The 2008 Indo-US nuclear deal granting international recognition to India as a state with advanced nuclear technology and the resulting waiver of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines which had so far banned nuclear commerce with India would normally have taken a year at most to fructify in most mature democracies with responsible political parties. In India,it took nearly four years.
The delay was due to: (i) a coalition government with the majority party wanting consensus on an issue which had preoccupied India since 1992,when the NSG imposed the ban on nuclear commerce; (ii) a minor party with no chance of governing India,but a strong ideological opposition to the US,bent on scuttling the deal,and (iii) a major opposition party jealous of the deal negotiated by the government.
In their efforts to impede the deal,the latter two relied on a motley crowd of scientists and analysts,including (i) Left ideologues carrying historical baggage against anything that might see India and the US working together,even if it benefited Indian interests; (ii) a group of US-influenced analysts opposed to the Indian nuclear strategic programme,in line with the US nuclear non-proliferation ayatollahs (iii) a mixed crowd of anti-Indian civil nuclear power programmes/ the Indian nuclear establishment especially the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and finally,(iv) a few romantic nuclear scientists and analysts who dreamt of India unilaterally testing ever-larger nuclear bombs without any thought being given to the implications of such adventure by India.
Finally,after a long spell of indecisiveness,the government put its foot down and went ahead with the formalities required to fructify the Indo-US nuclear deal. It is worth noting that many,if not all,of the doomsday predictions: that Indias strategic programme would be brought under US scrutiny,that India would be flooded with expensive nuclear power plants,etc.,have not only not materialised,but have not even cast a shadow on our nuclear programmes strategic or otherwise.
The last action that was needed for India to reap the benefits of NSG exemption and begin international civil nuclear commerce,both as an importer and exporter of nuclear equipment,was the passage of a nuclear liability bill in line with international conventions that would attract foreign suppliers to India,which would also enable compensation and relief in case of a nuclear accident stemming from the enlargement of the Indian civil nuclear programme. It was the considered opinion of many economists and planners that India would need to expand its electric power-generation capacity to realise its long-term goals,and that nuclear power would be one of the preferred options given the universal concern about carbon emissions and the declining stock of hydrocarbons. A domestic nuclear liability bill in line with international norms was sine qua non for any substantial international nuclear commerce. The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill was leaked before it could be formally introduced in Parliament last year. The government withdrew it,only to introduce it this year in Parliament in light of the need to give effect to the various bilateral civil nuclear cooperation agreements it had signed with France,the US,the UK,Canada,Russia,etc.
Not surprisingly,the coalition of opposition forces began their war of misinformation. These forces against the liability bill are the same ones who opposed the nuclear deal,but their motives are different. The anti-US brigade is against it because it would facilitate nuclear commerce with the US. Those against Indias strategic nuclear programme oppose it since it would validate Indias growing nuclear capabilities even if in the civil nuclear arena. The anti-nuclear power lobby should not be concerned with a nuclear liability bill since they are against any nuclear power in India,but in their opinion,anything that will impede international commerce with India will do equally well.
The bill that has been passed now will negate the success of the Indo-US nuclear deal and the NSG amendment by making both international and domestic nuclear suppliers boycott the Indian market. The bill is in its final stages and hopefully,as in the case of the Indo-US nuclear deal,will pass through Parliament.
What has been disheartening,however,is the indifference or indecisiveness shown by parties who would have benefited from both the Indo-US nuclear deal and the passage of the nuclear liability bill. The government has shown no clear direction all through the progress of the nuclear liability bill,it has been astonishingly inept. The DAE does not seem to have clarified the link between a bill in line with international conventions and international nuclear commerce,and how it is vital in order to make India a strong global nuclear supplier in coming years. The Indian nuclear industry stands to benefit substantially,but has kept studiously silent through the various debates. Indian industrial associations and chambers of commerce have also been conspicuously silent even as their US counterparts spoke up. Foreign nuclear suppliers (especially the French) who expect to gain from the Indo-US nuclear deal but required an Indian civil nuclear liability act in their inter-governmental agreement with us,have also been silent even when the bills opponents propagate the myth that the French would be happy to supply nuclear equipment to India even if the Indian liability bill directly names the foreign supplier as being liable for accidents.
To sum up,this has been a dismal picture of the Indian decision-making environment on a crucial national issue. This might now have been a handicap in the days when not much was expected of India,but it will not do if it expects to become a major power to whom others look to.
The writer is visiting fellow at IDSA and the National Maritime Foundation
