Kicking daughter-in-law cruelty: SC

On Tuesday, the apex court finally held that allegations of a woman kicking her daughter-in-law or threatening her with divorce would come within the meaning of “cruelty” under Section 498A of the IPC. Section 498A defines cruelty against a woman and makes the offence punishable with a three-year maximum jail term besides fine.

A Bench of Chief Justice of India P Sathasivam and Justices Ranjan Gogoi and S K Singh said, “Any conduct which is likely to cause injury or danger to life, limb or health (mental or physical) would come within the meaning of the expression ‘cruelty’.”

The court noted it was not inevitable for a woman to connect all her accusations of “cruelty” with demands of dowry to bring the alleged offence within the ambit of Section 498A and that not just physical but mental torture will also have to be accounted for whenever such a complaint is made.

“Having given our anxious consideration to the averments made in the complaint petition, we are of the view that the statements made in the relevant paragraphs of the complaint can be understood as containing allegations of mental cruelty to the complainant. The complaint, therefore, cannot be rejected at the threshold,” held the Bench.

The court then lifted the stay on the trial pending before a Delhi magisterial court against the mother-in-law and other -in-laws of the complainant woman and dismissed the appeals, contending the alleged acts did not amount to cruelty since no dowry was demanded.

“In view of the time that has elapsed, we direct that the trial be completed expeditiously and in any case within a period of one year from the date of receipt of a copy of this order by the learned trial court,” directed the court.

The 2009 judgment had quashed dowry harassment charges under Section 498A instituted against Bhaskar Lal Sharma and his wife by their daughter-in-law Monica, who accused them of physically assaulting her and threatening her with divorce.

However, in March 2013, while allowing a curative petition filed by the National Commission for Women, the court had set aside its two-judge verdict. It held that in view of the clarifications sought by the NCW, the 2009 ruling required a re-consideration because of its contentious findings.