Securing the vote : A day in the life of ADG – Naxal Operations,R K Vij

The days have been long and the nights longer for the ADG as the elections drew nearer. He has been on tenterhooks since the first polling teams accompanied by security personnel set off for booths. The wait was excruciating as some of these were forced to halt midway at night. And don’t even ask him about the party returning from an Abujhmaad booth that didn’t get to the nearest camp before dark.

“We made unprecedented arrangements,” he says. “We wanted to prove that we can secure elections in Bastar,and we achieved it.”

Nearly 1 lakh troops were deployed across the region,and Vij was at the centre of it all. In some places,as many as three companies of paramilitary forces accompanied a poll team of just four officers,making a ratio of 60:1. While Maoists attacked police teams and blasted IEDs before and on polling day,the forces managed to hold the fort. A CRPF personnel was killed and one injured in these attacks.

On November 12,a BSF vehicle returning from poll duty was hit and three people were killed. Hours later,around 6 pm,with journalists seeking him out,Vij admits the incident affected their morale as it happened when they thought everything had gone off quietly. “It was unfortunate,but they did not follow the SOP. There was no need to take a vehicle on that route,” Vij says.

The route of polling parties was the most crucial aspect of ensuring violence-free polls,he adds. Only select top police officers knew it,even the team leaders were informed at the last moment,and they were given the flexibility to change it should they sense any threat.

Another crucial challenge was training the additional forces. Most of these were regular policemen from states like Kerala,Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand,and had no experience of anti-insurgency operations. In fact,a DGP of a state requested the Chhattisgarh Police,in writing,to ensure the safety of his troops. So,before despatching them,the Chhattisgarh Police trained the men.

“The additional forces were given pre-induction training of conflict zones and theoretical exposure to Maoist insurgency. We taught them the modus operandi of Maoists,IED detection,even explained major case studies,” Vij says.

All this while,the ADG keeps dictating notes to his stenographer for a press release. It will be his third press statement in three hours. “To avoid any confusion or misinterpretation,we are issuing election updates every hour about the number of incidents,” he says,directing that the release time be clearly mentioned at the end.

A journalist ask about the number of EVMs looted by the Maoists,as reported by some. “Not even one,” shoots back Vij. “Those who are writing it,ask them about the source.”

Another journalist asks him about the number of violent incidents and casualties during the 2008 elections. It strikes him that the next release could also have a comparison between the 2013 and 2008 polls. He contacts a junior officer,asking him the figure for blasts,deaths and other such incidents in 2008. “If you can respond in two minutes,I’ve a prize for you,” Vij tells him.

He chides journalists telling them why they don’t approach other officers for the data. “You are our one-stop encyclopaedia,” comes the reply. The ADG beams,and orders for coffee.

It has crossed 6.45 pm,and the top cop is still receiving calls from his Bastar officers about the election parties. However,as this day too draws to a close without any more major incidents,the cloud on his face is lifting.

He confesses that he spent polling day without a blink,mindful that should the Maoists ambush a poll party inside the forests,reinforcements would never reach on time. None in even the Raipur police headquarters was willing to bet on how the forces would handle such a scenario,without risking the lives of voters and polling team in the crossfire.

Vij asks for a few copies of Police Times,a special journal he edited,got published and circulated. It focuses on strategies for handling Maoists and securing elections. The measures include tips like safe ways to cross rivers,culverts and valleys,how to check poll centres,effective ways to march in forests,instructions for choppers during landing and take-off,even how to hold weapons. Guidelines are marked for police superintendents,the field captains,to manage their forces.

The forces coming from outside the state were kept mostly for area domination and as road opening parties.

Around 7 pm,Vij gets a call from a senior officer of a neighbouring state. Chhattisgarh shares its border with the Maoist-hit districts of Andhra Pradesh,Orissa and Maharashtra. If the Greyhounds of Andhra helped induct the additional forces,other state police trained forces in border areas. Top cops of these states were in regular touch with their Chhattisgarh counterparts,and kept their choppers and ambulances on alert.

Vij sifts through the intel alerts and advisories he has received in the last hour. Nothing alarming it seems. Our intelligence department and the central Intelligence Bureau,he says,assisted us well.

His cellphone buzzes. A Bastar district superintendent of police has sent him some photographs on WhatsApp. A polling party has just returned with some spiked planks that the Maoists had hidden in the grass on their route. A narrow escape for the polling officials.

His bodyguard,meanwhile,is pacing the corridor outside. For the past two days his boss has been returning home late and then working through the night. Today,the AK-47-wielding bodyguard senses he will be relieved soon.

At 7.30 pm,Vij begins winding up. “Driver se bolo gaadi lagaye (Tell the driver to get the car),” he says.

The task is not over though. The second phase on November 19 remains. While other districts are not classified as severely Maoist hit,some of them do have a sizeable presence of the rebels.

Vij,who will be spending another day in Bastar to take stock of the situation,is hopeful though of repeating what they accomplished on November 11. And repeat history.