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Journalism of Courage
According to media reports, a new war doctrine was discussed during the recent Army Commanders’ Conference held in April. While the full details of the doctrine would naturally remain classified, the briefing by the official spokesperson did mention about the concept of ‘‘battle groups’’ being employed in place of the existing ‘‘strike’’ formations. Since this would amount to a total revamp of the prevailing system, it needs detailed deliberation.
The origin of ‘‘battle groups’’ as an idea can be traced back to the Germans during the concluding stages of the Second World War on the Russian front and in Europe. At the onset, the Germans had organised their war machine into Panzer armies, corps and divisions. However, after 1943, these German formations were no more than a ‘ghost’ of themselves, and the idea of ‘‘battle groups’’ took birth.
These actions of the ‘‘battle groups’’ achieved two things. One, ensured the time required to organise a new line of resistance, and secondly, gave a psychological boost to the German troops—that their Army was still capable of offensive action. However, after the initial success, they were forced to disengage, to be committed at another point of crisis. There were no reserves available to exploit the success achieved by them and their own combat strength could not sustain them beyond 48-72 hours.
On the other hand, our strategic reserves are organised into strike corps, and their commitment can take any shape. There are many possibilities regarding the employment of the strike corps. These impose decision dilemmas on the minds of the enemy commanders, especially for positioning of reserves. It is the commitment of reserves which decides the outcome of a battle. These strike corps have not only the capability to penetrate the enemy defences but more importantly to bring to battle the enemy’s theatre/ strategic reserves and then degrade them in a mobile battle which could last several days. During battle, should there be a requirement to detach a smaller force for a specific mission, the strike corps has the inherent capability, say a combat command which is essentially a battle group organised and tasked for a limited mission.
Strike corps generally have an independent armoured brigade integral to them, which again is like a battle group. An independent armoured brigade or a combat command when allotted to an infantry division gives it the capability to develop a thrust line which could carry out a tactical manoeuvre by itself or in concert with the corps. The strike corps thus provides to the Commander unlimited operational and strategic flexibility in planning and execution of offensive operations.
The initial planning is comparatively a simple matter because it can be done in the peaceful ambience of operation rooms at leisure. Intelligence inputs can be obtained and various options debated. However, once the battle has been joined, the situation becomes dynamic.
The orchestration of large formations in a rapidly changing situation requires tactical acumen and leadership of the highest order. In our Army, we do not seem to train and practise our senior commanders adequately at the level of corps and divisions to handle such situations under realistic conditions. Late General K Sunderji made such an attempt by holding exercise Brass Tacks, in which corps-level formations were practised by the Army and the Command HQ.
By advocating dismantling of the strike corps and armoured divisions, our military hierarchy has taken an easier way out: ‘‘If you can’t handle them, do away with them’’. Before that is done, the issue needs serious thought and debate.
Let us look at the 1965 and 1971 wars. During the 1965 war, our No 1 Corps was launched in the Sialkot Sector. While severe attrition was caused to the enemy by good tank gunnery and tactics, we did not achieve any strategic objectives. The weight of the Corps could not be brought to bear on the enemy in a ‘Corps Coordinated Battle’.
In 1971, the same Corps was allotted both defensive and offensive responsibilities. As a result, the Corps Commander must have faced a dilemma—how much to commit in the defensive and what to launch in the offensive. Eventually, offensives were launched by division-sized forces reinforced by armoured regiments/brigades. The result was that the enemy’s covering troops, hastily organised, were able to delay these offensives for almost 10-12 days before the main defences could be contacted. The bridgehead across Basantar river on the night of December 15-16th, 1971, and the ensuing tank battle was a saving grace.
If the war had continued, there were no reserves available to exploit the victory at the Battle of Basantar. Let us at least draw lessons from own experience.
Battle groups can at best make a dent in the enemy’s defences but can’t achieve a breakthrough in the developed terrain. Similarly, in semi-desert or desert terrain, they can’t carry out a turning move by themselves. To provide optimum combat support resources (artillery, air defence artillery, engineers and signals) would also be difficult for battle groups. We would need to raise many more units of these arms.
The very existence of strategic reserves also impacts on an adversary’s psyche. He has to cater to multifarious options that strike corps can generate. As against this, ‘‘battle groups’’, the types which are being talked about, will only be capable of pinpricks.
This will leave his strategic reserves free to strike at will and carry the war into our territory and perhaps keep it there. Moreover, the planning process would also be adversely affected. While a ‘‘strike corps’’ commander would think and plan at the strategic level, a ‘‘battle group’’ commander would be thinking at tactical level and would probably not look beyond 10-15 km from the border. As a result, the strategic vision in planning would be lacking.
(The writer commanded an armoured division and was Chief of Staff of a Strike Corps before retirement)
