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Journalism of Courage
BJP general secretary Arun Jaitley may have begun to sport a broad smile these days at the prospects of a personal hat-trick or at least a much better showing by the BJP in Bihar than initial projections, but any gains made by the party will be largely by default and through piggyback riding on the Janata Dal (United).
On the ground, the anti-RJD voters are veering towards the JD(U) and Lok Janshakti Party (LJP) much more than towards the BJP or Congress. Since both the JD(U) and LJP are led by leaders belonging to the lower castes, they are in a better place to take advantage of the mood for change without threatening a return to the upper-caste hegemony of the pre-Laloo (and pre-Mandalisation) era.
The Congress, which continues to enjoy the support of sections of its erstwhile base of Muslims, Dalits and upper castes, could have been a bigger beneficiary of the anti-RJD sentiment. However, because of its flip-flop tactics of both opposing and supporting Laloo Prasad Yadav, it has failed to emerge as a significant independent force.
The BJP has been far shrewder. Although it does not enjoy mass support outside urban pockets, it may make gains because of the alliance with JD(U). In several constituencies in north Bihar, this reporter was repeatedly told the battle was between ‘‘teer’’ (JD-U) and ‘‘lalten’’ (RJD), while in some cases it was ‘‘bangla’’ (LJP) versus ‘‘lalten’’.
Even in some seats where the BJP is in the fray, people refer to the candidate as belonging to ‘‘united’’ (a reference to both the JD-U and to their alliance with the BJP) but rarely say ‘‘kamal’’ (the BJP symbol). It is only in urban Sitamarhi or in parts of Patna that one heard of the ‘‘kamal ka phool’’.
Even in urban areas, the upper-caste and middle-class vote the BJP is hoping to get will be a result of the strong anti-Laloo mood in these sections for years rather than a pro-BJP sentiment.
The upper castes in Bihar, unlike their counterparts in neighbouring UP, have never been swayed by Hindutva as an ideology and even at the height of the Ram Janmabhoomi movement did not shift to the BJP, says historian Vijay Thakur. ‘‘In Bihar, the rise of the BJP was only because of the strong anti-RJD sentiment, not because of Hindutva.’’
Had the Congress taken a clear stand against the present regime, the upper castes—particularly Brahmins, and other sections of the urban professional class—would have voted for the party this time, Patna residents say. But the same people who voted for the Congress (and the RJD too) in the Lok Sabha polls eight months ago may not do so this time because if secularism was a key issue then, the failures of the Rabri government are the main issue now.
Aware of this reality and also that a high-decibel BJP campaign could make otherwise disenchanted Muslims flock back to the RJD, the party’s poll managers deliberately kept a very low profile in the first two phases of polls.
At the BJP national executive in Ranchi in November, it was announced that Shatrughan Sinha would lead a yatra in the state which was later cancelled. An angry Sinha told The Indian Express: ‘‘The rath was ready, I was ready but maybe out of insecurity or immaturity or in the best interests of the party, they changed the plans.’’ Four-five yatras would be taken out by different leaders. Sinha put his foot down—‘‘I said there can only be one yatra.”
There was no yatra at all. Even all that talk of projecting Uma Bharati as the OBC counter to Laloo never came to be. She did spend a few days in Bihar but was hardly seen or heard. And Sinha’s slender hope of being a chief minister candidate was also scotched when mid-way through the campaign, L K Advani announced Nitish Kumar’s name. This was no gesture of magnanimity. BJP leaders realised that a low-profile campaign as a junior partner of the JD(U) would help much more than unleashing Uma Bharati’s rhetoric or Shatrughan Sinha’s histrionics.
