Defence, regional partnerships: Why the India-Egypt relationship matters to New Delhi

But the current reduction of violence in the region due to a regional push for US President Donald Trump’s peace plan has allowed New Delhi to refocus on the dual approach to the Middle East it was setting in place in 2023 – strengthening bilateral ties with old partners (such as Egypt) and investing in fresh regional cooperative frameworks such as the India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).

Where did India and Egypt leave things in 2023? What role does defence play in India-Egypt ties? And how do ties with Egypt matter for the future?

Dusting off an old partnership

The history of deep cooperation between India and Egypt is well known, especially due to strong ideological alignment during the Cold War, and India’s preference for secular and nationalist Middle Eastern partners over Islamic monarchies. In the last decade however, there was little substantial engagement between both states, both due to regional instability as well as Egypt’s own focus on securing domestic stability since the 2013 coup which brought incumbent President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to power.

Ten years later, by 2023, Egypt was a significant part of the pragmatic wave that was sweeping the region – with Gulf, Levantine, and North African states intensifying efforts to de-prioritise ideological differences (such as with Qatar and Iran) and with Arab states testing normalisation with Israel through the Abraham Accords of 2020.

The upgradation of India-Egypt ties to a ‘Strategic Partnership’ in January 2023 occurred amidst this regional shift, and was set up by EAM Jaishankar’s visit to Cairo in October 2022. Robust economic foundations were also in place for an elevation of ties, with bilateral trade touching a record high of $7.26 billion during FY2021-22.

India’s initiative and Egypt’s reciprocation ensured that 2023 was a year of unprecedented diplomatic activity.

In May of that year, India’s then Chief of Army Staff visited Egypt to meet with President Sisi and launch a book commemorating the role of the Indian Army in Egypt. Earlier, the Indian and Egyptian Armed Forces had held the inaugural edition of their joint exercise (Cyclone I) in Rajasthan, with President al-Sisi also visiting New Delhi in January 2023 as the Chief Guest for the Republic Day parade which featured an Egyptian contingent marching alongside Indian troops. By June 2023, this burst of diplomatic activity culminated in PM Modi’s maiden visit to Egypt which cemented both states’ intentions to follow through with their new strategic partnership.

The crisis since October 2023 redirected Egypt’s diplomatic energies into mediating between Israel and Hamas and forced India-Egypt re-engagement into temporary dormancy. However, India-Egypt ties were already showing two strong characteristics – that Egypt was crucial to India’s defence export outlook in Africa and that Cairo is an influential actor for the IMEC.

Leveraging defence cooperation

Within their broader historic partnership, India and Egypt are natural partners in security cooperation. Egypt’s long experience in countering the Muslim Brotherhood (the ideological fountainhead of several jihadist groups) has led to a common outlook towards counter-terrorism, and EAM Jaishankar freshly appreciated Egypt’s condemnation of the Pahalgam terror attack during FM Abdelatti’s visit.

Both states’ security outlooks are also aligned in the multilateral fora. For instance, Egypt’s insistence on a UN Security Council resolution to legitimize Trump’s proposed International Stabilization Force in Gaza, in order for Arab troops to participate, is similar to India’s own tradition of not participating in multinational forces that are not under the UN flag.

More importantly, however, Egypt is vital to India as a ‘springboard’ for New Delhi’s fresh attempts to expand defence cooperation with African states. In Africa, defence has been India’s historic comfort zone. It has trained African personnel in Indian institutions, extensively deployed officers from across its three armed services to train African officers in their own bases, invested substantial resources in defence capacity building in African states, and emerged as a largely reliable supplier of arms.

Showcasing the wide ranging capabilities of its indigenous defence industry has been a priority for India, which hosted the second iteration of the India-Africa Defence Dialogue (with the participation of 50 African states) in October 2022.

Here, India arguably seeks to leverage its deep reserve of trust and goodwill with Egypt as a regional partner. Even as India’s pitch to sell the HAL Tejas to Egypt has been unsuccessful thus far, both have a shared history of jointly developing defence platforms, including fighter jets such as the Helwan 300 fighter. Similarly, the Cyclone Exercises (with its third iteration occurring in February, 2025) offer distinct benefits to both armies due to mutual lessons in desert warfare, while a legacy of imparting military training makes India a natural partner in the field.

An added common denominator is the similar arms import patterns from Russia for both militaries, with the Indian and Egyptian Air Forces operating a mix of platforms from both sides of the East-West divide. Consequently, for New Delhi, relying on both a long-shared military history and the appeal of its own defence industrial base, allows it to focus on military-to-military cooperation as a primer for broader strategic ties. This ‘springboard’ logic was also present in FM Abdelatti’s recent assertion of Egypt’s value as an access node for Indian investors to tap into a larger market comprising other African states with whom Egypt shares Free Trade Agreements.

Egypt & India’s regional projects

Since 2023, the IMEC represents a new priority for India in the Middle East, with both regional and extra-regional partners (such as the US) having committed to the project. However, as it presently stands, the IMEC undercuts several regional players such as Egypt, due to the Corridor’s potential to serve as an alternative to the Suez Canal.

Notwithstanding significant economic viability concerns and logistical challenges vis-à-vis the corridor itself, Egypt has made a concerted pitch to integrate itself with the Corridor, while advocating for India’s participation in the Egyptian Suez Canal Economic Zone.

The Egyptian pitch has consistently been to present its well-established ports in the Red and Mediterranean seas as a better economic alternative/supplement to Israel’s Haifa port (in June, Iranian missiles had struck in the port’s vicinity in Haifa City, showing its vulnerability). Even as the Suez Canal itself has been adversely affected by the Houthis’ Red Sea campaign, Egypt’s conciliatory approach for mutual benefit is a contrast to states like Turkey who feel similarly bypassed by the IMEC and categorically oppose the project.

However, even if the Corridor’s route does not change, Egypt plays a crucial role in the IMEC’s future. Cairo is central to the success of any plan that tackles the principal dispute in the Middle East with proven potency to disrupt the region and the IMEC’s prospects — that of Palestinian statehood.

Apart from its umbilical and inextricable relationship with the Israel-Palestine dispute as a border state to the Gaza Strip, Egypt has a dominant voice in the implementation of Trump’s peace plan, and the degree to which Arab states can leverage the Trump White House to ensure Israeli commitment to a Palestinian state. Egypt and Israel themselves directly clash over key parts of the plan, including Israel’s insistence to retain a military presence in the Philadelphi Corridor which is anathema for Egyptian military positions in the Sinai.

Hence, despite Cairo’s cognizance of the challenges in implementing Trump’s plan, it displayed continuing good faith with the White House by hosting the US President and other global leaders for the Gaza Peace Summit in Sharm el-Sheikh — a city that has served as a facilitating site for several Israel-Palestine agreements historically. Consequently, even as a non-IMEC state, Egypt significantly influences the chances of IMEC’s success, further necessitating New Delhi’s close engagement with Cairo.

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