As US President Donald Trump’s whirlwind tour of Asia concludes tomorrow with his summit meeting with China’s Xi Jinping in Busan, much of Asia — including India — is bracing for what could be a new chapter in the most consequential bilateral relationship of the modern era.
US-China relations took shape in the 1930s amid imperial Japan’s aggression. Washington backed Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government with aid and embargoes against Tokyo, while during World War II, China and the US became allies. India, sympathetic to China’s struggle, found itself divided: Gandhi refused Chiang’s plea for cooperation, prioritising India’s fight against British rule; Subhas Chandra Bose turned to Japan for help, and Indian Communists sided with the Allies by highlighting the dangers of fascism. India’s internal division cost it a role in shaping the postwar order, as China — on the side of the victorious Allies — secured a permanent seat on the UN Security Council while India was left out.
The wartime partnership between Washington and Beijing collapsed after 1949 when Mao Zedong’s Communists prevailed. The US refused to recognise the People’s Republic, backed Chiang in Taiwan, and viewed China through the prism of Cold War rivalry. The Korean War hardened hostilities, and Washington built a containment network through alliances with Japan, South Korea, and others. In contrast, India championed Beijing’s inclusion in the global order — even at the expense of its ties with America.
The rupture in Sino-Indian relations in the late 1950s did not bring Delhi closer to Washington. Instead, India turned to Moscow, while Beijing courted Washington. Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to Beijing — aided by secret diplomacy — led to the historic Shanghai Communiqué that laid the foundation for the normalisation of ties. China, under Deng Xiaoping, used the opening to integrate with the world economy. American capital, Chinese labour, and global markets produced what historian Niall Ferguson called “Chimerica” — a fusion of US finance and Chinese manufacturing that powered global growth for decades. India, still wary of the West, missed that wave.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 forced Delhi to reorient. India normalised relations with both the US and China and embraced economic reform. Yet, China’s rise was faster and deeper. Despite improving ties with Washington, India hesitated to break free from the old mindset of “balancing” the US with Russia and China.
The fourth phase began when Washington turned from engagement to competition. By 2017, the US formally declared China a strategic rival. Trade wars, technology restrictions, and industrial decoupling followed. The US sought to reshape supply chains, tighten export controls, and strengthen alliances — from Japan and Australia to ASEAN and India. China, confident of its new power, began to challenge US primacy in Asia. Its assertiveness — in the South China Sea, across the Taiwan Strait, and on the Himalayan border — unsettled its neighbours. Meanwhile, Washington’s outreach to India reached unprecedented levels: Lifting technology restrictions, deepening defence cooperation, and promoting shared Indo-Pacific frameworks such as the Quad.
Yet, Delhi’s response remained hesitant. Haunted by fears of “entrapment” in an American alliance, India was cautious to a fault. Despite facing China’s aggression on the border, Delhi has shied away from fully leveraging US support to bridge the widening power gap with Beijing. Now, as Trump and Xi meet in Busan, some in Delhi fear that a new US-China détente could sideline India. The old fear of “entrapment” has turned into anxiety about “abandonment”. But it is premature to assume a grand bargain between Washington and Beijing is at hand. Trump and Xi are expected to announce a truce in their trade and technology war — welcome news for global markets — but a ceasefire is not peace. The structural contradictions between Washington and Beijing are too deep to vanish overnight.
Many worry Trump might sacrifice Taiwan or other Asian interests for a deal with China. Yet, signs from Trump’s Asia tour suggest continuity as well as adjustment. He reaffirmed support for AUKUS and the “golden age” of the US-Japan alliance, promised long-term partnership with ASEAN, and unveiled plans to reduce dependence on Chinese critical minerals. These moves suggest Washington is refining, not reversing, its China strategy.
Within the US, debate continues: Should America retrench to its hemisphere, prioritise trade over geopolitics, or double down on balancing China? The answer will shape the next phase of the US-China rivalry, and Asia’s future.
For Delhi, it is reasonable to assume the US and China will oscillate between confrontation and accommodation, but structural rivalry will persist. What is new is that Beijing is now a superpower in its own right — marking a new phase in Asia’s modern international relations.
US-China engagement, as in America’s Cold War détente with the Soviet Union, does not end competition; it merely channels it. For India, the lesson is clear: Neither panic nor complacency serves its interests. Delhi must track US-China encounters closely but not be swayed by the theatre of summitry. As Delhi’s power deficit with Beijing grows and the US-China engagement reshapes Asia, strategic hesitation is no longer an option.
Instead, India must strengthen its own leverage through deeper economic reform, modernising its defence industrial base, and developing a more coherent technology strategy. Like China’s Deng, India’s leadership knows the US is the most valuable external partner in accelerating national transformation.
For a quarter-century, the US took the initiative to draw India closer. Even a minor reset in US-China relations means Delhi must be more proactive in stabilising and advancing the US relationship. At the same time, Delhi must also intensify efforts to limit confrontation with Beijing and widen space for bilateral cooperation.
The writer is contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express. He is a distinguished professor at the Motwani Jadeja Institute of American Studies, O P Jindal Global University, and the Korea Chair on Asian Geopolitics at the Council on Strategic and Defence Research
