HOLES IN THE WEB

The Indian intelligence system is complex. It consists of a maze of agencies with overlapping functions and no clear-cut reporting hierarchy. The prime agencies are the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the latter responsible for external intelligence. Besides, there are a number of other agencies, like the Directorate of Military Intelligence, which also engage in intelligence gathering. The National Security Advisor—a post created only recently and held currently by M.K. Narayanan, an ex-IB chief—is the nodal officer in charge of everything related to intelligence. He reports to the Prime Minister.

The Agencies
w Intelligence Bureau: The IB has the reputation of being the oldest intelligence agency in the world, tracing its origins to 1887 when the British government set up the Central Special Branch to procure early and authentic information about the political, economic and social conditions of the people. It also performed criminal investigations and military surveillance. It got its present name in 1920. Like other government institutions, it was bifurcated after Independence with one half going to Pakistan. The modern IB—as we know it today—was created and entrusted with the job of gathering both internal and external intelligence. It is headed by a Director, often a DGP-level IPS officer. The IB has its subsidiary units at the state level. The total intelligence-gathering workforce in the IB is in the range of 18,000.

w Research and Analysis Wing (RAW): It was created in 1968, after the wars with China (1962) and Pakistan (1965). With its agents in important cities of the world—mostly disguised in official positions in various Indian embassies—it is responsible for collecting information considered crucial to India’s strategic interests. Like in the Ministry of External Affairs, there are separate desks at the RAW headquarters that specialise in specific regions of the world. Legally, the RAW is an extension of the Cabinet Secretariat and reports to the NSA.

w Military Intelligence: All the three armed forces have their own intelligence units for their operational requirements. An important aspect of their function is to provide counter-intelligence in order to secure their strategic installations from surveillance and attack by enemy states.

w Central Para Military Forces Intelligence: Organisations like the Border Security Force (BSF), Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) rely on their own intelligence units, carrying out surveillance activities in the area of their operation.

w State intelligence units: At the lowest rung of the pyramid are the intelligence units of the various state police forces. In some states, it may be the Special Branch of the CID; in others, the Local Intelligence Unit (LIU).

The hierarchy
For a long time, the heads of RAW and IB reported directly to the Prime Minister. But with increasing instances of terror, new layers have been added. The current hierarchy was defined by the Atal Behari Vajpayee-led NDA government, which in 2002 created the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC, which comprises cabinet ministers and bureaucrats, is the highest decision-making body on matters relating to national strategic and security concerns.
The head of the council is the NSA who is the point-man for all issues related to national security. Brajesh Mishra was the first NSA. After the change of government in 2004, former foreign secretary J.N. Dixit was appointed the NSA. Following his death in 2005, Narayanan took over. NSA is assisted by three deputy NSAs, all former secretary level officers.
The IB Director, the RAW Secretary, and the directorates of military, air and naval intelligence report to the NSA, who in turn reports to the Prime Minister. Of late, the DIB also briefs the Home Minister almost on a daily basis.
Besides these, some other players are also working on the overall intelligence set-up. The NSC has a Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) whose job is to analyse the inputs provided by IB, RAW and units of the armed forces. There is also the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) which functions in close collaboration with RAW and IB and is responsible for garnering and analysing technical intelligence.

How the system works
Intelligence gathering essentially involves two aspects—human intelligence and technical intelligence. While the technical part involves such exercises as intercepting communication lines, forensics and encryptology, experts say more than 80 per cent of the work involves human intelligence. For this, the intelligence agencies rely on field officers who collect information at the ground level, either by mingling with the local population or from the informers they cultivate. Most often, it is a combination of both. These people, mostly in the rank of a constable or a sub-inspector, are the most crucial operators. There is a growing concern that reliance on human intelligence has dropped significantly in the last decade or so with technical intelligence growing in prominence.
The information gathered by the field officers moves through the ladder to the top, its pace dependent on its sensitivity and importance. Having analysed and assessed the inputs sent from the ground level, people at the top of the ladder issue reports or alerts to the relevant departments or state governments. The information is also to be shared with all other intelligence agencies.

Gaps in the network
Despite such an elaborate network, incidents like the ones in Bangalore and Ahmedabad highlight the fact that the intelligence set-up isn’t working as effectively as it should be. Experts point out that serial bomb blasts of the nature that rocked Ahmedabad would have required months of planning, the direct involvement of at least 80 to 100 people and a huge logistical exercise in terms of funding, communication and local support. Such a massive exercise should have been detected by any reasonably alert intelligence agency. But Ahmedabad is just an example. India’s intelligence apparatus is plagued by a number of problems.
w Multiplicity of agencies. With so many agencies entrusted with the responsibility of collecting intelligence, it was hoped that they would pick up every minute activity affecting the country’s security. In reality, however, this just adds to the confusion. Except for RAW, there are no clear-cut territories demarcated for the other agencies to carry out their operations. This results in many organisations working in the same area, often picking diametrically opposite inputs. w Lack of coordination. The multiplicity is further complicated by a lack of coordination between the agencies. There is hardly any understanding between the agencies to carry out joint operations or complement the efforts of each other. On the contrary, they often work at cross-purposes.
w Lack of political will. Despite 14 major terrorist attacks and several incidents of Naxal violence in the last three years, there is hardly any coherent response either from the Centre or the states. For years now, there have been talks of a federal investigating agency but nothing has come of it. As M.K. Dhar, a former joint director of the Intelligence Bureau who has written some path-breaking books on India’s intelligence set-up, put it, “India’s security suffers from a complete lack of political will to create tools of governance to fight jihad and other forms of organised terror.”
w Poor sharing of information and resources. Most of the intelligence reports filed by an agency are meant to be shared by all the other agencies. In reality, this happens rarely and only after reaching the highest levels of government, during which precious time is lost. Sharing of resources is even more rare.
w Inadequate penetration in certain populations. As the country faces a heightened threat from radical Islamic militants, the intelligence agencies have very less penetration in the Muslim community. There are very few Muslims working with them and many of them have little credibility within their communities, which limits their capability to garner information.
w Confusion over clear reporting structure. These days, the IB Director reports almost on a daily basis to the Home Ministry, which is responsible for internal security and law and order. The RAW Secretary continues to brief the NSA. The state intelligence units report to the respective DGP or an ADG or IG-level police officer of the state. Their information is rarely shared with the central agencies, which can prove costly especially when the information is also relevant to other states.
w Lack of resources. There is a huge shortage of resources, both in terms of manpower as well as modern equipment required to carry out sophisticated operations. The IB has a sanctioned staff strength of about 18,000 but its numbers are lower. One expert said the requirement was of at least 50,000 considering the security threat faced by the country.
w Secrecy and absence of effective laws. While a high degree of secrecy is necessary for the effective working of intelligence units, some experts point out the Indian system was too opaque in a manner that made it unaccountable. In many countries, the intelligence units are made accountable to Parliament. This is not the case in India.
w Output not actionable. Most of the alerts issued by the government are so general in nature that the authorities concerned can hardly act on them. Around important dates like August 15 or January 26, a flurry of alerts make the rounds but often they are so routine that they can only be utilised to apportion the blame on others in the event of an unfortunate incident.