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Journalism of Courage
When the crystal adorning the pinnacle of an important Buddhist shrine in the ancient city of Anuradhapura was blown off by strong winds and damaged, Sri Lankans said it was a bad omen. The next day, further north, in the battlefields of the Vanni mainland, 164 commandos of the military’s elite Special Force and Air Mobile units were killed in a gruesome battle against the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), with whom the Sri Lankan government is at war.
But last week’s debacle in Vanni might be less due to a broken crystal and more because of the government’s hurry to somehow complete before the end of this year the six-month-old military offensive code-named Operation Jaya Sekuru. Aimed at securing a land route connecting the southern mainland with Jaffna peninsula through LTTE-held territory, the successful completion of the operation is the linchpin of the government’s political strategy in the coming months. And therefore the haste.
Instead of heeding cautionary advice by the army top brass to suspend the operation in October and wait for the north-east monsoons to blow over before pushing ahead again, the government replaced senior commanding officers who offered this advice with those believed to be more amenable. And according to reports, defence minister Anuruddha Ratwatte has instructed the replacements to bash ahead and complete the operation by the year-end.
Since the operation began in May this year, the military has managed to take control of about 50 kms of the 75-km Vavuniya-Killinochchi route — some of it on a main highway and the rest through swampy wasteland.
Last week, as rains lashed the north, the army’s Special Forces, a crack unit of commandos especially trained for Operation Jaya Sekuru, broke out of their positions to once again attempt a push towards Mankulam. Apparently, the Tigers were well prepared for such an advance and using mainly artillery and mortars, managed to inflict terrible losses.
In the six months since Operation Jaya Sekuru was launched, the number of soldiers who have been killed in combat now exceeds 1,000, while twice that number of LTTE cadres have also perished, according to the defence ministry. Such losses, that too in a single operation, are unprecedented for Sri Lanka. Thousands have been injured on both sides during this offensive, the most ambitious military operation by Sri Lanka in the 14-year-old ethnic conflict.
It is not known yet whether the timetable for the completion of Jaya Sekuru has now been revised, but as army commanders ponder on how best to regroup forces after being routed in last Thursday’s encounter near Mankulam, it is clear that whatever respite the soldiers get will be a brief one.
And the main reason is that Kumaratunga’s "political strategy" in the coming months hinges on the completion of Jaya Sekuru. According to analysts, Kumaratunga is seeking to kill two birds with one stone: put in place a political framework that meets Tamil aspirations and at the same time, try and destroy the UNP as a credible political force.
In pursuit of this, there is a definite possibility that instead of looking for opposition assistance in Parliament for the necessary two-thirds support for the proposed new constitution — which includes proposals for sharing power with the minority Tamil community — Kumaratunga may hold a nation-wide referendum early next year to directly secure the country’s backing for it.
But before she takes the plunge, Kumaratunga first needs a major success in the battlefield. This government has time and again explained to the country that the fierce military onslaught against the LTTE in the north is necessary for eventual ethnic peace in the country. Coining the slogan of "war for peace", Kumaratunga has repeatedly stated that her government’s proposals to meet Tamil political aspirations can be implemented as soon as the LTTE is militarily marginalised.
Unless that is done, at least substantially if not completely, the government runs the risk of losing face. Securing a main supply route linking the peninsula with Colombo through area controlled by the LTTE may not spell the end for the militant group, but it can be projected by the government as such.
LTTE leader Velupillai Prabahakaran, who delivered a thundering speech last month exhorting his cadres to fight on, seems equally determined to stop the advance, prepared to throw into battle as many men and women as it takes.The Tigers may also use diversionary tactics in other areas forcing the army to reduce the heat in Vanni. According to reports, the LTTE has set its sights on disrupting the fragile peace in Jaffna and has appointed intelligence chief Pottu Amman in charge of this operation.
But the question is: To what extent the Sri Lankan army will allow itself to be pushed in order to meet the political objectives of the government?
Series of setbacks
May 13: Operation Jaya Sekuru is launched with two divisions of the army numbering nearly 20,000 men. The operation is Sri Lanka’s biggest and most ambitious military offensive. The aim: to secure a 75-km route from Vavuniya to Killinochchi from the LTTE to open a main supply route to Jaffna.
June 10: LTTE counter-attacks Jaya Sekuru at Omanthai, 5 kms north of Vavuniya. 180 soldiers killed, 300 wounded, 27 missing.June 24: LTTE attacks Jaya Sekuru once again near Periyamadhu, 15 kms north of Vavuniya. 75 soldiers killed, 201 wounded.August 1: Third attack by LTTE on defence lines near Puliyankuam, 18 kms north of Vavuniya. Attack thwarted but 70 soldiers and policemen killed.September 30: Attacks by LTTE on forward positions at Karuppakuthi, north-east of Puliyankulam. 48 soldiers killed, 20 missing and 308 wounded.October 6: LTTE counter-offensive at Karuppadimurippu, north-east of Puliyankulam. 30 soldiers killed, 42 wounded, large amounts of arms and ammunition taken away.December 4: LTTE attacks once again near Kanakarayankulam. Over 160 dead and 400 injured.
