Bangladesh Liberation War: New book details many small battles that were won before the war

One of the most interesting anecdotes that the book details is the role of an assistant commandant in Tripura who crossed over to Bangladesh without his superior’s permission and was almost dismissed but for the New Delhi’s decision to support the Bangladesh liberation reaching his commander in time.

On March 26, 1971, Assistant Commandant P K Ghosh, posted at Srinagar BOP in Tripura, received two Awami League politicians and an East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) constable at his BOP seeking help to defend their small town of Subhapur against a marauding Pakistan army.

The constable informed that a Pakistani brigade had passed by that morning and stationed a section of soldiers to guard the Subhapur road bridge. It was a strategically important bridge as it was on the main Chittagong-Dhaka Trunk Road. While Ghosh declined to offer physical help, he agreed to make a tactical plan for them that would trap the Pakistani soldiers in their position and deprive them of food and water.

But the constable insisted on at least Ghosh coming to Bangladesh to set up this trap. Against the advice of his juniors, moved by the plight of his erstwhile motherland (Ghosh’s family had to migrate after Partition), Ghosh changed into civvies and took on the identity of Chittagong college professor to arrive in Bangladesh. There he saw that the defenders had only six .303 rifles and 50 rounds each.

However, Ghosh set up the trap around the bridge in such a manner that the six men forced an entire section of soldiers to surrender within two days. All were shot dead.

Back in India, when Ghosh informed his superior, Lt Col AK Ghosh, the latter flew into a rage and threatened court martial and dismissal from service. However, by March 29 Lt Col AK Ghosh had received information that India had decided to support Bangladesh liberation covertly and BSF was to provide help. That day Assistant Commandant P K Ghosh once again entered Bangladesh, but with the permission of his superiors.

Another notable anecdote is the retelling of India’s defence against Pakistan’s Operation Chenghiz Khan to destroy India’s air bases near the western border. Due to the timely intelligence about an impending attack on Indian air bases on December 3, 1971, India removed all its aircraft and replaced them with dummies making Pakistan believe it had succeeded.

According to the book, this intelligence was generated by IPS officer Ashwini Kumar, who was then posted as IG with the BSF. He happened to apprehend a Pak spy posing as a godman near an Indian air base in Ganganagar, Rajasthan. His interrogation threw up the first clues to the Pak plan. This was further confirmed by Kumar’s contact in Pakistan.

This contact was none other than the son of Kumar’s instructor at a police academy in Phagwara in Punjab in an undivided India. Kumar’s instructor had migrated to Pakistan after Partition but his son was working in East Pakistan as a tea estate manager. During the civil war in East Pakistan, when the son wanted to reach Pakistan via India, Kumar helped him. Kumar was awarded Padma Bhushan for his work after the war.

According to the book, the BSF was training and equipping the Mukti Bahini but they were also donning civvies (lungis, gamchhas and vests) and fighting alongside them in hostile territory. This confined the Pakistan Army to its barracks and cantonments while it sent armed civilians to fight at the borders and torture Bengalis in East Pakistan.

“The BSF launched several clandestine operations in East Pakistan from its posts in Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and West Bengal, to aid the mutineers/Mukti Fauj. Its commando teams blew up bridges in East Pakistan in planned missions to sabotage the progress of the Pakistan Army, but the latter quashed the rebellion. BSF intelligence operatives gathered crucial intelligence that saved lives and changed the course of the India—Pakistan war when it began,” the book has said.

“It also coordinated with members of the national and international press, helping to publish and broadcast stories of the asylum seekers under their protection. The BSF assisted the Bengali diplomats and staff of the Pakistani deputy high commission in organising a coup. One of the most effective devices of the liberation war, outside of guns and strategy, was a clandestine radio station, which was seeded in Chittagong by staffers of Radio Chittagong,” it added.