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Journalism of Courage
GUWAHATI, Jan 20: Khoirabari, August 15, 1997: “A young girl, who had been shot in the arm, came to the thana to inform us about the incident. We had no vehicle or phone, just a wireless set. And none of us were armed. So we could not go. We were worried about our own security.” – S N Das, Sub-Inspector.
* Khoirabari, January 10, 1998: “Yesterday, we received a message at six in the evening that some militants were hiding in the fields…we could reach the spot only at 10.30 pm because the wireless set was with our patrol party.” – Mihir Jit Gayan, Deputy Superintendent of Police. On August 15 last year, 13 villagers were massacred in Khoirabari village. Though the police got the information, they could not reach the spot in time. Even now, the story is the same – and it holds true for the whole of Assam.
Almost every militant attack, every abduction and massacre in the state has police inaction written all over it. With a few wireless sets and vehicles, dead telephones and no sophisticated arms, the Assam police have been fighting a losing battle with the militants, who use state-of-the-art arms and know the terrain better.
“Yes, sometimes we cannot perform to the best of our ability or intentions because we do not have enough manpower and fire power. Roads are in a pathetic condition and most of the bridges have been blown up. There are not enough vehicles and wireless sets,” says S P Das, IG (operations). His telephone has been dead for the past two days.
The figures tell the rest of the story. In 1997, 316 civilians were killed, and the Assam police lost 20 men. Stories of police incompetence and perhaps connivance are plenty, surrounding each one of the 463 police stations and outposts in the state. Of the total 56,000 police personnel in Assam, who face over nine armed militant groups, only about 23,000 are armed – most with .303 rifles.
On January 20 last year, the Assam Government redefined the role of the police by making them an integral part of the Unified Command Structure. Neither trained nor equipped to fight insurgency, a mere redefinition of their role has not helped them in fighting insurgency.
Sub-Inspector S N Das, who is chief of an outpost which looks after 85 villages including Khoirabari, had written to the SP for a pistol before the massacre. “My request was turned down…they were out of stock,” he says.Assam police is at an all-time low. TOMORROW: Vulnerable force fights a battle without plans.
