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Congress leader Mani Shankar Aiyar recently defended the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and the deployment of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka under former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi. Speaking at the recently held Khushwant Singh Literature Festival at Kasauli, Himachal Pradesh, Aiyar blamed the Army and intelligence agencies for letting down Rajiv Gandhi and implied they failed to do the task they were given.
IPKF veterans have come down heavily on Aiyar and accused him of deliberately overlooking the political, strategic, and diplomatic failures that marred Operation Pawan and the IPKF’s role in Sri Lanka in order to give a clean chit to Rajiv Gandhi.
One such IPKF veteran is Lt Col Manoj Chanan (retd), of 65 Armoured Regiment, who took part in Operation Pawan in Sri Lanka and whose regiment saw some of the fiercest fighting around Jaffna.
Lt Col Chanan says—and his words are echoed by other IPKF veterans—that Rajiv Gandhi’s Sri Lanka policy suffered due to poor planning, lack of institutional oversight, and failure to assess the LTTE’s intentions accurately.
“No clear, unified national policy or command structure existed, and conflicting advice led to erratic shifts in mission objectives. The strategic and diplomatic failures that marred Operation Pawan and the IPKF’s role in Sri Lanka serve as crucial lessons, highlighting the need for robust policies and effective diplomacy,“ he said.
Lt Col Chanan, who has written extensively on the IPKF, says the India Government and the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) frequently engaged in backchannel negotiations that undercut the IPKF’s tactical gains.
“R&AW was meeting the LTTE leadership in Sri Lanka, and also ensured the wounded were treated in hospitals in and around Chennai. LTTE leader Prabhakaran escaped capture multiple times due to leaks or sudden political pullbacks. The Sri Lanka accord lacked domestic political consensus and was rejected by both elements of the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE,” he said.
He added that the India Government’s failure to secure its strategic interests, including allowing Sri Lanka to request IPKF withdrawal unilaterally, undermined the mission. “A golden opportunity for a long-term political solution was lost due to diplomatic inertia and premature deinduction,” he said.
Operational execution by the IPKF
In many instances, troops were deployed in the jungles of Sri Lanka after returning from the deserts of Rajasthan, where they had honed their skills in conventional military operations. They were not prepared for hybrid counterinsurgency or jungle warfare in built-up areas. However, the young officers and soldiers learned on the job and produced results, and the gallantry awards are proof of this.
“Despite operating without full political support, the IPKF demonstrated remarkable discipline and effectiveness in executing its campaign. IPKF operated without full political support but still conducted a disciplined and effective campaign,” said an officer who was part of the campaign.
By the end of 1987, the LTTE was pushed into the remote jungles of Vavuniya, Trincomalee, and Batticaloa. The IPKF restored control in population centres, revived civil infrastructure, and enabled the return of trade and public services. It successfully conducted presidential and parliamentary elections in 1988 under secure conditions.
By December 1988, the IPKF had met its objectives, and the IPKF commander sent a “mission accomplished” signal to higher headquarters.
Post-mission consequences
Sri Lankan President Premadasa, a critic of the India-Sri Lanka Accord, called for the IPKF’s withdrawal in 1989.
“Post-withdrawal, Sri Lanka and the LTTE formed an informal alliance to combat moderate Tamil factions, negating earlier gains. India lost all leverage in Sri Lanka after the IPKF’s exit, and Operation Pawan was unfairly labelled a failure,” said Lt Col Chanan. He adds that bureaucracy and politicians distanced themselves from the fallout and wrongly placed the blame on the Army.
Sacrifice and recognition
1171 Indian soldiers in the IPKF were killed in action and over 3,500 wounded.
IPKF earned:
• 1 Param Vir Chakra
• 6 Maha Vir Chakras
• 98 Vir Chakras
• 300+ gallantry awards
Sri Lanka honoured IPKF sacrifices with a national memorial in Colombo in 2009.
The India Government has yet to establish a formal national-level memorial or commemorate the IPKF’s role at the National War Memorial in New Delhi.
The neglect of these sacrifices reflects a lack of empathy and political will within the Indian establishment.
“Public remarks by figures like Mani Shankar Aiyar are seen as misguided and disrespectful, as they seek political spotlight at the expense of military sacrifice. Such statements overlook the operational achievements and the human cost borne by the IPKF,” said Lt Col Chanan.
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