Transboundary water sharing can be a source of resilient cooperation or trenchant conflict. The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) has been celebrated globally as the most resilient water sharing treaty, remaining strong even when India and Pakistan engaged in wars. But this time, the horrific terrorist attack in Pahalgam has pushed the needle too far. Can putting the IWT in abeyance get Pakistan, in the words of our Cabinet Committee on Security, to “credibly and irrevocably abjure its support for cross-border terrorism”?
Despite its celebrated resilience, the IWT has been under strain in recent times. It is fair to say that all the parties involved contributed to this, including the third party with a limited role, the World Bank.
In a unique way, the IWT provides for the geographic division of waters in the Indus river system. India has rights for the unrestricted use of waters in the eastern rivers of Ravi, Beas and Sutlej; and Pakistan in a similar way over the western rivers which are Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab. Driven again by geography, India has rights over domestic use, non-consumptive use (navigation, flood control, etc), run-of-river hydropower generation, and some limited rights for irrigation. Conversely, Pakistan too has rights over limited domestic and non-consumptive use over the eastern rivers.
In exercising its rights, India has pursued run-of-river hydropower projects like Salal, Baglihar, Kishanganga and Ratle. Pakistan has objected to all these projects. The early Salal was resolved bilaterally. The others led to disputes, with the treaty’s provisions for resolution through a Neutral Expert (NE) or the Court of Arbitration (CoA) being invoked. The disputes delayed the projects, although in most cases, India’s stance was eventually vindicated. While the resolution tested the treaty provisions with some novel issues and advances in technology, it contributed to the treaty’s evolution and advanced the interests of both parties. For instance, the NE’s decision on Baglihar supported India’s designs accommodating advances in sedimentation engineering, with a nuanced interpretation of the provisions. In other instances, like Kishanganga, the CoA’s decision allowed India’s design but required minimal flows to Pakistan to be maintained. The IWT became resilient through such antagonistic but productive contestations.
In recent times, this has changed. India’s proposed projects were increasingly met by Pakistan’s litigious strategies, often by subterfuge. India firmly resisted its recent escalation of the settled differences over Kishanganga and the Ratle projects, disagreed with Pakistan’s initiation of parallel CoA proceedings and chose not to participate. Such actions, combined with Pakistan’s assessed support to cross-border terrorism, have led to India’s growing distrust of Pakistan and disenchantment with the IWT. The World Bank’s passive approach has not helped either.
This regressive turn, away from building resilience, fundamentally contradicts the spirit of the treaty and defeats its aspirations of cooperation for optimal development of the Indus rivers. Cooperation is crucial and critical for both countries, not only for development but also to cope with emerging risks such as climate change. Pakistan’s petty and ultimately self-defeating projects of subterfuge and terrorism have squandered the spirit of goodwill and friendship upon which the treaty was founded. The terrorist attacks in Uri, Pulwama, Pahalgam serve as stark evidence of Pakistan’s failure to reciprocate the spirit of the IWT.
India’s decision to put the IWT in abeyance can be seen as the culmination of its deepening dissatisfaction with it, and growing frustration with Pakistan’s actions. The specifics of what India means remain to be seen and there is a good strategic reason to maintain a degree of constructive ambiguity. At the least, it would mean suspending the institutional processes of coordination and dispute resolution under the Permanent Indus Commission, which comprises one commissioner each of the two governments. The Commission is the core of the treaty’s resilience. The institutional processes include annual meetings, exchange of hydrological data, periodic inspection of each other’s projects, etc.
Further, as an upstream state, India will be free to pursue its development interests on the western rivers, limiting Pakistan’s ability to have its concerns addressed. While some of the current rhetoric in India can be seen as empty, critics fail to recognise that the continued suspension of the IWT provides India the required time and means to build infrastructure to affect flows substantively and accumulate an irrevocable leverage.
Those familiar with the complex and intricate dynamics of transboundary water sharing will understand that India does not need to build the infrastructure for there to be an immediate impact on Pakistan. The absence of data and means to resolve differences by themselves can exacerbate uncertainties and vulnerabilities downstream, adversely impacting the economy and livelihoods in the Punjab region of Pakistan. It is entirely up to Pakistan whether it wants to risk the slide of the IWT from its current state of mutual benefit to greater benefits for India.
The writer is President and Chief Executive, Centre for Policy Research
