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Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian died in a helicopter crash on Sunday (May 19). This is how Iran’s political system works, and what the fallout of Raisi’s death might be.
Raisi was born in 1960 in a clerical family in Mashhad, Iran’s holiest city. He was educated in Islamic law and jurisprudence at the Qom seminary, where Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian Revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic, taught.
His background, hardline conservatism, and long association with the current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, led to Raisi being picked as a presidential candidate, first in 2017 (he lost to incumbent Hassan Rouhani), and then in 2021, when he defeated the reformist candidate Mohsen Mehralizadeh.
Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran’s politics has developed between two poles.
On the one side are the conservatives who want to strictly adhere to the tenets of Twelver Shi’ism, Iran’s state religion, and want to implement its religious codes across society. They frame the Revolution as a radical assertion against Western imperialism, and enjoy massive support, especially among the poorer sections of the population.
On the other side are the so-called ‘reformists’ who, while remaining loyal to the Revolution, want more flexibility both in domestic and international matters. For instance, they support greater rights for women, strengthening civil society and human rights; they also want free elections and more conciliatory relations with the West.
The tussle between conservatives and reformists has been the central theme in Iranian politics.
Currently, and for most of Iran’s post-Revolution history, the conservatives have been dominant. While the reformists did enjoy power under the presidency of Mohammed Khatami (1997-2005), which saw improvement in Iran’s relations with the West, their challenge has been effectively quelled.
The conservatives have maintained a firm grip despite Iran’s worsening economic situation due to western sanctions, which triggered a wave of protests last year. While the regime has attempted to foster a “resistance economy” of self-sufficiency and increasing cooperation with other anti-West nations such as Russia and China — Raisi played an important part in these attempts — it is yet to find a sustainable formula for economic growth and well-being.
The conservatives have mostly succeeded in leveraging Iran’s geopolitical situation to mobilise domestic legitimacy. The assassination of General Qassem Soleimani by the US in 2020 galvanised support in favour of Raisi in the next year’s elections. Israel’s assault on Gaza and its treatment of Palestinians has been a major mobilising force for the conservatives.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the 2015 deal between Iran and western powers, which placed restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief, fizzled out after Donald Trump won the American presidency. Since then, Iran relations with the West have steadily worsened — which has helped the conservatives consolidate their position.
In Iran, the Supreme Leader is the head of state, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and the most powerful person in the country. He has great influence in the Guardian Council, which vets candidates for the presidential election. This is where the reformists have been weeded out — even though the presidential election itself is meticulously organised, and largely free and fair.
Iran’s President operates within the overall authority of the Supreme Leader. But he is nonetheless a powerful figure in the Iranian political structure, with a significant role in determining how the country functions. He plays a crucial role in mediating between the legislature and the executive, and appoints ministers and vice presidents.
The President also makes key foreign policy decisions. Then President Hassan Rouhani acted with significant authority during the JCPOA negotiations. Among Raisi’s major achievements was the Iran-Saudi deal, brokered by China. It was he who raised the pitch for an ‘Axis of Resistance’ — an informal, Iran-led political-military coalition comprising the Islamic resistance in Iraq, the Syrian government, the Lebanese Hezbollah, Yemeni Houthis, and Palestinian groups including Hamas.
The Iranian President’s authority is superseded only in the event of a clash between him and the Supreme Leader — which has only happened during reformist governments.
It is important to note, however, that the Supreme Leader does not have to be a conservative. Iran’s religious clergy is not a monolith, and there are many liberal ayatollahs (high clerics in Twelver Shi’ism). In fact, it was a liberal cleric and human rights activist named Hussein Ali Montazeri who was designated as the successor of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and the conservative Ayatollah Ali Khamenei became Supreme Leader only after a power struggle.
Ali Khamenei saw Raisi as his protege. But even if he were alive, there was no certainty that Raisi would have been Khamenei’s successor as Supreme Leader. Like the last time, there would be a power struggle.
A drawback of Raisi’s candidature for the post was his position within the religious order. Raisi’s clerical rank of hojat-ol-Eslam was below that of an ayatollah, meaning he would have had to improve his qualifications in order to be seen as a legitimate Supreme Leader.
While Raisi’s death definitely changes the field, it is too soon to make a prediction about how the tussle to become Supreme Leader may play out. This is more so because in recent years, the once unquestionable authority of the Supreme Leader has faced challenges.
Raisi’s death only leaves things open for a more fraught power struggle, and whoever succeeds Khamenei will find it difficult to exercise the overarching authority that the Supreme Leader once had.
There are specific constitutional provisions for handling such a situation. Mohammad Mokhber, Iran’s First Vice President under Raisi, has already been appointed as acting President by Khamenei.
An election will be held within 50 days. The establishment will attempt to effect a smooth transition, and avoid any major conflict. It remains to be seen what these elections will look like, and who will be contesting, but conservatives are likely to assert their control.
In term of policy, there are unlikely to be any major changes, especially in the immediate term, given that Acting President Mokhber was a close ally of Raisi.
However, Raisi and Foreign Minister Amirabdollahian had been a successful team that steered Iran’s foreign policy into a more combative stance. From Iran’s perspective, they were very successful in standing up to the West. In that sense, Raisi’s death might be a temporary setback — it remains to be seen how assertive the new President is.
Given that the power hierarchy within Iran is very much intact, there will also be no major change in how international actors, whether Iran’s friends or enemies, deal with it. Raisi’s death is not a political crisis for Iran, it is more of a tragedy, which Iran is well placed to overcome.
Ramakrishnan is Professor at the Centre for West Asian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University’s School of International Studies, and the author of US Perceptions of Iran: Approaches & Policies (2008).
He spoke to Arjun Sengupta.
