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The Supreme Court’s advisory opinion to the Presidential Reference on Thursday (November 20) is its latest pronouncement on the limits of gubernatorial power and discretion in India.
In a balancing act, the court ruled out “deemed assent” and said that the judiciary cannot place timelines on the Governor to act on bills, but said that prolonged and unexplained delay can be examined, even if the content of the Governor’s decision was beyond judicial review.
The powers of the Governor and the President over bills flow from Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution, respectively. Article 200 allows the Governor to “assent”, “withhold assent”, “return the Bill” or “reserve” it for the President, and requires reservation if, “in the opinion of the Governor”, the bill affects High Court powers. Article 201 sets the President’s options when a Bill is reserved.
Over the years, Courts have held that Article 163 binds the Governor to advice except in cases the Constitution itself “carves out” discretion — Article 200 is one such space. The contours of gubernatorial discretion have thus steadily consolidated the principle that the Governor is not a parallel political actor, and has only a few narrow zones to exercise discretion.
What emerges is a long arc — reduced unilateral action, confining discretion to specific issues, reaffirming that the governor is the constitutional head. The cases below show how that arc came to be.
The first case that touched on Articles 200 and 201 set the procedural framework for the Governor’s role. In Kameshwar Singh (1952), the court was hearing challenges to the Bihar Lannd Reforms Act, which abolished the zamindari system and transferred estates to the state. Under Article 31(3), laws of this kind had to be reserved for the President’s assent. The question that the court had to decide was whether the Governor had to first give assent before sending the bill to the President.
The court described the three possible outcomes when a bill is presented to the Governor: assent, withholding assent, or reservation for the President. The court also noted that if the Governor withholds assent, the bill comes to an end unless the legislature uses the route provided in the proviso. The case established the basic map of Articles 200 and 201 at a time when the constitutional process was still taking shape.
A shift came in Shamsher Singh (1974). The case involved two probationary judges whose services were ended through orders issued “in the name of the Governor”. Relying on an earlier order of the SC in which termination orders were held to be on the “satisfaction” of the President or Governor, the appellants in Shamsher Singh argued that their termination required the Governor’s personal satisfaction. They contended that the order was not placed before the Governor, and since the Governor’s personal, non-delegated satisfaction was required, the order issued in his name was legally deficient and therefore void. The SC rejected that idea. It held that the Governor acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in all matters unless the Constitution says otherwise.
The SC read “satisfaction” in the constitutional sense, tied to Cabinet responsibility. An order issued in the Governor’s name is the action of the State, backed by the elected government. No function is presumed to require a personal decision unless the Constitution states it. This keeps the chain of accountability clear and prevents the Governor from acting as a second executive centre.
The SC recognised only a few pockets of discretion. Some are express like reporting under Article 356, reserving Bills that affect High Court powers under Article 200, and the “special responsibility” clauses in a few States. Others are implied, usually when the Council of Ministers cannot give neutral advice or when the Constitution is silent on a situation that needs resolution. These include identifying a Chief Minister when there is no clear majority, dismissing a Ministry that has lost support, seeking a floor test when the government refuses one, or assessing whether a Bill must go to the President because it touches other constitutional provisions.
By the early 2000s, this position had settled. When Nabam Rebia was decided, unilateral action by a Governor was viewed with caution.
Nabam Rebia (2016) is the restatement of these limits. The Arunachal Pradesh crisis, where a large group of Congress MLAs broke ranks in 2015, triggered attempts to unseat both the Speaker and the sitting Chief Ministers. Acting without advice, the Governor advanced the Assembly session and issued a message dictating the legislative agenda, including a motion to remove the Speaker. All of this played out while disqualification petitions were pending. The Speaker responded by disqualifying 14 dissidents, but the Deputy Speaker reversed this decision. A parallel session then removed the Speaker. The SC treated these actions as a constitutional red flag.
It held that discretionary powers must be strictly read. The Governor can summon, prorogue, or dissolve the House only on ministerial advice. The SC reaffirmed that the Governor has no independent authority to summon the Assembly, except in the narrow case where the government has lost its majority and refuses to take a floor test.
Under Article 175, the Governor can address or send messages to the legislature. The court held that this must follow ministerial advice. The Governor cannot shape the business of the House or “act as the Ombudsman of the State Legislature”.
On disqualification under the Tenth Schedule, the Court held that the Governor has no role. The power lies entirely with the Speaker or the tribunal to whom the Speaker’s authority is transferred. Any reliance on disqualification proceedings is “clearly beyond his constitutional authority”.
The question of timelines entered the debate due to Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020). That case concerned delays by the Speaker in deciding disqualification petitions. The SC fixed an outer limit of three months and held that failure to act could be reviewed.
During the hearing leading to the April 2025 order, Tamil Nadu argued that the same logic should apply to Article 200 and that Governors should face similar limits. The SC agreed: a Bench of Justices J B Pardiwala and R Mahadevan set aside Tamil Nadu Governor R N Ravi’s decision to withhold assent to 10 pending Bills, terming it illegal and erroneous in law, and put a timeline within which the Governor had to act.
Now, in its opinion in the Presidential Reference, the SC rejected this analogy. It held that Keisham dealt with the Speaker acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, which is a different function. Article 200 involves a gubernatorial role that includes discretion. The SC said that setting deadlines for the Governor, or creating “deemed assent”, would amount to rewriting the Constitution. Long delays can still be questioned, but courts cannot control the timing or replace constitutional options with judicial innovations.
