot.

Maj Gen Tikka Khan visited the headquarters of 51 Brigade on March 9 and ordered the commander, Brig M Azhar, to move midway between Dingi and Kanjarkot. A battalion of this brigade, 6 Baluch, stationed at Karachi, was asked to move to Hyderabad and act as brigade reserve.

Sardar Post set up on March 13

On March 13, the CRPF established Sardar Post, roughly 4.5 km south of Kanjarkot. It was named after the company commander, Maj Karnail Singh. This post was in a featureless area with shrubs and bushes all over, but it effectively blocked the point of ingress by Pakistanis. Some outposts were also established ahead of the company post to act as screening points during enemy attacks and delay the advance. The Army later distanced itself from the siting of the post, claiming it was not its choice. That seems hard to believe since the operational area was under the Army’s effective command, and in fact, 1 Mahar provided one officer, four junior commissioned officers and 15 other-rank officers to help set up the CRPF defences around Sardar Post.

The commanding officer of 1 Mahar, Lt Col K Sundarji, who later rose to become the chief of Army staff, went around the area wearing a Gujarat Police uniform and recommended the immediate capture of Kanjarkot. He was officiating as the brigade commander at the time. However, nothing happened in this regard.

The establishment of Sardar Post led the Pakistanis to establish a post northeast of Sardar Post and the Indians established another post north of Sardar Post in retaliation.

Exercise Arrowhead at Mandvi

Meanwhile, on March 26-28, Exercise Arrowhead was jointly organised by the Indian Army and the Indian Navy at Mandvi Port on the Gulf of Kutch to familiarise the Indian infantry with naval aircraft flown from the INS Vikrant. This reportedly alarmed the Pakistanis.

By now, the Pakistanis had deduced that the Indians wanted to capture Kanjarkot, but the dilly-dallying on the part of Indian forces gave them enough time to plan their own offensive to catch India unaware. This was executed through Op Desert Hawk 1 in early April 1965. More about this will be covered in subsequent columns.