By Gadde Omprasad
The United States seems to be increasingly active in India’s eastern neighbourhood, particularly in Bangladesh, Myanmar, and the Bay of Bengal region, as part of the broader Indo-Pacific Strategy released in February 2022 by the Joe Biden administration. In subsequent years, the US-Bangladesh Partnership Dialogues and the Security Dialogues were held to deepen the bilateral cooperation between the two countries. These dialogues covered maritime security, trade, governance, Indo-Pacific collaboration, and strategic access to the Bay of Bengal. Since then, the US has engaged Bangladesh with maritime surveillance, disaster response operations and military exercises, including Tiger Shark, conducted in August. Accordingly, the US State Department’s 2025 factsheet highlighted Bangladesh as an important partner in its Indo-Pacific strategy. The recent US Ambassador-designate to Bangladesh, Brent Christensen’s October Senate hearing statement, also notes that stronger military ties with Bangladesh are essential to offset China’s influence in the region.
In Myanmar, following the military coup in February 2021, the US has also been attempting to engage with the rebel groups that are controlling large territories in both Kachin and Rakhine states. Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and its allies dominate most of the territories in Kachin state, while the Arakan Army controls more than 80 per cent of the territory in Rakhine state. Though the US did not engage in official discussions with these rebel groups, its interactions with ethnic groups and civil society in these regions highlights its attempt to connect to them in a coordinated and systematic way. The well-calibrated attempts to reach out to the various ethnic communities in the form of providing humanitarian assistance were visible through the US’s direct and backed initiatives. One, it supported and assured financial assistance to the UN-proposed Bangladesh–Myanmar humanitarian corridor, and two, it approached the local ethnic communities in Kachin state through its Chargé d’Affaires in Myanmar, Susan Stevenson’s visit to the region in August, a first by an American diplomat since the military coup. Both these initiatives were to expand the US presence along India’s eastern neighbourhood, and were also motivated by the goal of countering China’s domination in the region.
Both the Kachin and Rakhine states in Myanmar are geo-strategically and economically critical to China, as the former is rich in Dysprosium and Terbium, two critical rare earth minerals that play a critical role in high-tech, aerospace, and green technology. The available data shows that from 2017 to 2024, the region accounted for two-thirds of China’s overall imports of these minerals and increased from the value of a few million to more than 3 billion USD. According to the Institute for Strategy and Policy data, the mining sites have more than tripled since the coup in 2021. As the United States seeks to diversify critical mineral supply chains away from China, engagement with Kachin’s resource-rich areas may serve both humanitarian and strategic objectives, as well as make it a crucial frontier in the broader US-China strategic rivalry. Available data shows that there is a sharp decline of up to 89 per cent in rare earth minerals exports from the region to China between December 2024 and the middle of 2025 because of the Kachin Independence Army’s takeover of the majority of mining sites. In that context, Stevenson’s visit to the region commands great significance. Rakhine state facilitates direct access to the Bay of Bengal for China, a solution to its Malacca dilemma. As part of its China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, China has already invested more than $5 billion connecting its Yunnan province to the Kyaukphyu deep sea port through energy pipelines and transportation projects. Though the Sittwe and Kyaukphyu ports are still under the military junta’s dominance, the US presence and engagements with the Arakan Army can pose a considerable challenge to the Chinese interests.
The increasing US-China competition in both Bangladesh and Myanmar has significant implications for India’s strategic, economic, and regional interests. As both neighbours are part of India’s regional connectivity projects in its Act East Policy, the US’s growing presence presents a mix of opportunities and challenges for India. The US engagement in the region through aid, security cooperation, and infrastructure initiatives can complement India’s efforts to promote connectivity and stability in the Bay of Bengal and Indo-Myanmar frontier. US involvement may also help counterbalance China’s expanding influence in the region, indirectly supporting India’s long-term strategic goals. Hopefully, the US presence will also put a vigil on the growing menace of drug cartels in the region, affecting the cross-border northeastern part of India as well. However, it also introduces new challenges. Increased US activism might reduce India’s strategic space, especially if the US seeks to shape regional politics or economic corridors in ways that marginalise Indian interests. It also demands careful calibration from New Delhi to protect its autonomy, safeguard its traditional sphere of influence, and ensure that US strategic activism in its neighbourhood evolves in a manner that reinforces, rather than complicates, India’s long-term regional interests.
The writer is associate professor, Centre for South Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
