Over 14 years ago, on May 2, 2011, the US Navy Seals pulled off one of their most audacious operations — in Abbottabad, a military cantonment in Pakistan — and slipped away with a prized trophy, the body of the world’s most wanted terrorist, al-Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden.
But what happened in Pakistan after the world discovered that Osama had been hiding in Abbottabad for years? How severe was the backlash in Pakistan for its leadership, its Army and its intelligence agencies?
A recently released book on Asif Ali Zardari’s first stint as Pakistan president from 2008-2013, penned by his close aide and spokesperson Farhatullah Babar, offers a rare insight into the “national humiliation” that followed Osama’s killing.
Published by Rupa, the book, titled The Zardari Presidency: Now It Must Be Told, has a 50-page section detailing just the US raid on the Abbottabad compound and a vivid description of the “shock, confusion and paralysis” in Pakistan afterwards. The al-Qaeda founder was wanted in connection with the airline hijackings and suicide attacks by the outfit in the US on September 11, 2001, that had killed thousands.
Babar’s book juxtaposes the goings-on in Islamabad during those 40 minutes when Osama was taken out by the US Navy Seals against the squabble for power between the ruling Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and its ally, the Pakistan Muslim League-Q (PML-Q).
His book states, “The realization that the raid on the OBL (Osama) compound was taking place just as politicians were wrangling over power-sharing while the defenders remained unaware was deeply unsettling, evoking feelings of embarrassment, despair, and fear.”
Once the “shocking news” of the Abbottabad raid was known, the book mentions a 6.30 am meeting being called at the President’s office, with then Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar, Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir and the author in attendance. Babar recalls: “For the past decade, Pakistan had been denying any knowledge about Osama. It had been caught on the wrong foot…”
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He reveals that after a 90-minute meeting, President Zardari asked him what he thought about the situation. While the President kept his cards close to his chest, Babar’s own reaction was spontaneous. “Complicit or sheer incompetence, nothing else…an inquiry must be ordered immediately. Some action must be seen to have been taken against the Army and the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan’s military intelligence agency) Chiefs,” he told the President.
Pakistan was caught between a rock and a hard place after the Abbottabad raids, Babar surmises. “It could neither claim credit for the operation nor admit to a dismal intelligence failure and lack of army preparedness. It was a clear case of complicity or incompetence.”
It would be 14 hours before Pakistan formulated an official response to the US strike. And this was the author’s reaction to the communiqué: “The official press release’s claim that intelligence-sharing with the US had made it possible looked hollow and unconvincing. The web of lies and deceit had been exposed and failed to arouse any conviction.”
While Babar was convinced that the Osama fiasco presented an opportunity for an intelligence overhaul in Pakistan, President Zardari was of the opinion that there should be an inquiry commission, “but not with a view to punish anyone”.
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The President, he says, rejected the call for accountability. Babar adds that Zardari told him that both inquiry reports after the 9/11 attacks and the 2008 Mumbai attacks focused on improving procedures and systems, and not on punishing individuals.
Babar recalls Zardari telling him that an “important country” — without taking names — had expressly advised him not to take punitive action against the Army generals.
In his conclusion on the Abbottabad section in his book, the former spokesperson for the Pakistan president says, “…there would be no investigations, accountability, or restructuring of the intelligence apparatus in the wake of the OBL (Osama) fiasco. The civilian leadership got cold feet and did not want it. The military leadership did not want it to protect their pride. It was claimed that some foreign Governments also did not want it…the opportunity for intelligence overall was lost…”
Pakistan’s Foreign Office, Babar says, “faced a challenging and complex task of cleaning up a mess that was not of its creation”.
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He also described the discomfiture in Pakistan over high-level visits from the US, including those by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Senator John Kerry, shortly after the compound raid. Following Clinton’s visit on May 27, 2011, Pakistan wanted an “assurance” that the Abbottabad raids would not be used as a precedent for “unilateral” strikes in the future. However, such assurances were not forthcoming.
The book offers other disclosures too. For instance, the American intelligence’s awareness of details like the identity of the contractor who had built Osama’s hideout and other safe houses. The book also reveals that following Clinton’s visit, a CIA team met Osama’s wives in the compound in the military cantonment and that they were in the “custody” of Pakistani investigating agencies after Osama’s death.
A journalist who switched over to politics, Babar was the official speech-writer for Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan’s first woman Prime Minister, during her first term from 1988 to 1990. Babar would go on to serve as Bhutto’s spokesperson during her second term as the prime minister of Pakistan from 1993 to 1996. Bhutto, who was married to Zardari, was assassinated in 2007.
