Thankfully, the clash between the Indian Army and the Chinese PLA at Yangtse in the Tawang sector of Arunachal Pradesh on December 9 did not result in fatalities, though some jawans have been badly injured in the hours-long combat, fought on both sides with sticks and clubs. The Indian soldiers fought to thwart the transgression bravely and succeeded in pushing the Chinese soldiers back across the Line of Actual Control. According to Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, who made a statement in both houses of Parliament, the two sides are disengaged, and the local area commanders have held a flag meeting to discuss modalities to restore “peace and tranquility” in the area. Singh said India had also taken up the incident through diplomatic channels. On the face of it, the incident — the most serious stand off between the two sides in the eastern sector and the first violent “contact” between the two armies since the Galwan killings of June 2020 — appears to have been managed well by both sides to prevent further escalation.
That the incident took place at all is not a good sign, especially as hundreds of Chinese troops were involved in the operation. Singh said their intention was “to change the status quo” at Yangtse, that is, wrest the area from India. This broadly conforms to the view in Delhi that China is no longer interested in resolving the border issue through talks, and is determined to pursue, always at a time and place of its choosing, its territorial claims along the disputed border through tactics successfully deployed in Ladakh and attempted once again in Tawang. The Indian Army had for long anticipated that the PLA would activate the eastern sector of the LAC, and to that extent, it is evident that steps were taken to beef up military preparedness in the region. What the incident has effectively achieved though is the lighting up of one more section of the LAC at a time the issues in Ladakh have not yet been settled, from the point of view of India. After 16 rounds of talks, a disengagement has taken place in eastern Ladakh, but it has not restored the status quo that prevailed in April 2020. China, for its part, appears reluctant to hold any further rounds of talks on the leftover problems in Ladakh, including its play in Depsang and Demchok areas.
India’s relationship with China has been teetering from bad to worse over the last 32 months since the standoff in Ladakh began, and it seems unlikely to improve unless Beijing’s calculus vis a vis India and the region undergoes a drastic change. While Delhi’s G20 leadership may bring opportunities for engagement with Beijing, what is required first is a clear vision and a grand strategy to deal with the China challenge, instead of reacting to each crisis as it emerges.
