Explained Interview : ‘Trump sees China as economic rival, not in geopolitical sense…in this vision, India no longer enjoys priority’

For President Trump, it is somewhat different. He thinks of great power competition with China, but not in the traditional geopolitical sense. He sees it as economic competition. And more than that, he thinks of the entire world as economic rivals of the United States. In this vision, India no longer enjoys the priority it once had — it has become a “problem” along with many others.

So what we’ve seen in recent months — these violent oscillations — stem from that shift. Added to it are Trump’s personality traits, often described as temperamental and mercurial. Those create complications, but they are not the root of the problem. The root lies in this fundamental change in U.S. attitudes toward the world, and by implication, toward India.

Where’s the H-1B program going?

A: Remember, for close to 200 years, the United States believed it was a country welcoming of immigrants. In practice, that was not always true — there were strong nativist moments. We are now in another such moment.

Two streams come together in the H-1B debate for Trump, which account for his angst. First, the cultural stream: many in his party are uncomfortable with foreigners, especially from the global South, becoming part of the America of the future. Second, the economic stream: people believe the H-1B program undercuts wages for jobs that native Americans would otherwise enjoy.

Taken together, this means the H-1B program as India once knew it is no more. Trump may make modifications depending on the politics of the moment, but the view that the U.S. would freely import skilled labour through H-1B visas is on the cusp of fundamental change.

The US will increasingly meet its labour needs through outsourcing. It will continue to rely on Indian labour — but Indian workers based in India, producing goods and services for the American market…working in their own country through global capability centres or some other mechanism. I think that’s essentially the direction we are going in.

You talked about a fundamental change in the way Trump sees India. Is it about his personality, or does it reflect a deeper shift?

A: It would be a mistake to see it purely as Trump’s temperament. That matters — U.S. presidents have disproportionate influence over foreign policy, and whatever President Trump does will have effects. But there is a structural factor that we spoke about earlier in this conversation: if the US does not see China as its principal challenge, then India automatically loses relevance.

Trump has given no indication that he views China as a geopolitical rival of such importance that he needs allies like India or Japan. In fact, he has treated Japan with contempt, even though it is traditionally America’s most important partner in Asia. So India and Japan — once seen as bookends of U.S. strategy toward China — have both fallen off the pedestal. Add Trump’s mercurial, colourful personality and his violent oscillations in temperament, and then the outcome that you have described — the sudden view of India in adversarial terms — should not be surprising.

India’s initial response to Trump’s statements was fairly restrained. And then we saw Prime Minister Modi in Tianjin with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping.

A: On India’s response: I think India made a deliberate decision not to respond to Trump’s provocativeness with provocations of its own. And it did that because I think the Prime Minister very correctly recognises that the bet that successive Indian governments since Prime Minister Vajpayee have made on the United States is fundamentally a correct bet for India’s long-term future, and he did not want to imperil that. So India affirmed whatever was positive in Trump’s messages and simply ignored the nasty overtones. That was smart, deliberate, and probably had some effect.

On Tianjin: I personally think this is calculated theatrics, signalling India has other options. But I would caution against taking this too seriously because, at the end of the day, these are not real alternatives to the U.S. I understand India has a long and robust relationship with Russia, but it is still a very limited relationship. It satisfies Indian needs in some very specific areas, but it’s not a substitute for the United States. And India’s relationship with China is really a relationship of rivalry, not a relationship of amity. So yes, I think it was useful for Prime Minister Modi to do what he did and signal what he did. But I don’t think it fundamentally changes the importance of the U.S.–India relationship.

What did you make of the September 6 phone call, when Trump and Modi suddenly described the relationship as “special”? Was that a reset, or should we hold our judgment on that?

A: It was certainly an effort at thawing a relationship that had become surprisingly bitter. But calling it a “reset” is premature. I’d watch for three signs. I would look for an agreement on the trade issues, including tariffs. If we can get a trade agreement quickly and a reduction in U.S. tariffs, that would be a very good sign that we are moving towards a reset. Second, an understanding on Russian oil purchases. And third, if we can get a commitment from President Trump that he will in fact attend the Quad Leaders Summit in Delhi. I think that would be a very, very good sign that we’re moving towards a reset.

But I am genuinely of the belief that President Trump has come around to the idea that simply allowing the relationship to remain in free fall is not good for American interests. Now the question is whether that perception will grow roots, whether it will persist. And that I think only our performance on these three issues will show.

The success of trade talks almost seems to hinge on energy and Russian oil. How much leverage does India really have here?

A: For President Trump, there are two baskets. There is a Russian oil basket, and there is a trade basket. And I think on the trade basket, we are already discussing a variety of issues that have been issues of U.S. complaints. So, for example, India’s tariffs on industrial goods, India’s problems with respect to U.S. market access for agricultural goods. So we’re already discussing those issues. And I’m actually quite confident that we will be able to reach an agreement on the trade basket.

Then there is the oil question. And whether you believe that Trump is justified in pushing India on Russian oil or not, the fact of the matter is, he is obsessed now with India essentially ceasing to buy oil from Russia. I don’t think there is very much of a give there. He basically wants India to bring its purchases of Russian oil down to zero. And he wants that zero to have been achieved yesterday, not tomorrow. Now, unfortunately, India can’t quite do that at the pace that the President would like. But I think India has already moved to diversify its energy sources. It’s already reduced its purchases of Russian oil.

From a purely personal point of view, I do think that India’s purchases of that oil do subsidise Putin’s war in Ukraine. And if India is really serious about helping bring about a different outcome in the Ukraine war, then joining with the international community by reducing those purchases of oil is a helpful contribution. It’s actually far more helpful than offering to mediate between Putin and Zelensky and so on and so forth.

Of course, Indians have complained and rightly so that if the U.S. is serious about this, why is it not going after China and many others? And I accept those complaints completely because they’re completely justified. And so I think at our end, we need to do much more than just simply pillory India. But the President has now made this the single biggest point of complaint for him. And I think India needs to demonstrate some changes in its oil purchase relationship if we are to get a satisfactory outcome in the next few months. And my own view is I’m cautiously optimistic that India will get there.

You served as senior adviser to Ambassador Robert Blackwill in the early 2000s, a period that laid the foundations of today’s partnership. If you were advising Sergio Gor, the new U.S. Ambassador to India, what would your advice be?

A: I’d offer three pieces of advice. First, maintain the best possible relationship with the host government — something I learned from Ambassador Blackwill. It makes a huge difference to our ability to achieve our common interests.

Second, reach out to the widest spectrum of Indians across the country…We need to understand the country’s diversity. We need to understand the fact that there are people around the country who do not think of the United States in exactly the same way as the denizens of Delhi do. So go beyond government, reach out to members of the opposition, the press, civil society, the length and breadth of the country.

Third, stay away from issues that bring the U.S. only grief and no glory. Chief among them: trying to manage India–Pakistan relations. That’s the third rail of Indian foreign policy. And for us to dabble in that buys us absolutely nothing.

Ashley J Tellis has served the US Department of State as senior adviser to the undersecretary of state for political affairs, and was deeply involved in negotiating the civil nuclear agreement with India. He was also senior adviser to the US ambassador in New Delhi from 2001 to 2003. At present, he is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.