Tags:
Journalism of Courage
As the atomic energy establishment signals its satisfaction with the draft 123 agreement, hammered out in Washington last week after months of nail-biting drama, there will be little political sting left in the national debate on the Indo-US nuclear deal.
To be sure, sections of the BJP leadership will persist with the elevation of opportunism above the NDA’s own proud record of laying the foundation for the unfolding nuclear rapprochement with the US and the world. On the left, the two communist parties will find it difficult to swallow the historic redefinition of India’s global nuclear standing and the long overdue transformation of Indo-US relations. The countless talking heads, who spread gloom and doom for two years, would scramble to unearth textual gaps between the 123 agreement and the PM’s nuclear assurances to parliament last monsoon session.
With the Department of Atomic Energy now solidly behind the deal, the Manmohan Singh government will have to acquire a very special knack to lose the next round of the nuclear jousting in parliament.
The national debate was only partly about the complex technical details embedded within the nuclear agreement unveiled by the PM and US President George W. Bush on July 18, 2005. It was always about battling the old demons of our mind amidst India’s transition to being a great power.
As India prepares for its long overdue nuclear liberation, a number of lessons emerge from the great debate of the last two years. India’s nuclear negotiations with the United States are easily the most consequential the nation has ever undertaken. These have also been the most transparent under the UPA government.
As different parts of government aired their differences in public, the UPA government often looked weak and indecisive. That unprecedented openness, however, now guarantees solid public support when the government defends the 123 agreement before parliament.
Second, while transparency boosts accountability, it is not a substitute for building political consensus on key national issues. India is currently engaged in highly sensitive negotiations on the boundary dispute with China, and the Kashmir question with Pakistan. If successful, these negotiations would alter the very territorial map of India that we have grown up with for six decades.
There is indeed a real danger that the BJP, which had the courage to depart from the old paradigm with China and Pakistan, might be tempted again to attack the results of these negotiations. Whether the BJP is ready to play a constructive role or not, the PM must be liberal in giving credit to Vajpayee for his bold initiatives on the US, China and Pakistan. As Indian diplomacy succeeds, there will be enough credit to go around, and then some.
Third, India’s nuclear debate was, in essence, about building a different relationship with the United States. A similar arrangement with either Russia or France would never have raised the kind of political storm the negotiations with the US did. This was inevitable, given the historically difficult relationship that India has had with the United States.
The very purpose of the deal, in fact, was to bury for ever the past nuclear differences that continuously undermined the prospects of a normal Indo-US relationship. But the very implementation of the nuclear deal inevitably brought to surface all the accumulated mutual distrust. As we overcome the burden of the nuclear past, India must now confidently focus on the much larger bilateral, regional and global agenda with the United States.
The fourth lesson relates to the centrality of power in international relations. President Bush’s readiness to seek a change in the US and global nuclear rules in India’s favour was rooted in the recognition of two important realities — that the rise of India was changing the global balance of power and a nuclear accommodation was in its own interest.
Yet India’s nuclear debate revealed the mindset of a weak third world state rather than of an emerging power, with a trillion dollar economy and a per capita income of a thousand dollars. The India of the 21st century is not the nation of 1974 that conducted a nuclear test but backed off in the face of relentless international sanctions. An India that is aware of its own rise amidst a redistribution of global power will be less obsessed with the text of its international agreements.
That there is no national shame in a sensible compromise should be the fifth lesson we should take away from the nuclear debate. Like any agreement between two individuals or entities, the 123 agreement too is a compromise. So long as it meets India’s core concern — the unhindered pursuit of a nuclear weapons programme, a full blown civilian nuclear energy plan, and iron-clad guarantees against disruption of external supplies — the compromises in the 123 agreement are worth it. This, however, might be heresy for three generations of the Indian policy elite that revelled in defending diplomatic positions rather than delivering tangible benefits for the nation. As a rising power, India should focus more on outcomes and less on semantics; and it should be able to differentiate between the essential and trifling.
That India is on the verge of regaining international cooperation in civilian nuclear energy without giving up its nuclear weapon programme is indeed a cause for celebration. Yet, India must also learn the art of giving besides knowing how to extract the most. Great powers are expected to make some sacrifices to preserve regional and global order. It is that capacity to be generous, especially towards smaller neighbours, that offers a final test for India’s credibility as the world’s newest great power.
The writer is a professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
