India and China are working to strengthen their relationship to stabilise the turbulent international environment. Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s recent visit to New Delhi has intensified discussions on this critical initiative.
While the Indian media focused on normalisation and the reinstatement of halted relationship aspects, Indian leaders emphasised their commitment to fostering understanding, enhancing cooperation, and strengthening connections grounded in mutual respect and shared interests. They also highlighted the importance of ensuring border predictability for stability and trust.
The principle that differences must not escalate into conflicts is crucial for managing the relationship and moving forward. Yi, on the other hand, discussed the need to rectify “strategic understanding” and enhance mutual perceptions to build trust, thus tackling the persistent boundary issue.
In essence, he was inquiring about India’s intent regarding China’s territorial integrity, suggesting that it is not the border itself but a shift in the intentions since 1950 that requires correction.
For a moment, Beijing celebrated India’s reaffirmation of the ‘One-China’ Policy, which recognises Taiwan as part of China, only to be contradicted by Indian foreign minister Jaishankar subsequently. Beijing voiced its concerns that “certain individuals are trying to undermine China’s sovereignty and disrupt China-India relations.”
India ceased to endorse the ‘One-China’ policy in 2010. The Modi administration has further strayed from India’s previous stance, and the calls for discarding the ‘One China’ policy have only intensified.
Whereas China even lacked a coherent strategic understanding of India’s territorial integrity. The roots of the Chinese irredentist claims can be traced back to 1947, during the era of the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) government. At that time, Tibet, which functioned as an independent entity, urged India to reclaim all “Tibetan territories” once administered by British India. These territories represent roughly 10 per cent of India’s land located south of the Himalaya, in contradiction to the Simla Convention ratified during British rule in 1914.
A Tibetan delegation arrived in New Delhi before India’s Independence, allegedly dispatched by Hugh Richardson, the British Representative in Lhasa, to advocate for Tibetan independence to neutralise the McMahon Line and establish a federation of Tibetan-speaking regions in India, which had been under British governance until 1947.
Jawaharlal Nehru dismissed the Tibetan request but kept the issue hidden from the Indian public. Nehru declined to contest China’s suzerainty, accepted the One-China policy in 1949, and recognised Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang as integral parts of China.
When the Communist Party assumed power in 1949, Mao merely converted the KMT-Tibetan strategy into military operations.
The narrative of Chinese aggression commenced in 1951 when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) seized control of Tibet. Beginning with cartographic aggression in 1954, the PLA’s secretive incursions into the Aksai Chin plateau occurred in 1957, and in 1958, they crossed Kharnak. Subsequently, China officially asserted its claim over 50,000 square miles of Indian territory in Ladakh and North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA).
The distinction lies in the fact that the Kuomintang-Tibetan claim over Indian territory significantly surpassed the current claim made by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In 1951, India also liberated Tawang with minimal Chinese opposition, which may have been perceived as a reciprocal action for China’s annexation of Tibet that same year.
India’s strategic stance shifted in 1959, when Nehru permitted the Dalai Lama’s exile to India at the urging of the United States. However, this event ultimately led to the war in 1962, resulting in India losing a portion of the Aksai Chin plateau. Additionally, China acquired the Shaksgam Valley (which is under Pakistani control) through a boundary agreement signed in 1963.
After a military retreat from Arunachal Pradesh in 1962, Beijing raised the issue again in the late 1980s, proposing a “package deal” where China would accept India’s claims in the Eastern Sector in exchange for India’s recognition of its claim to Aksai Chin. New Delhi rejected this offer.
Since 2003, Beijing has stopped recognising 90,000 sq km of Arunachal Pradesh as part of India and has declared the region a “core interest” to be defended militarily. In 2017, China began renaming places in Arunachal Pradesh.
Indian officials firmly reject the idea that the recent improvement in relations is a reaction to US President Donald Trump’s tariff threats. However, Beijing has long been concerned about India’s drift from its traditional non-aligned stance toward closer ties with the United States. Known for their strategic patience, the Chinese have allowed events to unfold, positioning themselves to capitalise on opportunities as they arise.
During the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2022, President Xi Jinping emphasised the necessity of “cultivating opportunities from crises”. This approach highlights their strategy of exploiting adversaries’ vulnerabilities for tactical gain. Now that New Delhi shows reservation in its relationship with Washington, Beijing has pledged to “stand resolutely” with India against Trump’s tariff threats, marking a pivotal moment in the geopolitical landscape.
In the past, Tibet served as a notable instance of how India has unwittingly aided China’s objectives. China has adeptly exploited the Indian “card” to its benefit, often facing little resistance from New Delhi. This approach may still be in operation today, but many in India struggle to fully recognise or understand it, largely because their perception of China is filtered through a dominant Western narrative, which overlooks the more complex, bilateral dynamics at play.
India, in turn, has increasingly drawn strategic cues from the United States, particularly on issues like Tibet and Taiwan. The steadfast support shown by US leaders such as Nancy Pelosi for Taiwan has influenced Indian leaders like Shashi Tharoor to advocate using the “Taiwan card” — a diplomatic signal meant to hold China accountable or push it toward compliance on other fronts, such as border negotiations. Notably, aside from reacting to overt American moves, China has so far chosen not to strongly oppose India’s actions in this regard — a reflection, perhaps, of its broader tactical patience or calculated restraint.
Two new groups have been established to address border disputes, focusing on delimitation and management under the 10-point “early harvest” consensus from Yi’s visit. However, this pragmatic approach is unlikely to curb China’s expansionist ambitions. From China’s perspective, resolving border issues may not limit India’s leverage regarding Tibet and Taiwan, as New Delhi will likely continue to view the Dalai Lama as an important strategic asset.
Meanwhile, China is strategically adjusting its trade relationships and easing export restrictions on essential materials. For India, this presents an opportunity to collaborate where interests align, manage differences carefully, and practise patience. Yi emphasised the importance of Modi’s participation in the SCO summit in Tianjin, where Modi, Xi, and Putin are set to present a united front against Trump.
Modi’s presence at the summit follows the stark display of military alliance between China and Pakistan during Operation Sindoor. He is expected to advocate strongly for counter-terrorism initiatives.
Modi would do well to learn from Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s diplomacy in 2003 when he clarified India’s position on Tibet in exchange for Beijing’s concession on Sikkim. The Tianjin SCO summit offers Modi a chance to rise above domestic pressures and pursue a decisive resolution to border conflicts, even if it requires significant compromises.
As dissatisfaction with the West increases, resolving the Sino-Indian border dispute will be essential for India as it aims to reposition itself within Asia and possibly influence the developing global order.
The writer is a senior fellow at Delhi Policy Group
