The familiar problems of the world of globalism were on full display in the last few days — at the talks on climate change, the Asia Pacific economic cooperation, and the effort to strengthen global governance under G20. This world of globalism is unlikely to survive in its present form as Donald Trump prepares to hurl a wrecking ball against it. President-elect Trump is not bound by the ideologies that once guided — and often tripped up — many of his post-war predecessors. These include concepts such as “liberal internationalism,” “America’s global leadership,” “the rules-based order,” and “multilateralism”. The freedom from globalism reinforces Trump’s instinct for transactional foreign policy, reminiscent of his popular 1987 book, The Art of the Deal. Trump’s deal-making inclination, which was restrained in his first term by mainstream figures from the foreign policy establishment, is likely to find full expression in his second term.
Pursuing America’s proclaimed principles has always been challenging amid real-world complexities and inevitable domestic resistance following initial enthusiasm for foreign adventurism. Maintaining ideological purity in a world that demands constant compromise has proven difficult, often inviting inevitable accusations of hypocrisy.
By explicitly rejecting these lofty ideals and abandoning the claim that America has a special responsibility to lead the world, Trump frees himself and his administration from past burdens. This approach resonates with large sections of Trump’s support base who reject “globalism” and embrace the idea of “America First.” The strong opposition to globalism also underpins resistance to wars in distant lands.
It’s paradoxical that “nationalist” and “right-wing” Trump Republicans now view themselves as the “peace party” in America. Equally paradoxical is that liberals denounce those on the Republican side calling for restraint and peace as “Russian assets”. The liberal media has long demonised former Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard as a “Russian proxy”. A similar narrative is already emerging against many of Trump’s nominees for critical national security posts. Gabbard has been nominated to head the US national intelligence establishment. The accusations of “foreign influence” and “treachery” are not exclusive to the right; the American left employs these tactics as well. Trump’s opposition to wars has a flip side — the notion of “peace through strength”. Trump and his supporters advocate peace while insisting on a strong military capable of punishing those who challenge the US. Their emphasis is on avoiding needless wars in the name of broad global objectives and leadership claims but be ready to deploy force in full measure when needed.
Some nominees, however, come from the old school of muscular globalism. The anti-war faction in the Republican Party has openly opposed the nomination of former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and former UN envoy Nikki Haley to senior cabinet positions in the new administration. Both Pompeo and Haley have been attacked as “warmongers” of the “deep state”.
There’s also apparent unease among some party members regarding the nomination of Senator Marco Rubio as the new Secretary of State and Congressman Mike Waltz as National Security Advisor — both of whom have supported interventionist policies. It’s worth noting that all US administrations include senior figures with diverse approaches to national security issues, with the President having the final say in determining a particular course of action.
On one issue, though, there seems to be unity. While Trump’s domestic coalition broadly opposes deeper involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts, there remains unwavering support for Israel and its war against Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. The current policy of total support for Israel is expected to continue under Trump, even as he seeks to strengthen ties with Gulf Arab nations.
Trump’s transactional diplomacy involves making or demanding deals from both adversaries and allies at global and regional levels. Countries adept at hard bargaining and skilled in give-and-take are likely to fare well in dealings with the Trump administration. Trump’s interlocutors will need to adapt to his unconventional negotiation tactics — ranging from bold moves to public confrontation. We witnessed this in his dealings with Pakistan and North Korea during his first term. One day he would threaten to bomb Pakistan and North Korea; the next, he would host Prime Minister Imran Khan or become the first US President to step onto North Korean soil.
Crucially, Trump’s transactional approach will be bolstered by America’s growing power relative to other nations in the international system. Contrary to popular narratives of American decline, the US economy is thriving, and its intensifying technological clout is the envy of rivals and friends. Meanwhile, the Eurozone, once comparable to the American economy, is now shrinking in comparison. China, previously expected to overtake the US economy by the end of this decade, may not achieve this goal now — or ever. China’s steep demographic decline is exacerbating its economic deceleration.
Although China, with its GDP approaching $20 trillion and rapid advancement in technological, industrial, and military capabilities, will remain a formidable force, its ability to supplant the US as the world’s leading power (with a GDP nearing $30 trillion) is diminishing. Could China build a coalition — described these days as the “axis of autocracies” by the Western liberals — to challenge U.S. dominance? This seems unlikely, given the internal contradictions within any such alliance that would limit the effectiveness of shared anti-US sentiments.
More significant is the prospect that Trump’s transactional diplomacy, focusing on separate deals with coalition members, could weaken potential anti-American alliances. Interventionists tend to make sweeping ideological claims — such as rolling back communism in Southeast Asia (John F Kennedy), promotion of democracy in the Middle East (George W Bush), and establishing a rules-based world order (Barack Obama). Joe Biden’s framing of global conflict as “democracies versus autocracies” has led some to envision an American battle against the axis of autocracies, that includes Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Trump has little patience for such abstractions. His focus on bilateral deals with members of the “axis” could, in fact, prevent the consolidation of an autocratic alliance. Trump’s transactional approach might enable the US to navigate global politics more effectively than his predecessors, who often allowed ideology to overshadow pragmatic policymaking.
Trump’s deal-making focus, even from a position of strength, doesn’t necessarily guarantee smooth sailing. In any negotiation, the other party, even a weak one, has a vote. A deal with Russia, for instance, must satisfy Vladimir Putin without compromising America’s European allies. As Trump’s team discusses ending the war in Ukraine, Putin is working to consolidate his military position before Trump takes office. Biden, with nine weeks left before handing over to Trump, is complicating Putin’s plans by allowing Ukraine to use missiles against targets in Russia. Any restructuring of US relations with China under Trump must factor in the concerns of America’s Asian partners, including India. An American deal with North Korea must have support from South Korea and Japan. And its engagement with Iran must consider the sensitivities of Israel and the Gulf Arabs.
But do expect Trump to move boldly away from globalist dreams to bilateral deal-making. Major powers are gearing up to adapt. Despite their rhetoric on building a new order, Putin and Xi are more than eager to cut deals with Trump. On its part, Delhi needs to temper its recent globalist exuberance and focus on beneficial bilateralism with the US that can strengthen India’s comprehensive national power.
The writer is contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express
