India is currently witnessing a strange “they said, they said” situation involving X (formerly Twitter) and the Government of India regarding accounts belonging to Reuters, an international news organisation. Combined with other recent developments, this raises several questions about how the Indian state’s information restriction apparatus operates with opacity, across different political ideologies, and in the absence of meaningful oversight and accountability.
At the time of writing, X and GoI have contradicted each other’s version of events surrounding the suspension and subsequent restoration of two X accounts associated with Reuters (@Reuters and @ReutersWorld); they were restricted in India on July 5. Users were greeted with a now-familiar message that this was in response to a “legal demand,” but the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) denied issuing such orders. After the accounts were restored, X’s Global Affairs account contested MeitY’s position, stating that it received orders to block 2,355 accounts in India on July 3 and expressed concerns about “ongoing press censorship”. MeitY has refuted issuing “fresh orders” on this date and that it did not intend to block any prominent international news channel. Questions like how/why these accounts may have been referenced in a correspondence between MeitY and X are unlikely to be answered.
There have been other recent instances of friction and confusion. During the India-Pakistan conflict in May, X’s Global Affairs alleged its account was temporarily restricted in India, a day after it revealed having received orders to block over 8,000 accounts in India, with threats of fines, liability and imprisonment of local representatives. There are suggestions, though, that it was an inquiry rather than a blocking order. That such miscommunication can occur raises questions about the normal terms of engagement and lends credence to civil society fears of overcompliance by platforms.
Once military operations stopped, X accounts of some Turkish and Chinese state media entities were briefly restricted. In early July, there was ambiguity surrounding restrictions on social media accounts from Pakistan being temporarily lifted. The reasons and circumstances leading up to these flip-flopping actions are not clear.
Many of these orders were likely issued under Section 69A of the Information Technology (IT) Act under procedures defined in the colloquially-named 2009 Blocking Rules. This mechanism lets the government invoke confidentiality clauses, meaning that the contents of orders (including their reasoning) cannot be disclosed even to people/groups whose content has been restricted. Reviews, if conducted, are limited to the executive branch.
These recent instances of confusion and friction spotlight the problems with the opacity of the current process, the robustness of the purported procedural safeguards, and the tendency of the state to resort to broad restrictions of accounts limiting access to past, current, and future speech.
Apart from Section 69A, Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act creates a “grey area” which allows various government departments to direct internet services to remove/restrict content without the same procedures as Section 69A. X is currently challenging the use of this mechanism in the Karnataka High Court, arguing that it creates a parallel blocking regime, as does the “Sahyog Portal” developed by the Ministry of Home Affairs. The acquiescence of other social media platforms should be noted here.
More government departments across the country appear to be using this method, with recent reports and court documents revealing a pattern of problematic usage. The Department of Railways attempted to restrict posts about the tragic stampede at the New Delhi Railway Station in February, and content about overcrowded trains and incidents of vandalism. Law enforcement departments in Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, West Bengal, and Bihar have sent notices for content critical of/ridiculing political figures associated with state governments and local administrations.
This partisan use across the political spectrum suggests that the tendency to restrict information is a feature of Indian polity, not restricted to any particular entity, even as the degrees of use may vary.
The default nature of the Indian state to resort to information suppression, whether through internet restrictions or content blocking, through a range of events like geopolitical conflicts, tragedies, or criticism, is deeply worrying and counterproductive. In such situations, people need access to more information, not less. Instead of short-term, arbitrary actions, the Indian state would be better off facilitating and supporting a deeper understanding of the complexities in the information ecosystem today.
Political entities feigning concern, citing public order or security, should, first and foremost, stop constantly resorting to half-truths, fear-mongering, and poisoning the well themselves. Where content restrictions are absolutely necessary, they must be narrow and limited to specific pieces of content. Due process, sound reasoning, and rigorous accountability should be firm requirements rather than perfunctory acts. Any orders must be accompanied by adequate disclosures, and oversight (whether at the level of union/state governments) cannot be limited to the executive branch.
Measures that build resilience, both in institutions and the public at large, will offer more in the long term than unbridled censoriousness.
The writer is an independent technology policy researcher and former executive director of the Internet Freedom Foundation
