How should we describe the topsy-turvy world we are living in today? Children’s playbooks have a “joining the dots” game, which traces an image when the dots are joined together. We are now attempting to join dots that are constantly moving and no recognisable pattern is appearing. How can one navigate an unstable and shifting geopolitical terrain where familiar landmarks and reassuring anchors vanish with bewildering rapidity? And how should one deal with the most powerful country in the world, which under Donald Trump has transitioned from being the upholder of the global order to its ruthless undertaker? During Trump 1.0, which was a much milder version of Trump 2.0, a prescient Henry Kissinger had said, “I think Trump may be one of those figures in history who appears from time to time to mark the end of an era and to force it to give up its old pretences. It doesn’t necessarily mean that he knows this, or that he is considering any great alternative. It could just be an accident.”
Kissinger may have been right about Trump marking the end of an era. He may not have anticipated that Trump 2.0 has a blueprint that is being rolled out both at home and abroad. If one considers the welter of ordinances issued by Trump so far and the dismantling of the federal bureaucracy by Elon Musk, who heads the new Department of Government Efficiency, the playbook seems to follow very closely the “Project 2025” document formulated by The Heritage Foundation, a right-wing, conservative think tank. Several of the authors of the report now occupy senior posts in the Trump administration. The professional bureaucracy is being replaced by a cohort of loyalists owing personal allegiance to Trump.
On the foreign policy and security front, there is also a dramatic change in direction, overturning the ideological and strategic foundations of the American state. It is no longer an internationalist liberal state. It is avowedly right-wing and seeks closer association with similar ruling dispensations and political entities in other parts of the world. It is a mistake to think that these new equations are manifestations of Trump being a deal-maker and transactional. He and his close lieutenants see themselves as part of an emerging global mainstream which is the antithesis of the old conception of a liberal West. There is no longer a “West” in terms that the world has been accustomed to using the term.
It is not eccentricity alone which explains Trump’s sense of affinity with Vladimir Putin of Russia and even Xi Jinping of China. The readiness to do deals with them is the consequence of ideological affinity. I have also argued elsewhere that Trump seems driven by a 19th-century concept of imperialism when land became a marker of power. The US itself was an example of how the acquisition of large tracts of land in its westward expansion went hand in hand with its emergence as a major power. In this way of thinking, the US, Russia and China are great powers by virtue of being the largest countries area-wise. Each is entitled to its sphere of influence and will continue to contend but also collaborate within these parameters. Other states are pawns in this bigger game and must accept the roles assigned to them.
Ukraine’s refusal to acquiesce in its role as a bargaining chip is what lies behind the US voting against a resolution at the UN which condemns Russian aggression against Ukraine. It also led to the televised brawl in the Oval Office on February 28 where Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was subjected to a carefully choreographed assault by Trump and Vice-President J D Vance. What may have been missed is Trump openly expressing empathy for Putin as a fellow victim of a political witch-hunt during his previous term as president. It is this frame which devalues Europe as a credible power and makes its attempts to salvage the situation for Ukraine futile.
The sooner Europe acknowledges that there is no longer a West that it has been accustomed to be a part of, the more likely it would be to come together, develop its own capabilities and acquire independent agency. A fragmented Europe with each mid-size or small country having to deal with the great powers on its own, will stop to count geopolitically. The new chancellor of Germany, Friedrich Merz, has read the situation most clearly. In remarks post the recent elections, he said, “I would never have thought that I would have to say something like this in a TV show, but after Donald Trump’s remarks last week … It is clear that this government does not care about the fate of Europe. My absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can really achieve independence from the US.”
What does this mean for Asia and, in particular, India? Those who believe that a US-Russia détente will drive a wedge between China and Russia may be disappointed. The two countries have built up a solid, comprehensive and mutually supportive relationship which is unlikely to be diminished by Washington reaching out to Moscow. Trump does not see India as a big power in the same league as China and Russia. India has to be careful and ensure that it does not come to be seen as a convenient pawn for the US in the big power game. One expects that while the Quad (comprising India, Japan, Australia and the US) will continue to play a role in the Indo-Pacific, it may no longer be a strategic component of an American determination to retain its dominance in the region, but as a tactical bargaining tool vis-a-vis China. India must be alert to this shift.
It will be prudent for India to remain out of harm’s way by maintaining a friendly relationship with Trump’s America, being accommodating on lesser issues while quietly resisting on more critical ones. India must develop much closer relations with Europe, with countries in East and Southeast Asia and most importantly with its own sub-continental periphery, which may become a zone of strategic vulnerability. The ideological affinity which Trump shares with PM Modi is an asset for Delhi in handling a complicated relationship with Washington. But Trump’s great power vision does not align with India’s preference for a multipolar world order.
The writer is a former Foreign Secretary
