SC rejects Delhi Waqf Board’s claim over gurdwara: ‘Religious structure already functioning there… should relinquish claim’

The counsel appearing for the Waqf Board said it had filed a suit for possession against the defendant Hira Singh. The plea claimed that the property in dispute, i.e., a mosque at Oldenpur Village, Shahadra, is waqf property and has been used as a waqf since time immemorial.

The counsel pointed out that the trial court decided in its favour, and this was confirmed by the appellate court in 1989. However, on second appeal, a single judge of the Delhi High Court dismissed the suit. He submitted that the lower courts had ruled there was a mosque at the site, but now “some kind of gurdwara is there.”

Justice Sharma said, “not some kind of, (but) a proper functioning gurdwara. Once there is a gurdwara, let it be. A religious structure is already functioning there. You should yourself relinquish that claim, you see.”

Opposing the Board’s claim over the property, defendant Hira Singh had contended that it is not a waqf property and that the owner, Mohd Ahsaan, had sold it to him in 1953. He said the premises in dispute was being used as a gurdwara.

Ruling against the Board, the HC single-judge had said, “Oral and documentary evidence establishes that the suit property was private property. There is no evidence forthcoming to substantiate the submission of the plaintiff that, thereafter, there was a permanent dedication of the suit property by the owner as a waqf property… A mere bald statement in the plaint that this property was being used since time immemorial as a waqf property was not sufficient to establish this plea; this has not been corroborated by any of the witnesses of the plaintiff on oath.”

The HC added that the Board’s star witness “has admitted that this gurdwara is functioning in this property since Partition, i.e., since 1947…”

The HC had added that the documents “show that this property was privately owned. There was no intention to create a waqf; the intention and user have to be coupled.”

It said defendant Hira Sigh “was admittedly in occupation of this property since 1947-48. It is also true that the defendant was not able to adduce any document of title to evidence the purchase of this property, yet this does not in any manner benefit the plaintiff, who has to establish his own case and prove it to enable him to obtain a decree of possession.”