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A member of China’s top decision-making body on military affairs, the Central Military Commission (CMC), was removed from the country’s national legislature late last month.
Miao Hua, who is also a senior admiral in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy, was first suspended pending an investigation in November 2024. At the time, the charges against him were officially termed “serious violations of discipline”, which is terminology used for corruption cases.
Another senior military official, Vice Admiral Li Hanjun, was also stripped of his legislative credentials on June 27. He was the chief of staff of the PLA Navy and its third-ranking officer.
In recent years, two Ministers of Defence, one Minister of Foreign Affairs and several other key figures in the Chinese state have been purged, with corruption often cited as the reason. What differentiates the latest removals is the seniority of the officials and the fact that they are from the all-important military establishment.
“The PLA is the Communist Party’s army. It is not to the state or the People’s Republic of China that the PLA owes its primary allegiance. Its main task is to help the party remain in power. The party commands the gun, and the CMC is the party’s highest military leadership body,” said Jabin Jacob, Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations and Governance Studies at Shiv Nadar University, Greater Noida.
Who are the officials in question?
Miao, 69, headed the Political Work department of the CMC, tasked with political education and personnel management. “Miao Hua is the biggest fish in the past two to three years of investigations and subsequent purges,” said Anushka Saxena, a researcher focusing on the PLA at the Bengaluru-based think tank Takshashila Institution.
On the other hand, Li, 60, was rumoured to be under investigation since March, and has not been seen publicly since then. Such “disappearances” in China often indicate that all is not well and that an official may face an inquiry. Analysts closely monitor the visibility of leaders because, officially, little about them is ever confirmed.
The CMC decides on a range of defence matters, including weapons procurement, military priorities, and combat preparedness. The seven-member body is headed by a Chairman, two Vice-Chairmen and four members. Members represent a few of the various CMC departments, such as discipline inspection and political work (which Miao headed).
“Xi Jinping’s position as CMC Chairman is his second most important position in the Chinese political system after the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, and more important than his position as Chinese president,” Jacob said. The CMC also ranks higher than the Defence Ministry. “This is why in the wake of the 2020 Galwan incident [in which Indian and Chinese troops clashed violently on the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh], the then Indian ambassador to China, Vikram Misri, also met with CMC officials,” he added.
The Defence Minister is generally a part of the CMC. However, after the previous minister, Li Shangfu, was dismissed from the party in June 2024 (also for corruption charges), his successor, Dong Jun, has not been made a CMC member. This suggests a “further decline in the status of the Ministry of Defence”.
Such is its significance to the Chinese state that when power was being transferred from party leader Deng Xiaoping, who initiated China’s economic liberalisation in 1978, he initially refused to let go of the CMC leadership. “He believed that ultimately, being President of China or the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party doesn’t matter because by being the CMC Chairman, you have the army at your command,” Saxena said.
Even though the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party vets candidates, protégé networks or client-patron networks within the party play an important role in CMC appointments, she added.
Why is corruption often cited behind these purges?
Corruption has been a matter of concern in China over the decades. Shortly after assuming power in 2013, Xi Jinping unleashed a massive anti-corruption campaign.
Jacob said, “In the multi-phase anti-corruption campaign, the focus has shifted from the political and legal apparatus to the military to the financial sector, but all groups continue to be targeted.”
As for the PLA, “Corruption is certainly a serious issue, but it is entirely logical that corruption should occur since the PLA has seen a rapid growth phase for several decades now. It is modernising with the acquisition of new weapons and platforms, and the launch of new projects to achieve cutting-edge and asymmetric advantages over its adversaries. More qualified personnel are being inducted to meet its future combat requirements — both in conventional domains and new areas of warfare such as cyberspace or drone warfare.”
He added that significant sums of money and serious responsibilities are at play, with great power accorded to individuals and institutions. Thus, while tackling corruption might help Xi consolidate power in some instances, it is not the only driving motive behind the purges.
Saxena also said that if corruption were only a front, it would not be prudent for Xi to remove his loyalists, such as former Minister of Defence Li Shangfu or Foreign Affairs Minister Qin Gang. Neither was expected to rise so far up the ranks relatively quickly, but were elevated as they enjoyed Xi’s support.
Further, various party factions — based on common regional backgrounds or closeness to senior leaders — compete for power. “When this sub-leadership-level factionalism happens, each faction will try to reveal skeletons in the other person’s closet. Once out in the open, Xi can sometimes have no other option but to take action. A key reason he is in power today is that he told party elders he would root out corruption from the party,” she said.
What does this mean, ultimately?
High-level purges imply an element of instability and inefficiency in the system. However, for Xi, it also shows his ability and power to remove officials as quickly as he appointed them.
“Xi demands not just loyalty but also honesty to go with efficiency and progress. Such culling at the top might indicate a deep-rooted malaise within the system, but it also signals to the public that their supreme leader is serious about improving it. Simultaneously, lower-ranked officials get the message that there exists a path to promotion based on both loyalty to the party and following party discipline,” Jacob said.
In a non-democratic setup, what may be the incentive for a leader to display no tolerance for corruption? Saxena said it has to do with a sense of political insecurity as well: “From Beijing’s perspective, China is in a very precarious position right now, be it the domestic economic concerns, Taiwan, or the economic and political state of the world. At this stage, it cannot afford to have an inefficient bureaucracy or military. Say Li Shangfu’s corruption-related purge was because, when he was head of the equipment development department, he rigged the bidding process and got a cut. What happens if an inferior quality system is used in battle and fails?”
Well-functioning defence, political and economic systems will also help ensure the longevity of China’s unique one-party state structure. Just last Tuesday, the party marked its 104th anniversary, saying its current membership stands at more than 100 million members, making it one of the biggest political parties in the world.
