The violent clash in Leh on September 24, which resulted in four deaths, highlights a failure of police intervention that could have averted the tragedy. Despite protests escalating since 2022, the new Union Territory (UT) administration has made no serious efforts to address the unrest.
Ladakh has been experiencing unrest since its separation from Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) in October 2019. While UT status was initially welcomed in Leh, Kargil’s Shia population protested it as a “black day”, preferring to remain part of J&K. By 2020, early enthusiasm had faded, replaced by concerns about political representation, job security, and land protection. The repeal of Article 35A heightened fears of external land exploitation, uniting residents across religious and regional lines.
A central issue has been the reduced powers of the Autonomous Hill Development Councils (LAHDC-Leh and LAHDC-Kargil), which were sidelined by the UT administration led by the Lieutenant Governor. These councils, each comprising 26 elected members, traditionally exercised legislative and financial authority. Under the new UT framework, their role remains ambiguous, leading to jurisdictional clashes and growing discontent over political disempowerment and perceived outsider dominance.
As the disconnect with the Centre grew, many Ladakhis began expressing that they felt more secure under the former J&K governance. Political groups in Leh and Kargil began demanding self-governance, but with differing visions: Kargil’s Shia population sought statehood, while Leh’s Buddhists called for constitutional guarantees. These groups formed the Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA) and the Apex Body in Leh to press their demands.
By 2020, both groups united to form a high-powered committee (HPC) to engage with the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). Among their key demands was filling over 5,000 job vacancies linked to Resident Certificates. The administration’s failure to implement relevant rules left many youths unemployed and frustrated.
Talks with the MHA have been sporadic and largely unproductive, triggering public protests. Notably, even BJP leaders like Thupstan Chhewang and Tsering Dorjee resigned over governance concerns. Dissatisfaction has cut across party lines.
The KDA and Apex Body have pushed for Ladakh’s inclusion under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution [Articles 244(2) and 275(1)], which grants tribal areas a degree of autonomy through regional councils. While some of this push may be influenced by NGOs active since 1981, the call has gained traction locally. Still, some residents argue that the Sixth Schedule could be a regressive step for culturally diverse Ladakh.
These demands involve complex debates spanning constitutional, political, anthropological, and economic issues. With no legislature and limited powers for local bodies, Ladakh’s current governance framework fails to meet public expectations.
Border tensions with China have added to the urgency. Since 2021, rising Chinese pressure has intensified concerns about possible foreign interference in Ladakh’s protests. Ahead of the 2020 LAHDC elections, the Apex Body threatened a boycott, echoing China’s dismissal of Ladakh’s UT status. This prompted high-level intervention from the BJP. A meeting between Ladakhi leaders and Home Minister Amit Shah led to the boycott being lifted after Shah promised protections similar to the Sixth Schedule. In the subsequent elections, the BJP won 15 seats, while Congress secured nine — down from its earlier hold of 21.
In January 2020, the MHA established a committee led by G Kishan Reddy to address Ladakh’s concerns. However, this initiative was sidelined by the Covid pandemic and increased Chinese incursions.
Since then, the government’s inaction has become more pronounced. The MHA has failed to engage meaningfully with the broader public, choosing instead to deal with only a few agitators. This exclusion has deepened mistrust and undermined cooperation.
A technical question raised by the MHA — why Ladakhis now demand the same protectionist measures they once rejected under Article 370 — is not without merit. But it overlooks Ladakh’s evolving expectations in the wake of political disempowerment and economic uncertainty.
The absence of a legislative framework has driven demands for constitutional protection, especially under the Sixth Schedule. Over time, the movement has acquired emotional weight, often sidelining practical governance concerns. Meanwhile, both the government and civil society have ignored emerging narratives with subtle religious and foreign influences.
The Centre has alleged that the September 24 violence was incited by provocative statements made by those on hunger strike, amidst growing discontent with the government’s ongoing talks with Ladakhi groups. Managing religious influence — especially the Buddhist lamas in Leh and Shia clerics in Kargil — has added complexity to the situation. Activist Sonam Wangchuk has warned that his arrest under the Public Safety Act could further inflame tensions. Nonetheless, public sentiment still leans toward trust in due legal process.
Ladakh continues to face serious developmental challenges. The region has no major industries and remains dependent on subsidies. The Centre has significantly increased its annual allocation — from Rs 57 crore to Rs 6,000 crore — but development remains slow. Except for the first Lieutenant Governor, Om Prakash Mathur, the Centre has mostly appointed inexperienced administrators, ignoring capable regional experts familiar with Ladakh’s intricacies.
Ladakh today stands at a crucial crossroads between protectionism and integration. The region’s aspirations, since its separation from J&K, have been shaped by concerns over external exploitation and political marginalisation. The Centre’s vague and inconsistent stance has only added to the confusion, undermining both regional stability and national integrity.
If inclusion under the Sixth Schedule proves unfeasible, alternatives such as extending the Fifth Schedule or Article 371 should be seriously considered. The MHA has now scheduled fresh talks for September 27.
To address Ladakh’s concerns, the government must develop a robust legal framework backed by a national commission to enact essential legislation. This should aim to preserve Ladakh’s unique identity, secure employment for locals, and enhance regional integrity, while acknowledging limited political representation.
Recognising Ladakh’s strategic importance is not optional: It is a national imperative. Empowering the UT with clear governance goals is essential. At the same time, the government must avoid reductive tribal policies and resist reverting to outdated feudal structures. Poorly implemented Sixth Schedule status could risk exclusion and hinder real development.
The writer is president, Ladakh International Centre, Leh
