‘Mr PM,this is the deal of a lifetime.. let’s get it done’

The interests of the United States and India were in substantial alignment. But any change of this magnitude brings resistance. In Washington,the high priests of non-proliferation accused us of gutting the NPT,a treaty that had significantly limited the emergence of nuclear weapons states.

Our problems were considerable in 2006 but Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s were far more complicated,stemming from the Indian national security elite’s almost existential attachment to the “independence” of its nuclear programme. For some officials,the requirement to place India’s nuclear reactors (only the existing civilian ones and any new ones) under IAEA supervision amounted to nothing less than an attack on India’s sovereignty. Many of those Indian bureaucrats and pundits also valued their country’s “non-aligned status,” a relic of the Cold War,when India had declared itself as belonging to neither the Soviet nor the American “bloc”. When confronted with that argument,my Indian counterpart,K Natwar Singh,said,“The Cold War is over. Exactly against whom are we non-aligned?”

Good point. But for many in New Delhi the idea of close technological cooperation with the United States was just too much to swallow.

As a result of these tensions,the deal suffered several near-death experiences before and after Singh and Bush signed it in New Delhi. The first had come a year before in Washington,when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the United States in July 2005.

The two leaders were expected to sign a framework document to end the moratorium on nuclear trade and pave the way for a full agreement on civil-nuclear cooperation. I met the day before with my Indian counterpart Natwar Singh in his suite at the Willard Hotel. Frankly,there was so much buzz around the State Department that we wanted to work in a location away from the press and where the atmosphere was more informal. I also thought it a sign of respect to go to him,even though we were in Washington. Natwar was adamant. He wanted the deal,but the prime minister wasn’t sure he could sell it in New Delhi. We pushed as far as we could toward agreement. Finally,Natwar said that he would take the document to the prime minister and let me know.

That evening,[Under Secretary of State Nick Burns asked to see me. With Bob Zoellick,the deputy secretary,and several members of the senior staff,Phil Zelikow,Brian Gunderson,and Sean McCormack,in tow,he came down the hall from his office and entered mine. “It isn’t going to work,” Nick said. “The foreign minister tried,but the prime minister just can’t sign on to the agreement.”

I was a bit surprised,perhaps having misread Natwar’s determination as an indicator that he had the authority to speak for his government. It was late,and I was tired. “Well,if they don’t want to get out of the nuclear ghetto,I can’t do anything about it,” I said. “Why don’t you go and meet with the Indians and try one more time.” I called the President. “It isn’t going to work. Singh just can’t make it happen,” I said.

“Too bad,” he answered and didn’t press further. Later that night Nick called to tell me what I already knew — there wouldn’t be a deal.

I went to bed,constructing a script in my head for the press the next day about needing more time for the negotiations. That sounds lame,I thought as I drifted into a fitful sleep.

I woke up at 4:30 am and sat straight up in bed. I am not letting this go down,I thought. I called Nick at 5:00 am. “I am not prepared to let this fail. Arrange for me to see the prime minister,” I said. The meeting with the President was set for ten. “How about breakfast at eight?” Nick called while I was exercising to say that the prime minister didn’t want to meet. “Get the foreign minister,” I answered. Natwar picked up the phone. My heart was beating pretty fast — maybe from the exercise,maybe from the sense of an important initiative slipping through my fingers. “Natwar,why won’t the PM see me?”

“He doesn’t want to tell you no,” he said. “I’ve done my best. I told him that the United States wants to take this thirty-year millstone from around your neck. You should do it. But he can’t sell it in New Delhi.”

I wasn’t ready to surrender. “Ask him again,” I pleaded. A few minutes later,Natwar called to say that the prime minister would receive me at his hotel at 8 am.

I went to the office for a few minutes and then to the Willard,having called the President to tell him I would try personally one more time. Steve asked if I wanted him to go with me. “No,I think I need to do this alone,” I said. I entered the prime minister’s suite and sat there with Natwar and his boss — all three of us not bothering to touch the pastries and coffee that had been served.

“Mr Prime Minister,this is the deal of a lifetime. You and President Bush are about to put US-Indian relations on a fundamentally new footing. I know it’s hard for you,but it’s hard for the President too. I didn’t come here to negotiate language — only to ask you to tell your officials to get this done. And let’s get it done before you see the President.” Prime Minister Singh,a mild-mannered man who speaks slowly and softly,pushed back but eventually gave the nod to his people to try again.

I went directly to the White House and told the President what I’d done. When the Indians arrived,our negotiators and theirs sat in the Roosevelt Room,trying to find agreement,while the President,Prime Minister Singh,Natwar,and I sat nervously in the Oval pretending to focus on other matters. Finally,I got a note to join the negotiators. Natwar and I entered the room to the smiling Nick Burns and his counterpart. “We’ve got it,” Nick said.

The two leaders released the framework agreement to the press,most of whom were already writing stories of failure. Bob Zoellick came into my office. “Sometimes the secretary of state gets tested. You wouldn’t take no for an answer,” he said.

© Simon & Schuster India