Although the G20 summit will consume India’s diplomatic energies in 2023, Delhi can’t take its eyes off the significant shifts in great power equations triggered by Russia’s war against Ukraine. Multilateralism has a certain autonomous logic of its own, but it can rarely transcend the dynamic among great powers.
When great powers cooperate, multilateralism has reasonable chances of success and when they don’t, failure looms large. Three decades of relative harmony among major powers after the end of the Cold War produced significant advances in multilateralism. Today, as the great powers get at each other’s throats, the prospects for multilateral agreements have diminished. On both the economic and political fronts, the conflict among the major powers has sharpened. That makes India’s chairmanship of G20 more challenging.
For Indian diplomacy, then, the year 2023 is as much about multilateral diplomacy as it is about adapting to a potentially historic shift in great power relations. The endgame of the Ukraine war — or the nature of the peace settlement in Ukraine — remains the decisive variable in 2023.
Major wars have always reshaped great power relations and rearranged the international system. Russia’s war against Ukraine will be no exception.
The First World War saw the collapse of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and the Russian empires. It also helped the Bolsheviks in Russia form the Soviet Union, gave birth to new nations in Europe, and accelerated the rise of Asian nationalism.
The Second World War hastened the demise of European colonialism and heralded the rise of the United States and the Soviet Union as the “superpowers”. Washington and Moscow managed an armed peace in a divided Europe during the Cold War. The process of decolonisation saw the birth of a number of new nations in Asia and Africa.
The Cold War led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, undid its sphere of influence in East and Central Europe and led to the rise of the “unipolar moment”. The era of massive economic interdependence that followed the Cold War saw the rapid rise of China and a slower but definitive emergence of India as a major power.
Moscow and Beijing, which were willing to acquiesce in the unipolar moment in the 1990s, began to assert themselves against the US-led international order in the 21st century. Europe focused on strengthening its economic and political integration, and sought greater “strategic autonomy” from the United States.
As they drew steadily closer over the last decade, Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping bet that the apparent American decline was real and irreversible. That emboldened Putin to fancy his chances in ending Ukraine’s sovereignty.
The seeming political disarray in the West also convinced Xi to back Putin’s attempt to reorder European regional security order. The partnership “without limits” and “no forbidden areas” of cooperation was unveiled less than three weeks before Putin invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022.
As Russia’s “special military operation” that was to end in a couple of weeks drags on into 2023, some tentative conclusions stare at us.
First, as the costs of war mount, the case for diplomacy will gain ground in 2023. While both sides talk about peace, they are also gearing up to fight through the harsh winter. Bridging that gulf between Russian and Ukrainian negotiating positions will occupy diplomacy in 2023.
Second, whatever the nature of the eventual settlement, Russia will come out weaker from this military misadventure. Putin’s attempts to eliminate Ukraine as an independent nation and roll back the eastward expansion of NATO have backfired. The war has consolidated Ukraine as a nation and NATO has expanded to include Sweden and Finland.
Third, the war has also demonstrated Europe’s inability to defend itself against Russia despite the EU’s economy being 10 times larger than that of Russia. But for now and the near term, Europe will remain dependent on the US to defend it against an expansionist Russia. While Europe is weaker, trans-Atlantic NATO has become stronger.
Fourth, the US is emerging as a big winner from the Ukraine war. American oil companies are raking it in from high energy prices. US weapons like the HIMARS and its high technology companies — like SpaceX with its Starlink satellite system and Palantir with its algorithms — have actively shaped the battlefield in favour of Ukraine, the underdog in the war. Far more consequential is the fact that without being directly involved in the fight, the US is influencing the direction of the war and has the most leverage in defining the terms of peace in Ukraine.
Ignore the talk of a “multipolar” or the “bipolar world”. While the world is not returning to the “unipolar moment” of the 1990s, the US is coming out on the top of the heap in the unfolding geopolitical scrum. With very capable allies and partners in Europe and Asia, the US is well poised to sustain the pressure on both Russia and China at the same time.
Fifth, thanks to the overreach of Putin and Xi, the US has become a valuable partner for the middle powers at the receiving end of Russian and Chinese bullying. Russian expansionism in Europe and Chinese aggressiveness in Asia have compelled Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia to boost their defence spending. Poland in Europe and Australia and South Korea in Asia have embarked on ambitious regional security policies.
Sixth, if Xi’s initial backing for Putin on Ukraine was a mistake, the Chinese leader has some room to undo parts of the error. Unlike Putin, who is finding it hard to walk back from the terrible misadventure in Ukraine, Xi has minimised his risks by avoiding armed support to Putin’s war. China is also well placed to benefit from Russia’s Ukraine mistakes by expanding Beijing’s influence in Central Asia.
Xi has also opened a dialogue with the US, while continuing to complain about Washington’s plans to contain Beijing. While Xi is tempting the US with a G2 vision, it is not clear why the US would make major concessions to a leader whose hand has weakened amidst the mismanagement of the Covid-19 pandemic and the economy. While Xi may want to put the US ties back on track, there is no evidence that he is ready yet to make nice to his neighbours like Japan and India.
Seventh, India that long relied on Russia to provide a regional balance of power will have to rework its great power sums. This should not be too hard, given India’s improving relations with the US and Europe and its focus on diversifying its defence partnerships. Delhi, however, will have to move much faster in developing the national capabilities and international partnerships to deter China’s aggressive actions on the border and balance Beijing’s power in the Indo-Pacific. Delhi certainly can’t take for granted that its current economic and political advantages will endure.
Finally, it is unlikely the world will return to the kind of multilateralism we got used to since the 1990s. India’s G20 leadership would be a success if it can prevent the complete breakdown of the multilateral system and generate major power consensus on a few issues. Meanwhile, new rules for the global order are beginning to emerge from like-minded groupings like the G7 rather than a deeply divided G20.
The writer is a senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Research Institute, Delhi and a contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express
