The ongoing protests and large-scale anti-government demonstrations in Istanbul, Ankara, and several other major cities in Turkey, in the aftermath of the arrest of probable Republican Party (CHP) presidential candidate and existing Mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem İmamoğlu, need to be read as a serious challenge to the limits of authoritarian populism practised by Turkish strongman Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Starting as a moderate conservative politician, Erdoğan has been dominating the landscape of popular politics in Turkey since 2003, when he first emerged as prime minister, presenting himself as a plucky underdog and a moderate conservative supporting social pluralism and individual freedom. As his hold on power gradually extended, Erdoğan began to harness the other side of his personality—that of the street fighter from Istanbul’s tough neighbourhood of Kasimpasa—bravely confronting the old Kemalist establishment.
He justified his concentration of powers in the name of taking power away from the “corrupt” secular elites of Kemalist sympathisers and giving it back to the people. In a classical populist proclamation, Erdoğan took over the reins of power, shifting Turkey from a parliamentary system to an executive presidency after a constitutional referendum in 2017 that followed a failed military coup in 2016, which he broadcasted live on his iPhone.
As a populist leader, Erdoğan has displayed all three characteristic features described by scholar Jan-Werner Müller in his book What is Populism?:
State occupation and purges – Erdoğan has shown a tendency to “occupy” and colonise the state by putting his people in positions of power. He also used the failed coup to justify a purge of all those who opposed him, including members of the judiciary, the executive, academia, and the media.
Clientelism and patronage – Much of his support base is cultivated through a dense clientelist network of brokers and middlemen who help in redistributing the resources of the state through a well-oiled patronage network of his AK Party. The Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP or Justice and Development Party) has been more successful in establishing and sustaining clientelistic linkages compared to other secular or leftist parties, benefiting from the large organisational heft of the Fazilet Partisi (FP or Virtue Party), the parent organisation that was disbanded by a constitutional court due to violations of the erstwhile constitution. Under his leadership, the AKP was able to successfully mobilise large networks of party workers, headmasters, teachers, and graduates of religious schools called Imam Hatip Liseleri (IHL), who engaged with voters and supporters in local coffee shops and other public spaces, gradually marginalising the presence of opposition political parties.
Repression of civil society – Erdoğan has systematically repressed civil society. The last significant protest erupted in Istanbul’s Gezi Park in 2013 over environmental concerns. He brutally suppressed the protests, highlighting them as a coup and labelling the protestors as crepuscular or “looters,” delegitimising the demonstrators as enemies of Turkey and its “real people.”
While Erdoğan has consolidated his grip on power and crafted his image as a “new sultan” claiming to restore Turkey’s place back to the old glory of the Ottoman Empire—his own version of Make Turkey Great Again—his policies and the AKP’s dominance has faced multiple challenges. The rising cost-of-living crisis and extreme inflation often blamed on Erdoğan’s stiff resistance to raising interest rates as an un-Islamic practice, have already exposed some of the constraints of his populist politics.
Despite the marginalisation of the opposition, the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP or Republican People’s Party) has been able to claw its way back into the country’s political landscape. With 134 seats in the Turkish Parliament, the CHP is still behind the AKP, which has 272 seats. However, the local and provincial elections in 2024 have challenged Erdoğan’s populist politics, as the CHP won 35 of the 81 provincial capitals—eleven more than the AKP.
In Ekrem İmamoğlu, a common businessman from the construction industry, the CHP might have finally found someone to match Erdoğan. Even though the former CHP leader and 2023 presidential candidate, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu—often referred to as the Turkish Gandhi—was quite popular, and his 2017 March for Justice from Ankara to Istanbul played an important role in shattering the secular-elite exclusivist image of the CHP, he could not bring down Erdoğan. İmamoğlu, in contrast, presents a different kind of challenge, mirroring Erdoğan’s younger self in many ways.
The writer teaches courses on politics and democracy at Ahmedabad University
