It is said that swift wars are about strategy, long ones are about stamina. But the longer a conflict goes on, the worse it is for all the parties involved.
As the war in Ukraine enters its third year, it is clear that Russia’s original assessment of a quick capitulation was a gross miscalculation. It is equally clear that while it has the means to engage in a prolonged conflict — Russia has regained lost ground recently — a decisive “victory” for either side is a chimera. Moscow’s relationship with Europe is at its lowest ebb, NATO has expanded into its neighbourhood and Russia is now a junior partner in its alliance with China.
Behind the jargon of geopolitics lies the tragic human cost of the war. According to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 31,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed so far (the Russians claim the figure is higher).
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights places civilian deaths at about 10,500 while US officials put the total number of dead and wounded at over 5,00,000. Nor is the fallout of the conflict limited to the region.
Global supply chains — of energy, food and even capital — have been disrupted, disproportionately affecting people in developing and less developed countries. The fact is that Ukraine and Russia share a cultural, historical and even religious heritage.
These could have been built upon had the relationship not been soured by revanchist notions of empire and geopolitical insecurity. Fatigue with the war is setting in, particularly in the West. At the two-year anniversary of the war on February 24, many Western leaders did join Zelenskyy in Kyiv, including the leaders of Italy, Belgium, the European Commission and Canada. However, notable absentees included US President Joe Biden and the leaders of the UK, France and Germany — Biden had attended the same ceremony last year.
For much of the early part of the war, there was criticism in some quarters of New Delhi’s stance. The crux of it was that India did not take a clear stand against Russia’s violation of its smaller neighbour’s sovereignty. Two years on, Delhi’s principled pragmatism stands vindicated, even as the West grows more divided on the issue: A large chunk of US aid, for example, has been stuck in the legislature.
India has consistently called for peace while maintaining its historical ties with Moscow, even as its engagement with the US in particular and the West as a whole has widened and deepened. It is now more important than ever for both sides in the conflict to negotiate in good faith. February 2025 must not bear witness to another tragic anniversary.
