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During the 1965 India-Pakistan war, the 1 Parachute Battalion (1 Para) of the 68 Infantry Brigade launched an audacious operation to capture the Haji Pir Pass in Jammu and Kashmir on the intervening night of August 26 and 27. By 10.30 am on August 28, Indian troops had successfully taken control of the pass. However, less than six months later, this key strategic feature on the Uri-Poonch approach was handed back to Pakistan.
Over the past six decades, the one single question about the 1965 war which has vexed the defence community and strategic affairs experts is whether the decision to give back Haji Pir pass was a sane one and whether it was a monumental blunder on the part of the then political and military leadership.
As the country marks the 60th anniversary of the 1965 war, it is an opportune time to study the contours of the operation to capture Haji Pir pass and then the thought process which led to its return to Pakistan.
The Haji Pir operation
According to Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, the then Western Army Commander, the Hajipir bulge was identified for an offensive across the Line of Control (LOC) as the saboteurs were using it for infiltration into the Kashmir valley and Rajouri sector. It is located on the Pir Panjal range at a height of 2,637 metres (9,000 feet) on the road between Uri and Poonch. It significantly cuts down the travel time between the two towns and makes access to either valley less time-consuming.
In his book War Dispatches, Lt Gen Harbaksh says the plan was to launch a pincer assault along the axis of Uri-Hajipir with 68 Infantry Brigade from the north and 93 Infantry Brigade from Poonch in the south. “The main role in the offensive, codenamed ‘Operation Bakshi’, was allotted to 68 Infantry Brigade under Brig ZC Bakshi (‘Zoru’ Bakshi), a World War II veteran and highly decorated soldier of our Army,” he said.
One of the approaches through which 1 Para commenced its attack was the ‘SANK Approach’, and the assaulting troops began their task under the leadership of Major (later Lt Gen) Ranjit Singh Dayal at around 9:30 pm on August 26.
The troops had to battle not only the entrenched Pakistanis but also the steep climb and heavy rains. The aim was to reach the top during the night itself so as to surprise the enemy, and finally, the unit was atop at around 4 am. The Pakistanis fled in panic, leaving behind arms and ammunition, including two medium machine guns and three light machine guns.
“Exploiting their success, the battalion rushed on to the next feature, ‘SAR’ which was captured by 0930 hours 27th August. Two hours later the unit added LEDIWALI GALI to their list of successes that day. By 1800 hours all areas up to and inclusive of LEDIWALI GALI was secured. Own casualties in this action was 21 wounded. The enemy losses were 10 other ranks killed, 40 wounded and one taken prisoner,” said Lt Gen Harbaksh.
In the next stage of the operation to capture Haji Pir pass, the Indian troops climbed over 4,000 feet during the hours of darkness and reached the vicinity of the pass by 8 am on August 28. The battalion stormed the pass, and the Pakistanis again fled, and the pass was in Indian hands by 10.30 am.
A counterattack was launched by the Pakistan Army on August 29, which was repulsed by Indian troops. “To consolidate their positions the battalion captured RING CONTOUR NR 0993 on 30 August and point 8766 NR 1191 a day later,” notes Lt Gen Harbaksh. Major R S Dayal, who led his troops in this operation, was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra (MVC).
Tashkent negotiations
The Tashkent negotiations were held between India and Pakistan from January 4 to January 10, 1966, in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. These talks, mediated by Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, resulted in the signing of the Tashkent Declaration on January 10, 1966, to resolve the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965.
Maj Gen Sheru Thapliyal (retd), in Indian Defence Review, says that during negotiations India had to realise the threat posed by Pakistan in the Chhamb Sector. “Since Pakistani forces had already reached Fatwal ridge only four Kms. from Akhnoor, it could always resume operations for capture of Akhnoor,” writes Maj Gen Thapliyal.
He added that the Indian policy makers at that time did not visualise an infiltration threat through the Uni-Poonch bulge and hence it was decided to return Haji Pir Pass to Pakistan and ask them to withdraw from the Chhamb Sector since it would not have been advisable to let Pakistan point a dagger at Akhnoor and thereafter at Jammu.
“It was too high a risk to take. So Prime Minister Shastri was left with no option. Whether he died due to a feeling of guilt will remain a mystery. But in hindsight, India was remiss in not capturing Haji Pir Pass in the 1971 war. It was the only worthwhile objective on the Western Front,” the General writes.
While it was a fact that Pakistan had an advantageous position in Akhnur, the Indian Army was virtually encamped at the doorsteps of Lahore and Sialkot in Punjab and with Haji Pir pass in its control, it also carried a significant advantage in Jammu and Kashmir. In Punjab, Pakistan had a strong foothold in Khemkaran, and there were adverse holdings in Rajasthan too, but these were not very threatening.
The village of Barki, which Indian troops captured at great cost and many other localities on the approach to Lahore, are today virtually subsumed by the expanding Pakistani city, and even 60 years back posed a considerable threat to it.
Protests in parliament
The government faced considerable protests from Opposition parties led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Rajya Sabha. Foreign Minister Swaran Singh tried to defend the government’s stance even as the Opposition cornered him on giving away a part of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan, even as India claimed the entire Jammu and Kashmir as its own.
“About withdrawals, the occupation of Kargil, Haji Pir and Tithwal, as was stated by my colleague, Shri Chavan in the House and also by Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri on several occasions, was necessitated by the military situation that faced us. Here were these large number of armed infiltrators coming in. We approached Pakistan that they should own responsibility and withdraw them. They did neither of the two. We had, therefore, to defend our territory, and to prevent infiltration we moved to these places,” said Swaran Singh in parliament.
“We went to Kargil because we had to protect our lines of communication to the Ladakh area. All those actions had been taken with the object of safeguarding our integrity, sate-guarding our sovereignty over these areas, and therefore, after these three conditions have been agreed upon-that ceasefire terms on the ceasefire line will be observed; non-use of force, which, I have said, covers infiltrators; and non-interference internal affairs-our continuance in these areas was a question about which we did not take a decision lightly. We were faced with this position,” added Swaran Singh.
Vajpayee strongly objected to the Bill on the Tashkent agreement, which had been brought by the government, and questioned the return of areas in Haji Pir, Tithwal and Kargil to Pakistan.
“As a citizen of India, I have the right to go to Haji Pir. The people who reside in these areas of Haji Pir, Tithwal and Kargil have the right to be in the Indian Union. People of Jammu and Kashmir have the right to visit these places, purchase land, practice agriculture and build factories, etc. The government has signed the Tashkent Agreement without considering these aspects of fundamental rights of citizens,” said Vajpayee in Rajya Sabha.
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