Military Digest | Pak armoured division attack in Khemkaran sector began and ended in a fiasco

Pak 1 Armoured Division fiasco

While Pakistan Army’s operational plans for attack in the Khemkaran sector by its 1 Armoured Division eventually envisaged the capture of the vital bridge over the Beas River and cutting off the Indian 11 Corps along with Amritsar, it never could fructify into major gains due to poor handling by formation commanders and inept regimental commanding officers.

Leading armoured squadrons showed fear

In a detailed interview given to Pakistani military historian Major Agha Humayun Amin, Lt Col Sami Ud Din of 24 Cavalry, then a squadron commander of 24 Cavalry in the rank of Major, shared that two squadrons of Pak 24 Cavalry and 6 Lancers, respectively, refused to budge across a canal at the appointed hour of attack on Khemkaran.

Lt Col Sami Ud Din mentioned that lead tank commander Major Utra’s tank toppled while crossing the bridge over a canal on the Pakistani side, resulting in his death. This caused a paralysis of action among the two squadron commanders who deemed the bridge to be unfit for armour to cross and kept twiddling thumbs.

Lt Col Sami Ud Din, who was the reserve squadron commander in this attack, ultimately decided to push forward on his own and said that when he reached the Indian side, he was met with a surprised-looking armoured brigade commander who was waiting for two squadrons to fetch up. Eventually, Sami Ud Din entered Khemkaran unchecked and even managed to reach the village of Asal Uttar on the first day itself, before being asked to come back to Khemkaran by his commanding officer, who was suffering from panic.

Maj Amin has further written that Sami Ud Din’s commanding officer collapsed with a nervous breakdown even before the actual operations of the 1965 War started.

“As per Sami, his commanding officer 24 Cavalry Lieutenant Colonel Ali Imam collapsed before the actual operations started during the orders group. Sami narrated that off and on he regained consciousness but was not operationally fit. Later on after the war a story was invented that he was shell shocked during actual operations,” wrote Maj Amin.

Sami Ud Din also described 6 Lancers as being demoralised while within Pakistani territory when their Squadron Commander, Major Utra, drowned in a canal after his tank overturned and fell into the canal.

Maj Amin further mentioned that in an interview with him, a veteran of the Pakistan Army’s 1965 operations, Brigadier Z A Khan, told him that 90 per cent of Pakistan’s 1st Armoured Division’s commanders were in a state of collapse/nervous breakdown.

Pakistani plan of attack

The Pakistani plan, conceived by Maj Gen Saibzada Yaqub Khan (later Lt Gen and foreign minister of Pakistan), envisaged an advance by 3 Armoured Brigade along Sobraon Branch to secure the Beas Bridge, a distance of 60 miles and an advance by the 4 Armoured Brigade along Kasur Branch to Jandiala Guru on Grand Trunk Road east of Amritsar, a distance of some 50 miles.

If the 1 Armoured Division had succeeded in accomplishing this plan, this would have meant that the entire Indian 11 Corps would have been encircled and forced to either surrender or withdraw towards Pathankot.

The Pakistani Generals thought the Indian Army would have been forced to do a ceasefire and would have lost all territory, including crucial cities like Amritsar till the Beas River, wrote Maj Amin.

Pak attack

At 1430 Hours, September 6, 2 Frontier Force (FF) Regiment was ordered by 11 Division Headquarters to capture a bridgehead across the Rohi Nala by the morning of September 7. The 5 Armoured Brigade was ordered to secure “line Bhikkiwind-Patti as soon as possible”.

The 5 Armoured Brigade attack was to commence at 0500 Hours on September 7; however, it was delayed to 1130 Hours because of a delay in bridge construction on Rohi Nala, which was within Pakistani territory. By 1600 Hours, only about a tank squadron strength of the 6 Lancers, the leading unit of the 5 Armoured Brigade, had crossed the Rohi Nala since one of its tanks had got stuck on the Rohi Nala Bridge.

Pakistanis lost the initiative on September 7 itself with just 10 tanks across the Rohi Nala. Unknown to them at the time, there was virtually no Indian opposition against them, with many units having deserted under heavy artillery fire and only a handful of Indian Infantry manning trenches between Khemkaran and Bhikhiwind on the road to Amritsar.

“While all this was happening, Brig Bashir, commander 5 Armoured Brigade was throwing to winds Pakistan’s Armour superiority by dividing his brigade into two directions with 24 Cavalry to advance along axis Khem Karan-Bhikiwind and 6 Lancers towards Valtoha Railway Station. 6 Lancers reached Valtoha Railway Station but was recalled after last light back to Khem Karan by Brigadier Bashir to leaguer (rest for the night) in line with the old British practice which in this scenario was not required,” wrote Maj Amin.

By September 9, when the Pakistani armour once again commenced its advance, the Indian side had regained composure and Indian tanks were well positioned with infantry to checkmate the Pakistanis.

To make matters worse for Pakistanis, Lt Col Sahibzad Gul, Commanding Officer, 6 Lancers, a man showing drive and initiative in battle, was killed near Valtoha on September 9.

It was between September 8-10, 60 years ago, that the epic Battle of Asal Uttar was fought, and the Pakistani armoured attack was stopped in its tracks, inflicting heavy losses on them.

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