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Journalism of Courage
Pakistan’s status as a key US ally in the war against terrorism has not protected it from allegations of secretly supplying North Korea with uranium enrichment equipment and technical expertise in exchange for ballistic missile technology.
General Pervez Musharraf described the charge as ‘‘absolutely baseless’’. US Secretary of State Colin Powell, and National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice said they believed Musharraf though they refused to say in absolute terms that there had never been Pakistani-North Korean cooperation.
Most Pakistanis are outraged over the charges their country periodically faces, ranging from allegations of covert support of terrorists to accusations about Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programme. Their reaction is understandable, as is the reason why Pakistan is vulnerable to such allegations.
Pakistan is far more dependent on western assistance and support and its political system is far from open. The country is governed in a secretive manner, with its intelligence services and military running the show in spheres of international concern.
Even when civilians are in charge, security policy remains largely in the hands of the military establishment. It is inconceivable, for example, for a civilian government in Pakistan to redefine relations with India or review policies relating to nuclear and missile programmes.
The US takes a benign view of the Pakistani military’s covert operations when Pakistan’s strategic cooperation is important to the US, as was the case during the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance and the current war against Al-Qaeda. But nuclear and missile proliferation and relations with India become sticking points in the US-Pakistan relationship when Islamabad’s strategic cooperation becomes less significant.
The charges about Pakistan exchanging nuclear know-how for ballistic missiles with North Korea have come at a time when the US considers Pakistani support crucial for its anti-terrorism operations.
This explains the lukewarm official response to the allegations in Washington. Once the indispensability of Pakistan wanes, these very accusations could become the basis for sanctions against a less compliant Pakistan.
The real charge against Pakistan is not acquiring nuclear or missile technology, or for that matter transferring it to third parties because Pakistan, as a non-signatory to the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) is not bound by treaty restrictions.
Pakistan comes under fire mainly for breaking commitments to the US government made in return for aid and military cooperation. India, which is also a non-NPT signatory, avoids coming under fire because it is not bound by specific promises to American officials.
Pakistan’s choice is to either stop being dependent on US assistance if it wants to pursue the regional and proliferation options it seeks or to give up those options and keep its promises to the aid donors. The cycle of seeking economic assistance while covertly breaking commitments made to get the money only brings periodic allegations and humiliation.
One way to break this cycle would be for Pakistan to become an open democracy, with a constitutionally defined power structure. Then it would be easy to pin responsibility for actions such as training militants or buying and selling technology for weapons of mass destruction. Key decisions pertaining to national security would then be backed by popular will and decisions that compromise Pakistan’s relations with key countries would not be made.
It is ironic that allegations of the North Korean connection have surfaced so soon after Pakistan’s October 10 election, which set the stage, once again, for a dichotomy of power in Pakistan. Musharraf and the all-powerful military will wield effective power while an ineffective parliament and a weak Prime Minister will be available to share blame though not the power to make critical decisions of war and peace.
The Pakistani military undermined the mainstream political parties ahead of the latest elections to avoid having experienced civilian leaders contending for power. This has left the Islamists holding the balance of power in parliament. Musharraf could try to gain advantage in Washington by using the success of the Islamists at the polls to ring alarm bells. He might try to bargain harder over the terms of Pakistani cooperation against Al Qaeda and could blame increased anti-India militancy on the now powerful Islamists.
Instead of allowing such games to be played, the US should question Musharraf’s domestic policies. The moral imperative for supporting democracy in Pakistan is important. But equally important is the need to diminish the military’s influence as a means of ensuring a more transparent Pakistani foreign policy.
Write to Husain Haqqani at hhaqqaniexpressindia.com
