The interview given by Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on May 31 to a foreign news agency about Operation Sindoor has generated considerable interest and comment, both in India and abroad. It has also raised a few concerns — all for valid reasons.
In response to a question about claims being made by Pakistan about India losing combat aircraft in the early stages of Op Sindoor, the CDS stated, “What is important is not the jet being down, but why they were being downed.”
While General Chauhan did not go into any specifics about the number of platforms lost in combat, he asserted that India had swiftly rectified its “tactical mistakes” and resumed high-precision strikes at the designated targets, some deep within Pakistan. He added, “What mistakes were made — those are important. Numbers are not important. The good part is that we were able to understand the tactical mistake which we made, remedy it, rectify it, and then implement it again after two days and flew our jets again, targeting at long range.”
This has been interpreted as the first confirmation by the military leadership at the highest level that India lost some aircraft in Op Sindoor. It may be recalled that at the military briefing on May 11, conducted in Delhi soon after cessation of hostilities, the Air Force representative Air Marshal Bharti had responded to a similar question regarding fighter aircraft losses saying, “We are in a combat scenario, losses are a part of combat. The question you must ask us is: Have we achieved our objective of decimating the terrorist camps? And the answer is a thumping yes.”
Against this backdrop, the response of the CDS is pertinent and provides more tactical insights into the conduct of Op Sindoor. A reference was also made by General Chauhan to the nuclear threshold and how this was handled by Delhi. Any light shed on the role of the CDS in Op Sindoor would have been very valuable but this thread was not pursued.
Professionals will study these remarks carefully, for Op Sindoor has many strands related to the conduct of a high-intensity conflict between two nuclear weapon capable states, both by way of strategic signaling and the narrative campaign that has acquired its own autonomy in the modern age. The global tenet now is that more than winning the war in the combat domain, the “story war” must also be won. Perceptions have to be shaped in a favourable manner both in the domestic and international arena. Here, India has been put on the back foot; the CDS’s remarks in Singapore have drawn attention to this vital component of national security.
During combat, no nation divulges detailed tactical information, particularly about platform damage or loss. Indeed, while there was intense speculation about how many Rafale aircraft had been lost by India during Op Sindoor, the government kept silent. However it allowed some sections of the audio-visual media to engage in shrill triumphalism and ugly majoritarian nationalism, and to this was added some embroidered assessment by foreign sources. The net result was a further erosion of the credibility of the Indian media. A professional attribute that a nation ought to acknowledge and nurture with integrity is media credibility.
The May 11 military briefing was professional and the question about loss of fighters had been addressed in a tangential manner. If the government wanted to confirm the fact that India had indeed lost some platforms, why was this not done in Delhi soon after the first briefing ? The delay added to the speculation and was avoidable.
And if the CDS was identified as the senior most military officer to do so, then why in Singapore, and why to a foreign news agency and not an Indian one such as PTI? In my view, a professional briefing at a three-star level was adequate and further details could have been provided in Parliament as is the norm in democracies.
The sharing of some factual tactical details is desirable to enhance credibility and be better positioned in the narrative battle. India has not been able to rise to this challenge and many questions have been asked, both on social media and by the opposition parties as to why such details were not provided in Parliament or by the Defence Minister.
This leads one to infer that perhaps the CDS’s remarks were not part of any script but spontaneous. If so, this is even more disappointing with respect to India’s strategic communication acumen.
The Pahalgam massacre took place on April 22 and Operation Sindoor was launched on May 7. Delhi, with its much vaunted Modi-led communication capabilities both in India and abroad, was aware that the Shangri-La Dialogue would take place in Singapore at the end of May. Was there a suitable strat com plan in place ? The remarks of the CDS would suggest otherwise.
Operation Sindoor is in pause mode and the narrative battle continues. Trump’s assertions regarding brokering a ceasefire have queered the pitch for Delhi. Fidelity to facts and transparency as behoves a democracy are critical in dealing with national security challenges. Galwan 2020 and Op Sindoor 2025 have many embedded lessons.
The writer is director, Society for Policy Studies
