In a nation characterised by its diverse and complex political landscape, the role of governors entrusted with upholding the principles of democracy and federalism is now under intense scrutiny. Recent events have called the very nomenclature of these positions into question. Maybe the Narendra Modi government should rename its governors “Governor Generals” as many have already donned the mantle of de facto rulers.
The assertion of cooperative federalism, a fundamental pillar of governance in India, has been a recurring theme for PM Modi. However, actions on the ground suggest a dissonance between rhetoric and reality. Governors, appointed by the Union government, have, in several instances, assumed a critical role in disrupting the administration of Opposition-ruled states.
As South India continues to evade BJP’s grasp, it finds itself entangled in the web of constitutional complexities — thanks to the hyperactive governors in this part of the country. Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Telangana are bearing the brunt of the overzealous representatives of the Centre — from mundane activities to sitting over legislation passed by state assemblies. The South and opposition-ruled states like West Bengal and Punjab find themselves embroiled in disputes with governors’ offices, at a time when bills passed by BJP-ruled states like Madhya Pradesh or Gujarat are being assented to in a day or two.
Kerala, in particular, is grappling with the inertia of governance.
A staggering eight bills passed by the state assembly gather dust at Raj Bhavan — three of which have been pending for nearly two years. Tamil Nadu, in a similar predicament, struggles with 12 pieces of legislation awaiting the governor’s approval, prompting the state to pass a resolution a few months back urging the President and Centre to establish a timeline for assent to be given to bills passed by the Assembly. This growing frustration has now culminated in several Opposition-ruling states approaching the Supreme Court to direct governors to clear bills passed by legislatures in a timely manner. Telangana has already availed an opportunity to involve the SC, and the Court underscored the importance of federal principles and timelines.
The celebrated tagline of India’s recent G20 Summit was three Ds: Democracy, Development and Diversity. However, it appears that, at least in the context of Opposition-ruled states, the Centre is translating these three Ds as “Destabilise, Disrupt and Defame”. Notably, the offices of governors have emerged as the principal actors in putting these divisive “Ds” into application.
The framers of the Constitution left no room for ambiguity in the role of governors. They intended them to be ceremonial figures. B R Ambedkar, during the Constituent Assembly debates, referred to the governor’s position as “ornamental” and said that “he has no functions which he can discharge by himself… Article does not confer power to overrule the Ministry on any particular matter… According to the principles of the new Constitution, he is required to follow the advice of his Ministry in all matters.”
Despite this clear intent, every government that came to power in the Centre, with a few exceptions, often yielded to the temptation to misuse the office of the governor to advance their political interests. It is intriguing that PM Modi, who once voiced concerns against the actions of governors when he was the Chief Minister of Gujarat, has turned out to be the one who surpassed his predecessors in unleashing governors as a sledgehammer against opposition parties.
Article 163 of the Constitution categorically states that “there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion”. Likewise, Article 200 stipulates that the governor shall declare either that he assents to the Bill or withholds assent therefrom or reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President or returns the Bill if it is not a money bill, “as soon as possible” after it’s presented to him/her. However, these constitutional provisions have now fallen victim to misinterpretation, leading to the rampant misuse of gubernatorial powers.
While the SC, in its landmark SR Bommai and Ors vs Union of India and Ors verdict effectively prevented the arbitrary dismissal of state governments, ingenious ways are being adopted to perpetuate the misuse of Raj Bhavans. Various commissions appointed to recommend measures to obliterate the aberrations in the working of the Constitution have unequivocally recommended curbing the unbridled “freedom” of governors. The Sarkaria Commission even went to the extent of recommending that respective chief ministers should be consulted before appointing a governor. The Sarkaria Commission also said: “In dealing with a State Bill presented to him under Article 200, the Governor should not act contrary to the advice of his Council of Ministers merely because, personally, he does not like the policy embodied in the Bill.” It added: “Normally, in the discharge of the functions under Article 200, the Governor must abide by the advice of his Council of Ministers. Article 200 does not invest the Governor, expressly or by necessary implication, with a general discretion in the performance of his functions thereunder, including reservation of a Bill for the consideration of the President”. It also recommended a limit of one month for governors, if, in exceptional circumstances, they think it necessary to exercise their discretion.
The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, headed by Justice M N Venkatachaliah, appointed by the Vajpayee government, was also emphatic in its report that the chief minister should be taken into confidence before the appointment of a governor.
The newfound desire of governors to meddle with the appointment of university vice-chancellors was addressed by the M M Punchhi Commission. In its report, it stated: “To be able to discharge the constitutional obligations fairly and impartially, the Governor should not be burdened with positions and powers which are not envisaged by the Constitution and which may expose the office to controversies or public criticism. Conferring statutory powers on the Governor by State Legislatures have that potential and should be avoided. Making the Governor the Chancellor of the Universities and thereby conferring powers on him which may have had some relevance historically has ceased to be so with change of times and circumstances.”
All these Commissions had categorically argued for stipulating time within which a bill has to be given assent or returned or referred for consideration of the President. While the Sarkaria Commission recommended one month, the Punchhi and Venkatachaliah Commissions suggested a maximum period of six months.
The office of the governor was provided for by the Constitution-makers due to the widespread apprehension that prevailed during the initial years of Independence. It was felt that the nation’s unity and coherence could be jeopardised in the absence of Centre-appointed governors. As India has triumphed over those initial apprehensions, the time is ripe for a comprehensive review of this institution, a vestige of British colonial rule.
Will the Modi government heed these calls and address the pressing concerns surrounding governors’ roles in Opposition-ruled states?
The writer is a CPM Rajya Sabha MP
