Written by Ajit Phadnis
The recently released Unified District Information System for Education Plus (UDISE+) 2023-24 data shows that student enrolment in private schools is on the rise and, in some states, exceeds enrolments in government schools. This article focuses on private school enrolments under section 12(1)(c) of the Right to Education (RTE) Act 2009, which mandates private schools to reserve 25 per cent of seats for children from weaker socio-economic backgrounds. We assess that the policy, although well-intended, has failed to meet its objectives due to poor policy design and lack of stakeholder engagement.
As per a Ministry of Education document on “Clarification on (RTE) Provisions”, the objectives of Section 12(1)(c) were to enhance the quality of education received by underprivileged students and to reduce social barriers and foster social cohesion among students of different classes, castes and religions. This provision has received severe backlash from stakeholders in many states, leading to minimal or cosmetic implementation.
On the face of it, the failures of the policy can be tied to inadequacies in implementation. Implementation failures include non-transparency in student selection for reserved seats, delays in government reimbursement to private schools and alleged harassment of private school management by education officers. States such as Madhya Pradesh, which streamlined processes for reimbursements to private schools, have shown higher enrolment in reserved seats. On the other hand, recurring delays in reimbursements have plagued Maharashtra.
However, these administrative successes or failures are not accidental; they are rooted in the political economy of the respective states. It is well known that government school teachers oppose RTE quotas as they perceive that it would encourage students from underprivileged backgrounds to leave government schools and join private schools. Migration of students is feared as it would reduce the strength in government schools, prompting state governments to close schools and retrench/transfer school teachers. Teacher opposition translates into strong efforts to blockade the policy in states where teachers and teacher unions have substantial political power. For instance, in states such as Maharashtra, school teachers are formally represented in the state legislature (legislative council) through teachers’ constituency seats. This institutional power is employed to derail policy implementation.
Private schools are also hesitant to support the reservation policy. Elite schools — those that recruit better teachers and have high quality infrastructure — oppose the policy as the reimbursement rates, fixed by state governments, are too low to meet their operational costs. Additionally, schools face resistance from paying parents, who are uncomfortable that their wards will study in “mixed” classrooms. These schools find ways to dodge the policy by either making the admission process cumbersome for reserved seats, charging parents various non-fee payments, or conducting separate classes for students admitted under the quota. Another route is to register as a religious or linguistic minority-run institution. Since these minority-run schools are exempted from implementing reservation, the exemption incentivises private schools to change registration to a minority-run institution.
Budget private schools — those that charge lower fees — see the provision as an opportunity, particularly in states where government reimbursements are timely. The operational costs of budget schools are lower, which makes the reimbursement rate fixed by states more acceptable. Madhya Pradesh, for instance, incentivises budget schools by offering reimbursements for reserved seats even above the prescribed 25 per cent of seats. As a result, some budget schools in the state have reserved more than 80 per cent of seats in anticipation of higher reimbursement. This model is a win-win because budget schools profit from it, and state governments can showcase higher aggregate enrolment of reserved seats.
Underprivileged children who are enrolled in budget schools suffer from this bargain. Budget private schools offer only marginal improvement in educational quality over government schools. Further, the segregation of students continues, with the only change that underprivileged students, who earlier attended government schools, have now shifted to budget private schools. In contrast, elite schools, with higher educational quality, continue to be inaccessible. Therefore, neither the RTE quota objective of providing better education quality nor reducing social barriers for underprivileged children has made substantial progress.
The failure of RTE quotas has important lessons for policymaking in India. Policy failures are often blamed on weak implementation, but in the RTE quota case, the fault lies as much in poor design. A good policy must anticipate the interests, incentives, and motivations of all key stakeholders, including those that are accountable to implement and comply with it. Stakeholders can be motivated by appealing to a larger purpose and highlighting how a policy could benefit them. Currently, neither government teachers, education administrators, nor elite private schools are motivated. In some states, budget private schools have helped ramp up the state numbers, primarily driven by instrumental benefits to themselves.
A policy that fails to engage its key actors is unlikely to succeed, no matter how well-intentioned it may be. If inclusivity is the goal, India’s education policy must engage seriously with the political economy of schooling. Stakeholders must be part of the solution — not obstacles to it.
The writer is a public policy faculty with the Indian Institute of Management Indore. The article is based on a study on RTE quotas with Omkar Sathe, Partner, CPC Analytics and Pawandeep Kaur, PhD Candidate, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Germany
