Military Digest | Past US offers of fighter aircraft amid Chinese air threat to India

The US has historically been more concerned about the Chinese threat to India than about Pakistan. It has not shied away from arming Pakistan to the teeth, even in the face of vociferous Indian opposition. But the US has gone out of its way to assist India whenever the Chinese have posed a threat.

US assessment of Chinese threat

Historical records accessed from US State Department Archives reveal how the US military made a detailed assessment of IAF requirements against the Chinese soon after the 1962 war between India and China. In that conflict, India refrained from using the IAF in a direct attack role on the advancing Chinese troops for fear that the IAF would not be able to ward off a Chinese air attack on Indian cities.

Records dating back to 1964 indicate that the US assessment at the time was that China posed only a limited air threat to India. “The Chinese Air Force has the capability to conduct operations from present locations against northeast India using the IL-28 jet light bomber, and against nearly all important Indian targets with a few TU-4 piston-engined bombers. MIG-19, MIG-17, and MIG-15 jet fighters and TU-2 piston-engined attack aircraft could be brought into action, and the area coverage by the IL-28 could be increased by moving forward into Tibet-Sinkiang,” says one document.

The US thought that operations from these forward bases would entail serious logistical support problems and reduced capability due to high altitude. Because of these issues, it was not believed that the Chinese would move forward in force except to support a large-scale assault on India. “If such an operation were mounted, however, the Chinese could employ up to 275 jet and piston aircraft. An additional 135 aircraft could be employed from airfields in Burma, if available,” the report said.

At the time, to meet the Chinese air threat, the IAF had 309 jet fighters and 55 jet bombers in operational units. In performance, the Chinese MIG-19 is superior to the Indian Mystere, Hunter and Gnat fighters. “However, the Chinese had only a total of 80 MIG-19s, which they would probably hold in reserve to oppose the Chinese Nationalist threat. Indian fighter aircraft are comparable or superior in performance to the other jet fighters in the Chinese inventory, although the Gnat is the only Indian aircraft comparable to the MIG-17,” the report said.

US suggestions for IAF offensive role

The US suggested that, in view of the air assets available, the concept of operations that the IAF should use as a basis for force planning would be:

-Maximum effort in interdiction of Chinese supply routes in Tibet-Sinkiang.

-Continuous surveillance of airfields in Tibet-Sinkiang and attack of aircraft and facilities there as indicated by Chinese operations.

-Maintenance of a reasonably effective air defence system to counter sporadic Chinese attacks, recognising the impracticality of providing complete protection of Indian cities.

-Close support of Indian ground forces as appropriate.

-Withholding air attack on deep targets in China (such as Chengdu, Chungking, and Kunming), as operations against these relatively heavily defended targets would rapidly dissipate the Indian Canberra Force without an equitable payoff in achievement.

-Reliance on external support to ensure continued air superiority in the unlikely event of an all-out assault on India.

Exercise Shiksha of 1963

Exercise Shiksha, conducted in India in November 1963, revealed serious deficiencies in training and operational procedures of the Indian air defence system. The Americans found that logistical support in the IAF was also substandard and that the addition of a new and sophisticated type of aircraft to the inventory would compound these difficulties.

Possible alternatives discussed at the time to improve Indian air defence capability against the limited night/all-weather threat included:

A. Provide air-to-air missiles for Hunter or Gnat aircraft. This alternative would improve capability in clear air mass conditions but would not be effective in cloud conditions or provide airborne intercept radar.

B. Plan to provide US and UK air defence fighter units in an emergency as required. US plans were available and exercised during Exercise Shiksha.

C. Provide technical assistance to the Indians in indigenous production of an all-weather HF-24. This aircraft would not be available for several years, but it would have the advantage of increased performance and acceptability to India, while minimising adverse effects on Pakistan.

US offers of modern aircraft

Several options were considered by the US at the time, even as the Indian government was veering towards the MIG-21 as a viable option.

The US considered the F-104G aircraft as “very costly” and noted that its US production line would close in June 1964; however, the Canadian, European and Japanese lines were scheduled to continue production for some time. The aircraft had a limited all-weather capability, superior speed and a high rate of climb.

Another option discussed was the F-6A Skyray, a high-subsonic, all-weather fighter with a phenomenal rate of climb, which was well-suited to the Indian air defence problem. Additionally, the aircraft was almost immediately available at low cost. The 72 aircraft package proposed by Douglas, which included complete support for five years, was priced at only $28 million.

A third option was to provide the F-5. This was not an all-weather aircraft, and two squadrons of 36 aircraft, six trainers, initial spares, plus six months of follow-on support would cost $32.3 million.

“In consideration of the nature of the military requirement, the cost involved, and the impact on US-Pakistan relations, the preferred solution would be to plan to provide US/UK air defence units in an emergency and provide technical assistance for Indian production of an all-weather version of the HF-24,” the assessment concluded.