Written by Pradeep Bhandari
The election results in the three northeastern states — Meghalaya, Nagaland and Tripura — were declared on March 2. The BJP alliance returned to power in Tripura and Nagaland and declared support for the NPP government in Meghalaya. These elections hold multiple messages in the run-up to 2024.
First, these elections have once again confirmed Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ability to win the support and faith of voters in non-traditional geographies. In 2014, the BJP won 90 per cent of its seats from 60 per cent of the country. In 2019, this geographical base increased further, and if the current trends stand, the social base of the support could increase in 2024. The reasons for this expansion are centred around PM Modi’s welfare push.
On the ground, Modi’s welfare schemes have improved the life of the marginalised. Whether it is the PM Awas Yojana reaching the far-flung areas of Tripura, or Har Ghar Jal reaching the tribal areas of Nagaland, these schemes have delivered visible change. This has helped the BJP go from being perceived as a “Hindi heartland” party to a pan-India one. Despite emotive tribal consolidation in favour of TIPRA Motha (which, electorally, hurt the Left more than the BJP), the BJP was able to make minor dents among the Chakma and Tripuri tribes because of the impact of welfare schemes.
Any consolidation is followed by a subsequent counter-consolidation. So if the Debbarma tribe consolidated behind TIPRA Motha, the Bengali community counter-consolidated with the BJP. On a larger national level, this has also been the trajectory of secular and Hindutva politics in India. Modi’s welfare schemes coupled with rapid infrastructure development have provided the party with a winning combination. Anyone travelling from Guwahati to Shillong will see the widening of roads and anyone who has travelled to Tripura in the past will acknowledge the benefit of a direct daily flight between New Delhi and Agartala. Voters today observe and acknowledge these changes. This “vikas” helps Modi defy political alliances that look strong arithmetically ( INC- CPM, for example). In politics, chemistry is more important than arithmetic.
This brings me to the second takeaway from the three polls — the failure of the inorganic Congress-CPM alliance. Inorganic because when traditional rivals suddenly come together, it is looked at with suspicion among party workers. This is why erstwhile Congress workers moved towards the BJP in Tripura, the BJP-PDP alliance failed in Kashmir and similarly, in the past, the SP-BSP could not transfer votes to each other in UP. The index of opposition unity can only work when the votes of parties are complementary, not contradictory. The Congress and Left have fought each other for decades in Tripura. Their coming together will not “add” votes – it will deplete votes from either party. Similarly, the Left and TMC can never lead to “opposition unity” in Bengal, nor can the Congress and Left in Kerala. As long as one party in the opposition does not get triple-digit seats at a pan-India level, there can be no “opposition unity”.
Many say Congress can be the “pole of opposition unity”. This brings me to my third point – disillusionment with the Congress party. Winning 8/180 assembly seats in states that were earlier under its control is not an impressive feat. The Bharat Jodo Yatra might have rebranded Rahul Gandhi’s image in the eyes of some opinion makers, but there is no data to conclude that it has or can add votes for the Congress in future state elections, or the upcoming general election. The approach of the two parties (BJP and Congress) is poles apart. For instance, on March 3, Amit Shah was campaigning in Karnataka, while Rahul Gandhi was preparing for a lecture at Cambridge. Most voters vote for leaders first, and then for the party (not including the committed voter). When voters contrast Narendra Modi with any other opposition leader in 2024, there are chances that, with a bigger organisation than in 2019, Modi’s BJP may exceed its 2019 tally.
Lastly, these elections have further established the “woman” vote as one that swings elections. In Tripura, Modi’s welfare schemes helped the BJP get more women’s votes than any other party. Something similar happened in the 2019 general election and in UP in 2017, to name just two other examples. This trend is geography-agnostic. Across geographies, reading Jan Ki Baat poll data makes one conclude that women are driven to a party/leader that provides ease of living. Ideological reasons work more for men. For women, welfare is a more instrumental factor.
So, is 2024 a closed chapter? They say a week is a long time in Indian politics. Different state elections can, of course, throw up different results. However, if the results of the elections in the Northeast are extrapolated to the general election, the BJP has a decisive advantage in the 26 Lok Sabha seats from the region in 2024.
The writer, a psephologist and journalist, is founder, Jan Ki Baat
