Military Digest | When US promised not to let Pakistan down: ‘If there is another attack, we will react violently’

In this week’s column, we look at how, post the 1971 war, the US reassured Pakistan that it would stand by it if India initiated any military action against what was then West Pakistan, and also considered a Pakistani offer of military bases on Pakistani soil for the US.

The memorandum of a conversation in the US State Department Archives for March 29, 1972, records a meeting where Nixon, Kissinger, and Aziz Ahmed, secretary-general of Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry, and many others participated.

Kissinger referred to how “we went through tragic days together in December (1971)” and said that Pakistan enjoyed the US’ goodwill. He further said it was important for Pakistan to get through the next six months, and felt that it was inconceivable that there would be an Indian attack before the forthcoming summit meeting in Moscow, or even for some time after that.

President Richard Nixon’s ‘very warm feelings for Pakistan’

“Dr. Kissinger continued that the President makes the policy, and ‘we won’t let Pakistan down. If there is another attack, we will react violently’. He noted that we have told the Indian Ambassador that we cannot cut off military aid to Pakistan unless India is prepared to forego Soviet military aid. We have said that we will not restore the $87 million of aid that had been suspended,” the memorandum records Kissinger as saying.

He went on to say that the US did not believe that one country should have the right to impose its will on its neighbours. “The President has very warm feelings for Pakistan,” he added.

Aziz Ahmed expressed concerns that India had moved three Army divisions to the West Pakistani border. “General Manekshaw has gone to Moscow, presumably to seek equipment to replace India’s war losses. India is going ahead—with whatever plans it has-either exerting pressure on Pakistan for the negotiations or for a more serious attack. There has been some thought that the Indians would seize Azad Kashmir. The Chinese, however, felt that an attack on Azad Kashmir would be unlikely until after President Nixon’s visit to Moscow,” he said.

On March 17, 1971, US Secretary of State William P Rogers wrote a memorandum to President Nixon titled ‘President Bhutto’s Proposals for Closer Military Collaboration’. This memo discussed specific proposals, which involved:

• Pakistan is prepared to make available for US use port and “tracking station” facilities along the Arabian Sea coast near Karachi.
• The Pakistani Government is thinking of “access to facilities as needed” and not of large numbers of American personnel.
• Pakistan would also welcome collaboration in strategic military planning.

The memo further quotes the Pakistani Defence Secretary Ghias Uddin Ahmed as suggesting that Pakistani military facilities could be made available to the US if that country wished.

“He said this would include facilities on land or at ports. With regard to the latter, he mentioned locations along the Arabian Sea coast, including (from west to east) Jiwani, Gwadar, Sonmiani Bay, Karachi, and the area south and east of Karachi. He thought the US might be interested in developing a port such as at Gwadar, which would be important for the economic development of that region of Pakistan,” the memo notes.

The reason for this approach, Ghias said, was that Pakistan now faced an entirely new situation after the recent war, when it had suffered defeat by India with Soviet collaboration. The Pakistani Government was increasingly concerned about the intentions of both the Soviets and the Indians.

“Pakistan needed to bolster up its defenses in order to provide some credible deterrent. Ghias acknowledged that Pakistan was now only a small fraction compared to India in size and strength. He went on [to say] that Pakistan could not contemplate attacking India, but it needed some assurance about its defense. In this regard, he thought Pakistan would be looking to closer defense collaboration with Iran and Turkey, and seeking to improve its relations with Afghanistan,” the memo says.

Ghias also referred to close Soviet collaboration with Indians both at the port of Visakhapatnam and on the Andaman Islands, which he interpreted as providing important naval facilities for the USSR.

A month earlier, on February 3, 1972, President Nixon had a meeting with the US Ambassador to India, Kenneth Keating, and Henry Kissinger. Referring to India and Pakistan, President Nixon said, “Neither country should be a country. They are too poor, too bloodthirsty”. Ambassador Keating responded, “Yes, there should be a regional solution, like the EEC (European Economic Community)”.

China is India’s bigger problem: President Nixon

President Nixon was of the opinion that India shouldn’t waste its resources fighting Pakistan and that China was India’s bigger problem.

“Let me give you my view. I’ll tell you what I’ll do. I am afraid they’ll leak it, so of course we can’t announce it. Let me tell you where we went wrong. I was too soft on Mrs. Gandhi. When she was here. I led her on. If we were going to restrain them at all, we should have been tougher. I am not mad at Mrs. Gandhi. She has not had a better friend in this office than me. I have taken the line that India should have to compete with the PRC. I have always defended India,” he said.

Nixon went on to say that India has a friend in the White House. “They should know this. We are going to China for reasons of our own. We took action on India because our law requires it. In reality, we are India’s best friend. Right, Henry?,” he said.

Henry Kissinger gave a guarded reply, reflecting his pro-Pakistan stance. “That is true. But we must move at a measured pace,” he said.