US 79 memo: Lets sell Pakistan F-16s and prevent n-proliferation

Estimate,Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Since 1972,the Pakistanis have been operating a natural uranium power reactor. We estimate that there could be as much as 200 kilograms of plutonium in irradiated fuel elements being stored in the sites cooling ponds. Pakistan plans to construct a small chemicals reprocessing facility with French assistance,but negotiations have locked over the issue of safeguards and no contract has yet been signed. The French are insisting on stringent conditions which include IAEA safeguards and a prohibition against re-transfer of material and against replication of the technology. Strict adherence to these conditions would severely circumscribe the facilities value for a nuclear weapons program. We believe that the facility could be completed within two or three years after construction begins. Assuming an early start,as well as completion of HE and weapons research and development (R&D) concurrent with construction of the reprocessing plant during this time period,the Pakistanis could develop a device as early as 1978.

5 December 1978

Monthly warning report: Nuclear Proliferation by National Intelligence Officer for Nuclear Proliferation

Pakistani Uranium Enrichment Acquisition: Pakistans efforts to acquire foreign equipment for a uranium enrichment plant now under construction have been more extensive and sophisticated than previously indicated. Despite the best efforts of nuclear supplier states to thwart these activities,Pakistan may succeed in acquiring the main missing components for a strategically significant gas centrifuge enrichment capability. To the extent Indians learn about or suspect Pakistani progress toward a nuclear weapons capability,and there are signs of heightened concern,their aversion to intrusive safeguards on nuclear facilities and their interest in more nuclear weapons-oriented activities may be strengthened…

n Libyan-Indian Nuclear Cooperation: Prime Minister Desai has reportedly promised Libya nuclear assistance,including training and technology transfer in certain previously proscribed fields,presumably reprocessing. This unprecedented decision was apparently taken in response to an offer by Major Jallud (Libyas number two man) of $1.5 billion for a number of Indian-manned projects in Libya,along with nuclear cooperation. During his visit to India in July,Jallud expressed his governments concern with Israeli nuclear weapons capability. While one leading Indian nuclear official seems to believe that the agreement,if fully implemented,could lead to a Libyan nuclear weapons capability,the precise terms of agreement are not known,may not yet be decided,but could be settled within the next few months.

June 1979

US Ambassador Robert Goheens report on conversation with pm morarji Desai

In line with instructions,I met alone for 55 minutes this afternoon with Prime Minister Desai. The atmosphere was relaxed,even at times chatty,but I made no progress along any of the lines suggested in reftels…

The PM will not accept the idea of a joint non-development,non-use agreement with Pakistan. He said when they had suggested that he had told them that he had already made a unilateral pledge; if Pakistan did likewise,the two pledges would be as good as a joint statement. When I said that governments change,and more formal agreements may have greater influence on future governments than unilateral pledge,he laughed,said that was not necessarily so,and added,Look at you and Tarapur. He could not bind a future government in any case but he hoped the course he had laid down would have influence.

When I asked what then he proposed to do about the danger,not only to India but much more widely,should the Pakistanis develop an explosives capability,he said that he proposed to take Zia at his word for now. But if he discovered that Pakistan was ready to test a bomb or if it exploded one,he would act at on(c)e to smash it. (If I take to be the Pak explosives capability.) He said he had recently assured Pak fonsec (foreign secretary) that India had only good intentions toward Pakistan and wished to do nothing to cause it any difficulties,but also that If Pakistan tries any tricks,we will smash you. I gather that he went on to remind Shahnawaz of 1965 and 1971 in order to emphasize Indias readiness to react forcibly when sufficiently provoked.

March 5,1979

A memorandum to the Secretary of State by state dept officials

…We are urgently in need of a comprehensive strategy for Pakistan. We face two major issues: (1) an increasing requirement for security and stability in the South Asia region in which Pakistan is a key actor and (2) the need to deal with Pakìstans nuclear weapons program.

To deal alone and separately with the nuclear weapons problem is likely to push us into a punitive and restrictive policy toward Pakistan thus ignoring the major need also to enhance through assistance programs its security and stability. Similarly,ignoring Pakistans nuclear ambitions is likely to set off a nuclear arms competition with India rekindling its explosives program.

The key to our success will be in the quality of the stability and security package which we are prepared to offer. The most important item which we can provide is conventional armament to deal with deep security concerns regarding India,Afghanistan,Iran and Baluchistan. We will have to make a hard decision,in the face of the collapse of Iran,that provision (for cash) of modern conventional weapons in Pakistan,such as the F-16,should take priority over the proliferation of a nuclear weapon there. Irans shift would help with the arms ceiling problem and Indias acquisition of the Jaguar (ground attack aircraft) might reduce,but will not eliminate traditional Indian concerns with arming Pakistan. Some provision of American technicians to maintain the weapons for a reasonable period of time should also serve to reassure Zia of our continuing support. In addition to the F-16s,we should consider favorably the provision of Cobra helicopters with TOM missiles,some sophisticated air defense and other modern weapons. FMS (foreign military sales) credit at about the $50 million level for FY 1980 and FY 1981 should be part of the military package.

In sum the package would include: a) willingness to sell for cash F-16s (2-3 squadrons – 36-48 aircraft) and other modern weapons (Cobra and TOW): b) $50 million in FMS credits; $30 million in immediate DA and ESF reprogramming,with $60 million in an ESF supplemental for FY80 and $100 million in FY81.

29 June 1979

Note by Richard Lehman,National Intelligence Officer for Warning

I called attention to the potential dangers arising out of the Pakistani nuclear program. The more attention is called to it,the more alarmed the Indians will become. Given that they have fought two wars with Pakistan in the last 15 years and that the military balance is even more in their favor than before,they will be strongly motivated to prevent Pakistani acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by military force.

24 July 1979

Memorandum from CIA director

Pakistans apprehensions about Indian intentions will rise as Indias intensified preparation for preemptive air strikes or nuclear arms competition become more perceptible. Pakistans resistance to foreign pressure on its nuclear development plans will thus tend to harden,at least initially. While Pakistans leadership is almost certainly unwilling to transfer any nuclear explosives abroad,it could be tempted by possible offers of political and financial support from sympathisers in the Islamic world,particularly among the oil rich Arab states. Indeed,it might already have been induced to share with unidentified foreigners some sensitive nuclear equipment and to propose terms for possible future nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia,Libya or Iraq.