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Journalism of Courage
THE latest India-Pakistan crisis has been defused as a result of international, notably US, intercession. Today we are witnessing the second phase of diplomacy, beginning with the visit of US Secretary of State Colin Powell to the region by month-end. But General Pervez Musharraf’s difficulties have not eased. He now faces the domestic consequences of the decision to reverse Pakistan’s 25-year-old involvement with Jihad and Islamic militancy. With the murder of Afghanistan’s vice-president and of several Pakistani army officers by the Al-Qaeda, there is anger in the Pakistani army. Yet, a refusal to contain the militants will bring Pakistan to the brink of crisis.
Faced with Indian threats of military action, Musharraf expected the international community to restrain New Delhi. Instead, most world leaders — from President George W Bush to Russia’s Vladimir Putin — called upon Pakistan to concede India’s demands. Musharraf has discovered that alliance with the US does not guarantee support against India.
The US will use its own technological means to ascertain whether Pakistan and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir are still being used as a base for militant operations. The US also seems to have assured Musharraf that it will urge India to resume dialogue with him. But while the US may keep its promise of urging India, it is in no position to coerce compliance.
General Musharraf has a tough act on his hands, one that requires untested political skills. He will have to roll back the Jihadi movement without appearing to do so under pressure and without getting an immediate quid pro quo over Kashmir. He will probably face defiance from the militants and the religious parties, as well as ideologues within Pakistan’s civil and military bureaucracy. He could pull through if he reached out to mainstream political parties and if India eased pressure on him.
The problem is that the General hates Pakistan’s politicians almost as much as he dislikes India. Consider his latest Constitutional amendments, aimed as it is in preventing former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif from contesting the October elections.
Musharraf could try to keep up his anti-India rhetoric at least in public, which may not go down too well with BJP and RSS hardliners. These hardliners may then seek out ways of embarrassing him, which would bring us back to the confrontational mode. Colin Powell’s visit attaches significance from this angle because, if we return to confrontation, the breathing space provided by the Armitage and Rumsfeld missions could evaporate in a very short time.
In an interview with The Washington Post, Musharraf said India’s real objective was to diminish Pakistan’s sovereignty. But the question that remains un-addressed is why, despite its military alliances and intelligence exchanges the country keeps getting itched by the world’s major powers. And why is it unable to internationalise the Kashmir issue as a question of self-determination as it seeks to.
The reason lies in factors that Musharraf, as a military man, may not comprehend. The strength of nations these days does not depend solely on military factors. Intellectual output, economic growth and diplomatic potential are also important elements of a country’s power. Pakistan has consistently neglected these factors.
General Muhammad Moosa, Chief of Pakistan’s army during the 1965 war, went on to become Governor of then West Pakistan. After his retirement, he was asked why he failed so miserably as Governor after such an illustrious career as a soldier. ‘‘In the army’’, he said, ‘‘I was trained to locate the enemy and liquidate the enemy. In politics. it is not always easy to locate who and where the enemy is and sometimes you discover that you can’t liquidate him even if you locate him.’’ Musharraf would do well to heed his words.
(The writer is a Visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC.)
